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Abstract 
 
 There is a debate taking place within the global war on terror (GWT), and its legal and 
moral parameters are established by two basic arguments.  The first is that “Citizens who associate 
themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction 
enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague 
Convention and the law of war” (Ex parte Quirin, 37).  The second is that an “Enemy combatant” 
is a general category that subsumes two sub-categories: lawful and unlawful combatants.  The 
conclusion as it currently stands is that under international law only lawful combatants receive 
POW status and the protections of the Third Geneva Convention.  Unlawful combatants, on the 
other hand, do not receive POW status and do not receive the full protections of the Third Geneva 
Convention (Haynes 2002, 2).  Within the context and legal framework of the GWT nonstate actors 
may be treated differently from state actors when captured and interrogated (Haynes 2002, 2).  The 
legal framework finds its basis in international law, which in turn finds its moral basis in part on 
conditions of just war theory (JWT).  JWT requires combatants to possess legitimacy; to possess 
legitimacy a combatant must be a state actor; therefore, nonstate actors “do not receive Prisoner 
Of War status and do not receive the full protections of the Third Geneva Convention” (Haynes 
2002, 2). 
 
 My research question asks if JWT should be modified or abandoned in order to 
accommodate greater fairness toward armed nonstate actors, those individuals to whom we 
commonly refer, and legally define as terrorists?  For two reasons the answer to this question is 
yes: (i) man has an inherent value that is not recognized under JWT, and (ii) the utility of criminal 
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prosecutions for those engaged in political violence is higher relative to the desirability of the goal 
of greater peace, security, and stability. 
 
 To arrive at my conclusion I traced the evolution of the school of thought that makes up 
JWT and I analyzed its applicability to modern international relations – specifically international 
relations in the context of nonstate actors.  My analysis found that JWT is both still relevant in the 
twenty-first century and applicable to nonstate actors who challenge the modern state and 
international institutions with the use of force and JWT is not relevant in the twenty-first century 
and is thus inapplicable to nonstate actors who challenge both the modern state and international 
institutions with respect to the use of force.  Nevertheless, given the supposed goals of international 
law, the international community and specifically the U.S. ought to treat nonstate actors as 
criminals and prosecute them accordingly.  To engage in an ideological war like the GWT is to 
litigate anew the competing ideas of justice.  Finally, in critically thinking through the substance 
of the logical syllogisms that make up both JWT and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
I find JWT is simply not universally valid as it is neither a metaphysical truth nor a transcendental 
one; therefore, JWT is important only insofar as it is understood to be but one way of seeing the 
world, not the universally correct way.   
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Chapter One: 
 
Introduction 
 
An “enemy combatant” is an individual who, under the laws and customs 
of war, may be detained for the d 
uration of an armed conflict.  In the current conflict with al Qaida and the 
Taliban, the term includes a member, agent, or associate of al Qaida or the 
Taliban.  In applying this definition, the United States government has acted 
consistently with the observation of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Ex parte Quirin (1942): “Citizens who associate themselves with the 
military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and 
direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents 
within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.” 
“Enemy combatant” is a general category that subsumes two sub-
categories: lawful and unlawful combatants.  Lawful combatants receive 
prisoner of war (POW) status and the protections of the Third Geneva 
Convention.  Unlawful combatants do not receive POW status and do not 
receive the full protections of the Third Geneva Convention (Haynes 2002, 
1). 
 The foregoing argument, made by William Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of 
Defense, under President George W. Bush, in a widely disseminated memorandum, provides both 
the legal and intellectual justification for why nonstate actors, in the context of the global war on 
terror (GWT), may be treated differently from state actors when captured and interrogated.1  In 
                                               
1 If they are state actors they are entitled to the protection of both the laws of war and the international legal system.  
If they are nonstate actors a series of federal court cases have rendered those nonstate actors being held in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba (GTMO) subject to indefinite detention with little recourse.  In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court of 
the United States (SCOTUS) held the writ of habeas corpus was applicable at GTMO (Boumediene v. Bush 2008).  
The writ of habeas corpus, as guaranteed by the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, holds “The Privilege 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it” (Boumediene v. Bush 2008).  However, Boumediene made no mention of the Due Process Clause, 
which reads “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”  
Consequently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, after Boumediene, held the writ of habeas corpus had limited 
application with respect to detention, (See, e.g., Maqaleh v. Hagel 2013 and Kiyemba v. Obama 2009).  The D.C. 
Circuit refused to extend due process rights to extraterritorial challenges based on habeas petitions by holding “[T]he 
due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States.” 
(Kiyemba v. Obama 2009).  The D.C. Circuit also enforced the distinction articulated in the Military Commissions 
Act (MCA).  While the MCA restored federal habeas jurisdiction it revoked jurisdiction over “any other action . . . 
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement” of detainees (Military 
Commission Act 2012 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2012)).  In effect, argues Stephen Vladeck in The DC Circuit After 
Boumediene, the DC Circuit rendered the Boumediene decision meaningless (2011). 
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short, the argument is as follows: International law is based in part on the conditions of just war 
theory; just war theory requires combatants to possess legitimacy; to possess legitimacy a 
combatant must be a state actor; therefore, nonstate actors “do not receive Prisoner Of War status 
and do not receive the full protections of the Third Geneva Convention” (Haynes 2002, 1). 
 This basic argument gives rise to my research question: to what extent should just war 
theory (JWT) be modified in order to accommodate greater fairness toward armed nonstate actors, 
those individuals commonly, and legally, defined as terrorists?  This is important because the 
twenty-first century sees mankind facing not only challenges at an accelerated pace relative to 
times past, but also challenges that were simply inconceivable in centuries past.  I believe we are 
in the midst of what Samuel Huntington referred to as a clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993, 
22).  Also, modern weapons of mass destruction (WMD) render the potentiality of massive 
destruction increasingly probable given the ever-present possibility that individuals not acting on 
behalf of a state will come to possess WMD and use them against a state, which could lead to a 
retaliatory response and a full-scale2 military conflict.  In an attempt to deal with these individual 
nonstate actors, states have responded in ways that range from imprisoning individuals suspected 
of engaging in terrorism to holding them indefinitely without charge or trial to torturing prisoners 
and killing suspects.3  Moreover, those individuals who have been tortured, assassinated, or both 
                                               
 
Nevertheless, in Aamer v. Obama (2014), a case brought in an attempt to enjoin force-feeding of detainees engaging 
in hunger strikes, the D.C. Circuit held a habeas suit is permissible if challenging the conditions in which detainees 
are confined.  Ultimately the detainees’ claim, argued on the merits, was unsuccessful.  This has created a situation 
whereby noncitizen detainees may challenge their detention if they argue a violation of the due process clause, rather 
than an outright habeas corpus violation. 
2 The current president of the U.S. has actually advocated that the U.S. “wipe out” certain countries, and kill the entire 
families of individuals suspected of terrorism.  It should be noted that either course of action would constitute a war 
crime. 
3 I emphasize the word suspects as in several well known cases governments have not proven the guilt of those 
assassinated and have instead expected the public to accept their pronouncements. 
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are deemed to be outside the protection of law as they are deemed to lack proper political authority.  
It is this reality that provides the backdrop for my research question: to what extent should JWT 
be modified in order to accommodate greater fairness toward armed nonstate actors, those 
individuals commonly, and legally, defined as terrorists?  In answering this question I examine 
whether JWT is relevant in the modern world as a moral guideline for states wishing to engage in 
military conflict either with other states or with nonstate actors. 
 In answering these questions I trace the evolution of JWT, as well as analyze its 
applicability to states generally, and nonstate actors specifically.  Ultimately, my analysis finds 
three answers to the question of whether JWT is applicable to nonstate actors who challenge both 
the modern state and international institutions with respect to the use of force.  The first answer is 
yes: JWT is relevant in the twenty-first century.  The second answer is no: JWT is not relevant in 
the twenty-first century. The third answer is JWT is not universally valid; therefore, it is important 
only insofar as it is understood to be but one way of seeing the world, not the universally correct 
way.  My conclusion that there are three answers does not belie an attempt to equivocate or a 
reticence on my part to reach a definitive conclusion.  Instead, my three answers are a response to 
the fundamental problem with JWT’s underlying conceptual and philosophical foundation. 
Importance of Research Question 
 Understanding the extent to which JWT should be either modified, or abandoned entirely, 
in order to accommodate greater fairness toward armed nonstate actors, or terrorists is both a 
practically important topic and a theoretically important topic.  It is the exploration of ideas, which 
is crucial because practically the implementation of an international law based on JWT is resulting 
in cruel and inhumane treatment of individuals and the continued fracturing of an increasingly 
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culturally divided global community.  Several examples of this are widely known: the indefinite, 
incommunicado detainment of individuals at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the 
degrading and inhumane treatment of individuals at Abu Ghraib prison; the kidnapping, rendering 
to CIA-affiliated black sites, and torturing of persons like Khaled El-Masri for interrogation 
purposes; and the U.S. targeted assassination program, which has already resulted in the deaths of 
many foreign nationals and at least three U.S. citizens, most notably Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16-
year-old son.4  All of this, and more, is possible because the U.S. has decided anyone designated 
an enemy combatant is “not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, the Torture 
Convention and other laws against cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, or even torture” 
(Martin and Onek 2004, 15).  Although such treatment is deemed permissible because unlawful 
enemy combatants are not entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions and therefore not 
entitled to any of the legal protections of the Geneva Conventions against torture or cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment (Haynes 2002, 2; Martin and Onek 2004, 15), the legal 
conclusions that support such treatment actually stem from unilateral determination by the U.S. 
that unlawful enemy combatants are illegitimate, nonstate actors (Haynes 2002, 2; Martin and 
Onek 2004, 15).  As I will demonstrate below, the question of legitimacy is directly tied to an 
element of JWT, namely, proper political authority.  One who possesses proper political authority 
is deemed to be a legitimate actor under JWT.  On the other hand, one who does not is not. 
                                               
4 The GWT now effects U.S. domestic law in that American citizens may now be targeted for assassination in clear 
violation of the constitutional protections afforded all American citizens by the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution.  Attorney General Eric Holder, at Northwestern University School of Law, on Monday, 
March 5, 2012, argued “[w]hether the capture of a U.S. citizen terrorist is feasible is a fact-specific, and potentially 
time-sensitive, question… In that case, our government has the clear authority to defend the United States with lethal 
force.”  To that end, according to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), it is impossible to know how many 
Americans have been targeted for assassination because the list is secret.  While speaking to the Washington Times, 
in response to a question about the procedures used to order lethal strikes against U.S. citizens abroad, White House 
Terrorism advisor John Brennan, on Thursday, June 24, 2010, suggested that "dozens of U.S. persons who are in 
different parts of the world" were "very concerning."  Again, because of the secret nature of the so-called kill list it is 
unclear how many American citizens are on the kill list or have been killed. 
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 This is problematic given the largely subjective nature of an individual country’s foreign 
policy.  The application of a JWT-based foreign policy is problematic because JWT is ultimately 
vague, incoherent, and suspect given the power dynamics within international relations.  This leads 
to divergence at the international level.  For example, the decision that unlawful enemy combatants 
are illegitimate nonstate actors, as determined by the United States, is consistent with JWT but 
contravenes international opinion insofar as the international community believes that the meaning 
and requirements of international law are different from that understood by the U.S.  This is 
problematic for if every country were to engage in similar behavior, it would undermine the 
explicit purposes of the United Nations Charter as set forth in the Charter’s preamble, and arguably 
international law itself.  Functionally, on one side of the debate is the U.S., initially in the form of 
individuals such as Jay Bybee,5 John Yoo,6 and Alberto Gonzales.7  On the other side is the 
international community in the form of organizations such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), ad hoc tribunals, and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  Assuming the 
goals of greater global unity and less violence, the world in the twenty-first century is now too 
interconnected to leave 195 sovereign countries to determine for themselves whether individuals 
                                               
5 Jay Bybee is a federal judge currently serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and a 
Senior Fellow in Constitutional Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  While serving in the Bush administration 
as the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice, he signed the 
controversial "Torture Memos" in August 2002. 
6 John Yoo is currently a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley.  He is best known for his opinions 
concerning the Geneva Conventions that attempted to legitimize the United States’ GWT.  He also authored the 
“Torture Memos,” which concerned the use of what the Central Intelligence Agency euphemistically called enhanced 
interrogation techniques, which included waterboarding (simulated drowning).  Mr. Yoo also advised the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the United States Department of Defense, and the president on the use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques: mental and physical torment and coercion such as prolonged sleep deprivation, binding in stress positions, 
and waterboarding.  The memos stated that such acts, widely regarded as torture, which were used in the systematic 
torture of detainees at Guantanamo Bay detention camp beginning in 2002 and at the Abu Ghraib facility following 
the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, might be legally permissible under an expansive interpretation of 
presidential authority during the "War on Terror". 
7 Alberto Gonzales is presently Dean of Belmont University College of Law.  His tenure as U.S. Attorney General 
was marked by controversy regarding warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens and the legal authorization of 
"enhanced interrogation techniques" (i.e., generally acknowledged as constituting torture), in the U.S. government's 
post-9/11 "war on terrorism." 
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are entitled to the protection of law.  Instead, what is needed is greater adherence to a more uniform 
perspective that governs the behavior of states and individuals alike.  This unifying perspective is 
being developed and increasingly provided by a more universal ideological standard, which is 
increasingly becoming a universal legal standard: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).  While presently largely aspirational, which is to say it is not legally binding, at its core 
the UDHR sets forth and rearticulates procedural requirements that act as safeguards for 
individuals accused of committing a crime at the international level.  In a sense the UDHR 
supplements the mandate of the UN’s charter, “sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war” (United Nations Charter 1945, 2). 
 As a result of the GWT and the manner in which it is being carried out with respect to 
nonstate actors, the last few years have witnessed a reconsideration regarding how individuals may 
be treated under international law.  Among other places we see this playing out in the judicial 
branch of the U.S., the various judicial arms of the international community, and quasi-legal 
organizations such as the ICRC, etc.  On one side are those who do not see as problematic the ways 
in which nonstate enemy combatants are being treated.  They adhere to the state actor vs. nonstate 
actor distinction of JWT (i.e., proper political authority) and by implication all that follows.  On 
the other side are those who embrace the ongoing change in international law – a change toward 
what they see as a more humane treatment of individuals in general, regardless of their status 
within the JWT framework.  In evaluating both arguments I undertake a jurisprudential analysis,8 
a theoretical analysis, of the interconnectedness of JWT and international law in a very narrow 
sense as products of both moral and political philosophy.  Lastly, I ultimately argue in favor of a 
                                               
8 I undertake an analytical jurisprudence as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (7th edition): A method of legal study 
that concentrates on the logical structure of law, the meanings and uses of its concepts, and the terms and the modes 
of its operation. 
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practical, less subjective development of an international law toward a procedurally sound9 
perspective and against any future adherence to the JWT with respect to fighting terrorism. 
 
Approach 
 My approach is qualitative in nature.  I trace the theoretical lineage of JWT and examine 
international law in order to better understand the implications of the integration of JWT and 
international law as well as their respective impact on the treatment of nonstate actors.  The 
examination of law is within the context of law as written and understood by national legislative 
bodies10 and international institutions,11 practiced by national and international lawyers, and 
adjudicated by national courts, international courts, and ad hoc tribunals.  With respect to JWT, I 
demonstrate that it leads to what I argue is “inhumane”12 treatment of nonstate actors.  To arrive 
at this conclusion, I describe the predominant JWT, as followed by the West, mainly the U.S., and 
I explore its provenance as predominantly, if not originally, a Christian ideology in order to better 
understand the origin of and justification for both the theory as a whole and its individual elements.  
Finally, I examine the consequences of JWT within the ongoing GWT given that the Bush Doctrine 
is now the ideological cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, unchanged by President Barack Obama 
(Obama) through two terms and thus far unchanged by Donald Trump (Trump) who has given no 
indication that he will change it given that (i) he has largely turned over tactical decision making 
to his military commanders, and (ii) he gave a speech at the UN that indicates a willingness to 
                                               
9 “Procedurally sound” in the sense of procedural fairness.  I advocate adhering to a system that ensures all accused 
are provided with an opportunity to air their grievances.  The current system, which essentially focuses on the 
“outcome” of the matter, as a war, is problematic as it requires an exploration of right and wrong within both a 
historical and a philosophical (natural law) context. 
10 E.g., the Laws of Armed Conflict. 
11 The ICRC, for example, as a quasi-legal institution that oversees the implementation of international law supervises 
the maintenance of legal standards. 
12 It is important to note that what is and is not considered inhumane is a fluid concept subject to change over time. 
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wantonly violate international law should Trump believe it necessary to do so.13  Trump recently 
released his National Security Strategy Memorandum, which makes clear that he will in no way 
reverse the “America First” policy initiated by President George W. Bush.14  I then examine the 
relevant international law (i.e., international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and 
international criminal law), juxtaposing and comparing my examination and analysis of JWT to 
my examination and analysis of international law as procedural due process.  In the final analysis 
I argue in favor of rejecting the former and embracing the latter. 
Just War Theory 
 In attempting to both limit aggression and protect innocent men and women, JWT sets forth 
six elements that must be satisfied before war is deemed morally permissible.  These elements are 
(i) just cause, (ii) right intent, (iii) proper authority, (iv) political proportionality, (v) chance of 
success, and (vi) last resort.  Once undertaken, JWT’s jus in bello contains two additional elements: 
(i) military proportionality and (ii) military discrimination.  The basic idea is that the decision to 
engage in warfare will be inextricably and demonstrably tied to the ultimate goals of peace and 
security, and not mere subterfuge, pretext, or pretense to achieve one’s own personal goals.  And, 
once undertaken, military force will be applied surgically and not indiscriminately in order to use 
just enough force required to attain peace and security, minimizing the amount of damage to 
                                               
13 Speech given by Donald Trump to the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2017. 
14 Donald Trump recently gave speech at the United Nations on September 25, 2018 in which he said, “As far as 
America is concerned, the ICC has no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no authority. The ICC claims near-universal 
jurisdiction over the citizens of every country, violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process. We will 
never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy.”  If one looks at this from 
the standpoint of the United States, it makes perfect sense as America already claims for itself universal jurisdiction 
over the citizens of every country, violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process while perhaps not 
subjecting the world to a global bureaucracy but an American one. 
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property and loss of life in pursuing those goals.  In short, JWT is used when protecting and 
preserving a state. 
 In examining the GWT, as constrained or governed by JWT, considering the fact that the 
ideological motivations that make up the Bush Doctrine are the motivating forces driving U.S. 
foreign policy, I not only call into question the U.S.’s motivation as just cause, but also reexamine 
the utility of the theory as a theoretical model given the increasingly globalized nature of 
international relations and the inevitable clash of different cultures.  The desirability of the 
consequences of its implementation is being reconsidered.  This reconsideration can be seen as an 
attempt to clarify the legal and philosophical difficulties involved in conducting any operations to 
end terrorism, as the GWT is purported to be. 
 As stated above, the main factor giving rise to this reconsideration has been the American-
led response to the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the forms of the Bush Doctrine and 
the GWT, and its treatment of individuals captured on the “battlefield.”15  This military action 
brought to the surface the legal distinctions between state and nonstate actors; however, and I 
believe more importantly, the manner in which this military action is being conducted brings to 
the surface the subjective nature of JWT and therefore many of its theoretical problems.  The very 
fact that this reconsideration is taking place, and seems to be gaining momentum within the 
national and international judiciary, is in itself proof that there is disagreement as to what rules 
should be brought to bear on such legal and moral considerations.  Nevertheless, equally true is 
                                               
15 The U.S. now argues that the battlefield is global, which includes the domestic homeland of the U.S.  An argument 
has been made that depending on the circumstances the U.S. military can be used to fight terrorism on the continental 
U.S. and not simply overseas in direct contravention of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. 
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that while this debate is not necessarily evidence of the desire for greater theoretical and legal 
coherence, it is certainly evidence of a lack of theoretical and legal coherence. 
 At present, the U.S., in the form of Jay Bybee, John Yoo, and Alberto Gonzales, is arguing 
that the requirement of legitimacy, proper political authority, as a function of JWT, provides a 
sufficient standard with respect to whether a captured individual is entitled to various protections 
under the law.  This is problematic for two reasons: (i) the consequences of the implementation of 
this standard are widely condemned as unacceptable as this antiquated tradition of thought is being 
used to justify the absence of legal protections under the law, which in turn allows for almost 
anything with respect to the treatment of nonstate actors; and, as stated, (ii) JWT as understood by 
the U.S. is not the only version of just war, which means that the practice of allowing, or simply 
tolerating, individual countries to implement their own conception of JWT will likely undermine 
the international legal order itself.  JWT, as understood in the U.S., was first articulated by St. 
Augustine.  It was later elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas and other Western Christian 
philosophers.  But the theory was developed into its modern form after both Francisco de Vitoria 
and Hugo Grotius began to remove it from under the auspices of a Christian God and secularized 
it.  Since Grotius, while there have been many more philosophers of JWT, there has been relatively 
little change to the basic structure of JWT – especially with respect to the notion of legitimacy of 
state actors and the illegitimacy of nonstate actors, vis-à-vis proper political authority, and the 
element of just cause.  For this reason, my tracing of the lineage of JWT largely concludes with 
Grotius. 
 As to the theory itself, JWT covers two aspects of war: (i) jus ad bellum, the initiation of 
war, and (ii) jus in bello, the permissibility of the actions one may undertake during it (Grotius 
[1625] 2005).  I address both but focus primarily on the former.  Although JWT has remained 
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largely unchanged since Grotius, what is deemed morally permissible regarding the treatment of 
human beings seems to have changed and continues to change.  As a result of 9/11 and the GWT, 
new questions are arising, and I believe old questions must be considered anew as I do not believe 
they have been satisfactorily answered, or, rather, what were once deemed satisfactory answers 
are no longer deemed as such.  For example, who has the right to wage war, and when?16  What 
targets are legitimate?  What is a state in the context of war?  May only states wage war, or do 
oppressed groups and individuals have that right?  If they do, are they bound by the same rules of 
noncombatant immunity as limit the behavior of state military?  In one form or another these 
questions, and a great many more, are being addressed with a sense of urgency as policy-makers 
try to adapt to the seemingly rapidly changing international legal, political, and moral environment. 
 From a practical perspective, because of the growing interconnectedness of international 
relations, at a minimum a cursory acknowledgment, if not an in-depth examination and 
consideration of the various just war traditions, is in order.17  To the extent that this century will 
witness greater conflict, and I believe that it will, it will likely witness it between groups of people 
whose understandings differ with respect to what constitutes a just cause for going to war, and who 
may in fact engage in armed conflict, among other issues of cultural and societal importance.  This 
is precisely the situation in the GWT.  For example, Osama bin Laden, as the founder, and now 
executed leader of al Qaeda, in his “Letter to America,” citing the Qur’ān, claims to have divine 
permission from Allah to initiate war because the Qur’ān says “[p]ermission to fight (against 
                                               
16 International law already applies to individuals in allowing them to rebel under certain instances.  In other words, 
the international community acknowledges that individuals are absolved of their “legal” allegiances to their state under 
certain conditions.  Even if the state itself disagrees, once absolved, however, they must comport their behavior to 
certain international legal standards. 
17 I do not endeavor to undertake an in-depth examination of the many different traditions as such an examination is 
not the purpose of this dissertation.  Instead I simply acknowledge that the literature is replete with precisely such 
examinations. 
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disbelievers) is given to those (believers) who are fought against, because they have been wronged 
and surely, Allah is able to give them (believers) victory” (Qur’ān 22:39 – parentheses addded).  
This one statement frames their struggle as one of both self-defense and defense of others.  Also, 
the concept of victory is altered in that victory need not be military victory.  It may be spiritual 
and religious, a victory to be enjoyed in the hereafter.  Bin Laden continued, stating the Qur’ān 
says “[t]hose who believe, fight in the Cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve, fight in the cause 
of Taghut (anything worshipped other than Allah, e.g. Satan).  So fight you against the friends of 
Satan; ever feeble is indeed the plot of Satan” (Qur’ān 4:76 – parenthesis added).  This one 
statement renders al Qaeda’s “resistance” squarely in the context of a religious war, and ultimately 
a battle between God and Satan, or good and evil.  When one considers that St. Augustine also 
cited a religious text, the Bible, when justifying his arguments we see that the disparity between 
texts, or rather the disparity between the interpretations of religious texts, can, and will, lead to 
problems.  More recently, but along a similar line of thought, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), wishes to return to the Caliph and return 
to the time of the Rashidun, a time when it believes Islam existed in its purest form.  ISIS follows 
the writings of Sayyid Qutb, who believes a return to the Caliph is necessary for there to be correct 
adherence to Allah and his word the Qur’ān.  While this is not self-defense there are similarities 
to be drawn with respect to bringing forth a city of God.  These are examples of religious casus 
belli.  Moreover, when President Bush declared the GWT to be a battle between “good and evil”18 
we can see that at a minimum he too was invoking the ideas of a transcendent morality of right and 
                                               
18 Remarks made by President George W. Bush at the commencement ceremony at West Point, United States Military 
Academy, June 1, 2002 (https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html) 
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wrong, and, at most he was framing this as a battle of the respective followers of God and Satan, 
similarly to bin Laden’s framing of the battle. 
 At the broader level, differing casus belli are argued by China and Russia, each of which 
has its own societal, political, cultural, and military traditions, any of which can provide the 
impetus for going to war.  If this is the case, then my research question is not simply one of 
academic concern.  It is of practical importance.  A greater understanding of the inadequacies and 
the limitations of JWT will demonstrate the preferable nature of the current development of 
international law. 
State of International Law 
 With respect to international law, the main focus of my research will be the current state 
of international law as defined and contained within international treaties and applied in practice 
by international lawyers, which is ultimately open to interpretation, point, counterpoint, argument, 
and counterargument, and adjudicated by justices of their respective institutions.  Because the 
purely theoretical, or academic, aspects of international law are ultimately of little value when 
standing before a state court judge, a federal court justice, a nation’s highest court, and a court or 
tribunal of international jurisdiction, I examine not only the philosophical aspects of law but, more 
importantly, the black-letter procedural questions of law.  To that end, it must be noted at the outset 
that the term “international law” is inherently vague.  International law includes everything from 
the law governing the delivery of mail to the laws governing war.  Again, for purposes of my 
dissertation international law is defined narrowly as that aspect of law that is practiced by 
international lawyers and interpreted by judges (themselves lawyers), and includes three main 
areas: (i) international humanitarian law (IHL), (ii) international human rights law (IHRL), and 
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(iii) international criminal law (ICL), as argued before a court or tribunal with the requisite legal 
jurisdiction.  These three areas constitute the relevant laws of war.19  A modern understanding of 
customary international law sees all three areas of international law moving in a direction where 
nonstate actors are both viewed and treated differently from the traditional approach required by 
JWT. 
 As for the philosophical questions, for the limited purpose of distinguishing international 
law from JWT, I am calling for a rethinking of questions such as: What is law?  What is the purpose 
of law?  Does the law consist of little more than procedure and rules?  Can anything at all be law?  
What, if anything, does law have to do with justice?  What, if anything, has the law to do with 
morality, or democracy?  What makes a law valid?  Does one have an unequivocal duty to obey 
the law, or may one be justified in breaking the law, if not morally obligated to break the law?  
And how far may one go if they are morally obligated to break the law?  I touch upon these 
questions in chapters 3 and 4 because I demonstrate that if the answers to these largely 
philosophical questions provide the foundational bases for whether someone is entitled to the 
protection of international law, one should fully expect discord and violence to follow as different 
philosophical and religious traditions have answered, do answer, and will answer these questions 
in different ways. 
 For example, while the GWT can be looked at as a response to 9/11, 9/11 can itself be 
partially viewed as a response to U.S. foreign policy (bin Laden 2002; DABIQ Issue 15, 30).  
Determining whether nonstate actors are entitled to legal protections under the framework of JWT 
                                               
19 The laws of war should not be confused with the law of armed conflict.  The laws of war are the body of law that 
exists at the international level, while the law of armed conflict is American law, both used within and enforced by 
the U.S. legal structure. 
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requires a preliminary assessment of the reasons for both parties engaging in their respective 
behavior.  In other words, a basic concern is whether a party is engaging in an act of aggression20 
while the other party is engaging in self-defense.  More to the point, these largely philosophic 
questions require that a determination be made with respect to who is right, which is at once a legal 
and a moral concern.  Making this determination necessarily requires an assessment of natural law, 
which is admittedly far beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Nevertheless, I do raise many 
questions to demonstrate that any belief in a transcendent natural law is incorrect and inherently 
unjustifiable. 
 These questions are important because while theoretical questions are at the very heart of 
jurisprudence and legal theory, an almost blind adherence to the traditional answers to these 
questions has resulted in both conceptual incoherence and a misguided pursuit of justice, 
mistakenly believed to be universal in its existence.  I firmly believe the answers to philosophical 
questions must be defended rationally, not speculatively.  With respect to rights, protections, and 
their corresponding duties and legal vulnerabilities, in the limited context of the law, humanity is 
better served by the international law shifting its focus from the state as its main unit of analysis 
toward the individual as the main focal point.  If we acknowledge that the international community, 
in the form of both courts and tribunals, and international non-profit non-governmental 
organizations, now accept, almost without question, that individuals have internationally legally 
recognizable individual rights by virtue of their humanity, not by virtue of their being citizens of 
a state, then we see that the predicate groundwork already exists.  We need only go a step farther. 
                                               
20 The International Criminal Court took jurisdiction over the crime of “aggression” on December 7, 2017.  The U.S. 
recognizes neither the crime of aggression nor the International Criminal Court. 
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 While the nation-state is the main actor at the level of international relations, I begin with 
an understanding that individual nonstate actors nevertheless have both rights and responsibilities 
under international law.  Consequently, the international community no longer balks at the idea 
that individuals are entitled to international rights under customary international law.  The 
corollary to this is also true.  Individuals are increasingly seen to have obligations to the 
international community that cannot be violated with legal impunity.21  This is so even when the 
law recognizes an individual as having broken away from a state.  This is quite clear under 
international law.  For example, international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, 
or war crimes will result in legal liability and legal accountability directly upon the individual.22  
And legal liability is not at all contingent upon whether individuals act through states or act as 
nonstate actors.  Legal liability attaches because of the nature of the act, not the character or the 
legal or political status of the actor.  In this way individuals are already bound by both customary 
and codified international law.  Evidence that this is so is a status of forces agreement (SOFA).  A 
SOFA is entered into between two states where one state promises to immunize from legal liability 
the military personnel of the other state.  These are required when the state providing the military 
personnel wishes not to have its personnel subject to prosecution under either national or 
international law.23  This is but one way of ensuring that American military personnel are not 
subject to prosecution under international criminal law.  A more drastic way is the American 
                                               
21 It should be noted that in some instances a party of the first part can be contractually absolved of having to abide by 
these obligations.  The party of the second part can sign what is known as Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which 
provides legal immunity to military personnel of the party of the first part. 
22 For example, Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon issued an order that asked British authorities to allow Henry Kissinger 
to be questioned while in London.  Judge Garzon wanted to interview Dr. Kissinger, who served as President Nixon’s 
Secretary of State, for his involvement in “Operation Condor.”  Operation Condor was a scheme by the dictatorships 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay that saw the persecution and execution of their respective political 
opponents. 
23 Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) are back in the news because National Security Advisor John Bolton has made 
it clear that no American citizen (soldiers) will ever be subject to arrest and prosecution at the ICC.  To make certain 
of this Mr. Bolton has said that he will seek additional SOFAs wherever American forces are located. 
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Service-Members’ Protection Act, which was voted into law on August 2, 2002.  This law has 
been dubbed the Hague Invasion Act due to the fact that the law calls for the use of force, up to 
and including invasion of The Hague, Netherlands, which it should be pointed out is a NATO 
country, a supposed steadfast ally in NATO.24 
 This development of the applicability of international law to nonstate actors has been rapid 
and sophisticated (Fassbender and Peters 2012).  A complex catalogue of crimes, as well as rules 
concerning individual responsibility and joint criminal enterprise, has developed under the 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone 
(2002), and Cambodia (2006).  As an example of the expanding nature of international law, 
individual criminal responsibility now clearly applies beyond the context of armed conflicts.  
Individual criminal responsibility now extends to crimes against humanity or genocide.  Moreover, 
in some cases, international criminal law has been used to prosecute the members of armed 
nonstate groups for treaty crimes such as torture and hostage-taking. 
 A deeper philosophical and legal question arises here.  Should nonstate actors be bound by 
international law?  And if so how?  International law has begun to deal with these issues.  In some 
sense nonstate actors already fall under jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; national 
jurisdictions, therefore, may very well have to evaluate legal liability under international legal 
norms.  Some recent U.S. judicial decisions have set down some parameters for what sort of 
violations by nonstate actors might result in international liability.  U.S. courts do not seem to 
demand a link to state action for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity to be 
considered justiciable violations of international law.  A recent court of appeals decision reviewed 
                                               
24 Human Rights Watch, "U.S.: 'Hague Invasion Act' Becomes Law". 3 August 2002. 
18 
 
the case law and recalled the jurisprudence that sees violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions as war crimes and mentions that “this standard applies to all ‘parties’ to a conflict … 
which includes military groups” (The Presbyterian Church of Sudan et al. v. Talisman Energy et 
al. 2008, 35). 
 It seems that the position argued by the Appeals Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court 
is gaining traction.  In 2004 the Special Court argued, “it is well settled that all parties to an armed 
conflict, whether states or nonstate actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even 
though only states may become parties to international treaties” (Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norma 
2004, 14).  If nonstate actors can be deemed to have obligations under international law, they ought 
to be deemed to have the protections afforded state actors under international law.  To do otherwise 
is not only inconsistent with the current progress and understanding of international law, but also 
quite simply counterproductive given our stated goals for the GWT. 
Conclusion 
 Finally, I conclude in chapter 5 that international law grounded by JWT, especially in the 
context of the GWT, is untenable insofar as it always requires an assessment of the philosophical 
merits of casus belli.  In other words JWT requires one to engage in an assessment of the deductive 
soundness of what are little more than appeals to natural law and religious argumentation seeking 
validation in and of God and thus justification for killing one’s enemies.  Lastly, I suggest that 
JWT applied to the American GWT is a confused endeavor, philosophically problematic because 
it essentially relies on the Bush Doctrine and therefore is destined to fail, certainly destined to 
neither halt nor prevent either further acts of terror or political violence.  Instead of the preventive 
posture of current U.S. foreign policy, driven by a desire for hegemony or global domination, 
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enforced by the military, the U.S. would be better served by simply acknowledging that the current 
fight against terrorism is simply a criminal matter and not a war.  Therefore, the time has come for 
JWT to be abandoned and replaced by the aspirational components of the UDHR, which is already 
delineated in various international legal institutions, where proper political authority is of no 
consequence and one’s humanity, not their political status, is recognized and protected. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
Just War Theory & Natural Law 
 
Introduction 
 JWT is widely acknowledged as having originated with St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo.  
In many respects, it is accurate to say his political writings are indeed the intellectual foundation 
of JWT.  However, while he may be credited with founding JWT, Augustine is but a part of the 
just war tradition.25  Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars is considered the best modern 
explanation of JWT.  In this work Walzer makes clear that JWT is not simply a European theory, 
nor is it a European tradition.  Walzer writes, “As long as men and women have talked about war, 
they have talked about it in terms of right and wrong”26 (Walzer 1977, 36).  This can be taken, in 
some sense, as an indication of a universal component of JWT.  That is to say, because we know 
that men and women throughout time have discussed, or at least considered, just war, it must be 
something inherent to the human condition.  In the chapters that follow I will demonstrate that it 
is universal in its subjectivity.  That is to say, the intuition appealed to by scholars since time 
immemorial hinted at a simple truth with respect to morality, it is universal in its existence and 
validity.  Ultimately that intuition was largely misunderstood by the great moral, political, and 
legal philosophers of the world. 
 I focus on the Western version of the theory within that tradition.  Also, given the role JWT 
plays with respect to international law I will trace its provenance in an attempt to better understand 
                                               
25 A JWT is a specific theory of what constitutes a just war while a just war tradition speaks to the notion that multiple 
theories can be created within a tradition of thinking and writing about what constitutes a just war. 
26 The full quote is, “for as long as men and women have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of right 
and wrong.  And for almost as long, some among them have derided such talk, called a charade, insisted that war lies 
beyond (or beneath) moral judgment.  War is a world apart, where life itself is at stake, where human nature is reduced 
to its elemental forms, where self-interest and necessity prevail.  Here men and women do what they must to save 
themselves and their communities, and morality and law have no place” (Walzer 1977, 36). 
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both the how and the why we came to have the system we have.  I will show that historically the 
very nature of warfare changes over time.  To that end it is important that we temporarily suspend 
our knowledge of JWT in the twenty-first century and read these writers on their own terms.  For 
example, JWT and international law in the twenty-first century have as their main goal the 
achievement and maintenance of peace – the cessation of violence.  War is supposedly thought of 
as an evil to be avoided if at all possible.27  This was not always the case with war.  For example, 
Augustine argued that a just war includes using the power of the state to kill heretics, thereby 
eliminating heresy, at least insofar as heretics refused to convert to Christianity.28  Nevertheless, 
before moving on to the theology, and the JWT of Augustine I address Cicero to demonstrate that 
Augustine’s JWT is based, at least in part, on Cicero’s conception of just war. 
Cicero and Augustine 
Cicero 
 In tracing the provenance of the Western version of JWT we begin with Cicero’s De 
Officiis.  The relevant sections of this work are Book 1, 1.33 - 40.  Cicero argues: 
11.33  Ultimately, our actions are limited.  We do not have carte blanche to do what 
we like to those who have wronged us. 
11.34  When it comes to a state in its external relations the state must strictly 
observe the rights of war and only then turn to the use of force as a last resort. 
11.35  Living in peace, unharmed, is the only justification for going to war.  Once 
war is commenced the state must conduct itself mercifully and with restraint.29 
                                               
27 See the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, which states, “We the people of the United Nations 
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, …have resolved to combine our efforts to 
accomplish these aims.” 
28 I demonstrate that ISIS/ISIL are doing/arguing precisely the same thing today. 
29 This clearly foreshadows the argument that comes later in history that both the reason for going to war, and the 
manner in which the war is carried out, once undertaken, must be just. 
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11.36  The reasons for both going to war and conducting one’s behavior are strictly 
defined and must be strictly adhered to. 
11.37  Cicero speaks to the legal status of soldiers. 
12.  One may treat their adversaries with some form of respect. 
12.38  Even wars of supremacy and glory must be initiated pursuant to the same 
just reasons set forth earlier. 
13.39  Individuals, even during the stresses of war, must behave with what today 
we would call integrity.  One must keep one’s word. 
13.40  One must keep one’s oath, keep one’s word. 
 What can be extrapolated from the foregoing is the following: (i) there are in fact certain 
duties that we owe even to those who have wronged us, (ii) there is a limit to retribution and to 
punishment, (iii) the only excuse for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed, (iv) we 
should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare, (v) we should 
always try to secure a peace that shall not admit of guile, (vi) we must show consideration for those 
conquered by force and those who have laid down their arms and pleaded for mercy,30 (vii) the 
man who is not legally a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe,31 and (viii) one must always 
keep his promise to an enemy for it is the spirit of the promise that must be honored, not simply 
the words.  In his Republic Cicero also writes, “Unjust wars are those that have been undertaken 
without cause.  That is to say, no just war can be waged except for the sake of avenging oneself or 
driving back enemies….  No war is held to be just unless it has been proclaimed, unless it has been 
declared, unless it concerns recovering property” (Cicero, On The Republic 3.25). 
 Along similar lines Augustine, writing in the fourth and fifth century, citing the Bible, 
Romans 13:4, argues that God permits the government the use of the sword.  Therefore, a Christian, 
                                               
30 This argument foreshadows the concept of a Prisoner of War, and their treatment while in captivity. 
31 This argument foreshadows the modern argument that nonstate actors are unlawful by definition as they are not 
soldiers, do not represent the state, and therefore are not entitled to legal protections. 
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if he is serving God and country, may be a soldier, take up arms and engage in violence when need 
be.  Romans 13:4 states, in relevant part: 
For he is the minister of God to thee for good.  But if thou do that which is 
evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of 
God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. 
This notwithstanding, Augustine’s rationale for his position is best described, and understood, by 
turning to many of his works. 
Augustine 
 As demonstrated in what follows, Cicero’s influence on Augustine is revealed by looking 
at Augustine’s explanation of JWT.  For example, there are three basic concepts used by Augustine 
in grounding his theory: (i) justice, (ii) eternal and temporal law, and (iii) the commonwealth.  
Augustine relies rather heavily on his conception of a commonwealth.  Moreover, there are two 
reasons upon which war can be initiated by a commonwealth: (i) to right a wrong, and (ii) to defend 
itself from attack.  Eternal law and temporal law are both instrumental here, as well. 
 Beginning with justice we see that this is a very broad concept.  It affects both someone’s 
internal makeup as well as someone’s environment.  That is to say, civic justice.  I believe that 
Augustine modeled his concept of justice on the example provided by Cicero.  Justice, for Cicero, 
in essence, is service to others.  It is basically a civic duty.  In De Officiis Cicero writes: 
The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, 
unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common 
possessions for the common interests, private property for their own….  But 
since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves 
alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; 
and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created 
for man’s use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they be 
able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow 
Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of 
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acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, 
and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man. 
(Cicero, De Officiis 1.7).  
Something between selflessness and selfishness in the performance of one’s civic duties, for 
Cicero, seems to be a close approximation of justice.  For a person to act justly, he must be 
operating for the well-being of others.  This behavior, this just behavior, is what fosters, and 
promotes, a healthy society.  In short, justice’s sole function is a social one.  
 In The City of God, Augustine defines justice as “… that virtue which gives to each his 
due” (Augustine, The City of God, XIX.21).  For Augustine, justice is reflected in how others are 
treated.  In other words, given civic duty, civic justice, justice is intimately connected to the 
treatment of others.  This, for Augustine, is false justice.  The only true justice is found in the city 
of God.  To state it plainly, for Cicero justice is found on Earth, but not for Augustine. 
 Augustine added something to his formulation of justice.  Because Augustine was a 
Christian, it is perfectly reasonable to expect his Christianity to influence his thinking.  According 
to Marcia Colish, Augustine’s belief that the moral value of a given act is largely derived from 
one’s internal disposition is entirely consistent with the notion that virtue is tied to an individual’s 
undertaking an act with proper moral intention, a view argued by Cicero (Colish 1989, 209).  
Augustine, we see, agrees with Cicero that virtue is internal to human beings and comes from right 
moral intentionality.  Augustine believes that God made human nature good.  Despite original sin, 
human nature is still good insofar as it exists.  It is simply less good than before.  After all, human 
beings are born with original sin.  Augustine writes: 
For it cannot give itself the justice which it has lost and no longer has, 
because the man received it when he was made, and by sinning has certainly 
lost it.  He receives justice, therefore, and on account of it he may merit to 
receive blessedness.  Wherefore the Apostle truly says to him who begins 
to boast as though it were from his own good: ‘For what has thou that thou 
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has not received?  And if thou hast received, why doest thou boast as though 
thou has not received it?’ (Augustine, On the Trinity XV.xv.21). 
What this means for Augustine is that humans fell from grace due to their original sin, disobeying 
God, and in so doing lost their innate capacity for perfect justice.  Therefore, to the extent that 
human beings have justice it is only due to God giving it to them.  By extension, Christians, the 
true and honest worshippers of God, are capable of exercising justice.32  Augustine writes: 
For if these are true virtues – and such cannot exist save in those who have 
true piety – they do not profess to be able to deliver the men who possess 
them from all miseries; for true virtues tell no such lies, but they profess 
that by the hope of the future world this life, which is miserably involved in 
the many and great evils of this world, is happy as it is also safe (Augustine, 
The City of God, XIX.iv). 
Augustine also writes, “For though the soul may seem to rule the body admirably, and the reason 
the vices, if the soul and reason do not themselves obey God, as God has commanded them to 
serve Him, they have no proper authority over the body and the vices” (Augustine, The City of 
God XIX.xxv).  At their core these passages stand for the proposition that one cannot expect to 
find true virtue in those who do not have true piety.  Therefore, true virtue can be found in those 
who have true piety.  For Augustine this means one thing, Christian piety.  On The Republic 3.27). 
 Despite this definitional difference, Augustine, like Cicero, asserts that justice is useful for 
social cohesion.  According to them both, however, justice is the external manifestation of internal 
virtue.  To remain consistent with his Christian beliefs Augustine simply substituted God for 
reason as internal virtue’s source.  Nevertheless, Cicero and Augustine seem to be in complete 
agreement in so far as the commonwealth has the right to either defend or avenge itself, and punish 
the offending party.  It should be noted that for Cicero and Augustine it matters not whether the 
                                               
32 This is an idea that plays an important role in Vitoria’s conception of international law even when Vitoria is 
purportedly secularizing justice, natural law, and creating international law. 
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offending party is from without or within the commonwealth.  An enemy of the commonwealth is 
subject to punishment, and when the commonwealth does punish the offending party the 
commonwealth is acting justly. 
 The temporal law can contain punishments for unjust acts, assuming the temporal law is 
based on, and consistent with, the eternal law.  Cicero and Augustine agree with the fact that for 
temporal law to be valid in this way it must be consistent with natural law.33  If it is, the temporal 
law is just.  If it is not, the temporal law is not.  Despite the agreement between the two men 
Augustine modified Cicero’s articulation of natural law in order to fit his Christian beliefs.  Cicero 
writes 
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its 
commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions.  And it does 
not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither 
have any effect on the wicked.  It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it 
allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish 
it entirely.  We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and 
we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or an interpreter of it.  
an there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws 
now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid 
for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and rule, that is, 
God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its 
enforcing judge.  Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and 
denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the 
worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered 
punishment (Cicero, The Republic 3.25).34 
In the final analysis reason is what is used to govern one’s actions.  Humans use reason to suppress 
vice, and in so doing humans produce virtue. 
                                               
33 It should be noted that Cicero is a skeptic about natural law. 
34 This idea is of paramount importance when Vitoria, and later, his student, Grotius, argue in favor of an international 
law based on Reason.  A similar notion is argued by John Locke with respect to the state of nature being governed by 
the law of nature, which is to say reason.  Nevertheless, despite the idea’s popularity it is ultimately wrong. 
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 From this passage, part of which was quoted earlier, we can clearly see some of the more 
important characteristics of natural law: (i) natural law is basically reason, (ii) it is universal in its 
application, for it applies to all human beings, (iii) reason, used correctly, is able to control vice 
and thus produce virtue, (iv) temporal law can, but should not, abrogate natural law, (v) it is 
accessible to all and needs no interpreters, and (vi) god created it.35  The sole focus of Cicero’s 
god is ensuring the universe remains in order.  This is markedly different from Augustine’s 
Christian God.  Cicero’s god has no need for worship from individuals, nor does he seek to 
maintain a personal relationship with each individual alive in the way that Augustine’s Christian 
God requires.  Augustine writes: 
I did not know that true interior justice, which judges not according to 
custom but by the most righteous law of almighty God.  By this law the 
customs of various regions and times were adapted to times and places.  But 
the law itself is everywhere and always the same; it is never one thing in 
one place and different in another (Augustine, Confessions III.vii.13) 
However, Augustine does not believe that humans have access to the natural law on their own.  
That is to say, human beings cannot discover natural law.  Augustine believes for one to gain 
knowledge of the eternal law they must first receive divine illumination.  To put it simply, in so 
far as natural law is concerned, humans cannot understand it unless God wants them to.  
Nevertheless, both Cicero and Augustine agree that the natural law emanates from God and thus 
requires human beings to submit to natural law, and by extension, to God.  They disagree, however, 
on what submission meant.  While the nuances of the definitions of submission are not necessarily 
relevant to my dissertation, for Augustine, submission to the natural law has spiritual implications.  
That is to say, submission, or obedience, to the natural law, and thus to God, benefited a person in 
so far as it brought them ever closer to the ultimate spiritual goal.  Moreover, before one can 
                                               
35 It should be noted that God, for Cicero, is not the Judeo-Christian God.  Cicero died prior to Christianity’s 
emergence. 
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understand the relationship between justice and natural law one must first understand the 
relationship between justice and temporal law – laws created by humans.  Ideally, the temporal 
law ought to be based on the natural law. 
 Augustine believes that while the temporal law ought to reflect the natural law, the two are 
not equivalent.  In On Free Will Augustine argues, “There is nothing just or legitimate in temporal 
law save what men have derived from the eternal law” (2006 [387-395], 121)  The extent that the 
temporal law is valid at all depends entirely on the extent to which it is consistent with the eternal 
law.  In other words, temporal laws are subject to the space and time of their creation while the 
natural law is immutable and transcends space and time.  In short, the natural law is the same 
everywhere, and always.  Therefore, to reiterate, to the extent the temporal laws are consistent with 
the natural law they are valid.  When the temporal law is at variance with the natural law it is 
invalid.36 
 In Augustine’s JWT, the idea of the commonwealth plays an important role as well.  In 
fact, for both Cicero and Augustine the concept of a commonwealth rests on natural law, temporal 
law, and justice.  Here also Augustine looks to Cicero for his conception of the commonwealth.  
As with the ideas already discussed, Augustine seems to have simply modified Cicero’s concept 
to fit Christianity. 
 In The Republic, Cicero writes (through Africanus): 
So then, a republic is a “thing” of a people.  A people, however, is not every 
assemblage of human beings herded together in whatever way, but an 
assemblage of a multitude united in an agreement about right and in the 
sharing of advantage.  The first cause of this assembling, however, is not so 
much weakness as a certain natural herding together, so to speak, of human 
                                               
36 These ideas, essentially shared by Cicero and Augustine, foreshadow the argument to come, namely that of St. 
Thomas Aquinas. 
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beings.  For this species is not solitary, nor does it wander alone, but it has 
been begotten so that not even with an abundance of all things (Book I, 39) 
I believe Cicero’s implication is clear.  He is arguing that commonwealth needs justice.  
Essentially, Cicero believes that a commonwealth cannot exist without justice.  In fact, for Cicero, 
the viability of a commonwealth is predicated on two important characteristics without which the 
commonwealth perishes: (i) a just temporal law under which people agree to live, and (ii) the 
reciprocal nature of justice – that is to say, people behave justly toward one another. 
 In The City of God Augustine, along the same line as Cicero, writes that nothing is more 
injurious to a republic than injustice, or the lack of justice.  In fact injustice places the very 
existence of the republic at risk.  Essentially, Augustine agrees with Cicero.  For Augustine, like 
Cicero, a commonwealth is, at its foundation, but a group of people living under a temporal law 
for the benefit of all.  To do otherwise is to live under a form of government that is anything but a 
commonwealth as both he, and Cicero, agreed that a commonwealth requires justice.  Without 
justice it is not a commonwealth but something else.  To this point, Augustine, in one of his most 
famous lines in Book IV of The City of God, asks rhetorically, “Justice being taken away, then, 
what are kingdoms but great robberies?” (Book 4.4) 
 Augustine Christianizes Cicero’s idea of a commonwealth so that it may fit Christianity, 
implying that a function of a just commonwealth is the punishment of vice.  A just commonwealth 
assists humans in curbing their propensity toward sin – a propensity that is partly due to original 
sin and humanity’s fall from grace.  Augustine believes that God provides humans with at least 
the ability to produce virtue. 
 God, argues Augustine, has endowed humanity with political systems so as to help 
humanity keep the peace.  In other words, through the use of laws and punishment, government 
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guides humans.  Therefore, the main purpose of a commonwealth, according to Augustine, is to 
restrain humans and indirectly guide them toward salvation in the hereafter where humans can 
then enjoy eternal life.37 
 Augustine, while accepting the notion that a commonwealth affords humans with a way of 
achieving the common good, ultimately believes that these are but means to an end.  Eternal life, 
not peace is the end to be sought.  Having explained the concepts of justice, the natural law, the 
temporal law, and the commonwealth, and connections of those concepts to one another, we can 
now look to their connections to JWT.  With respect to preserving the state, Cicero argues that a 
just war is permissible in order to defend the commonwealth and to achieve its goal of establishing 
a peace that benefits all.  Moreover, the commonwealth could undertake a just war in order to 
preserve its honor and to protect its citizens.  Essentially, a commonwealth could punish a 
wrongdoer.  Moreover, the commonwealth could undertake a just war for no other reason than to 
ensure its own survival, for how can a commonwealth that no longer exists perform the 
aforementioned functions? 
 Augustine makes clear that the war is a means to an end, the end being securing peace so 
as to allow for the welfare of the humans living in the commonwealth.  JWT, for Augustine, begins 
with a variation of justice that was different from that of Cicero.  Where Cicero sees justice as a 
civic virtue that ultimately serves the interests of the people in a given commonwealth to be treated 
honestly and fairly, Augustine adds the concepts of God’s grace and divine illumination.  Because 
of the special nature of Christians it is their responsibility to afford the opportunity to others to be 
                                               
37 For Augustine a commonwealth without a Christian God may be possible; however, only a commonwealth with a 
Christian God, which God has blessed with divine illumination, can ever understand natural law, and thus reach its 
full potential. 
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virtuous in a manner consistent with Christianity.  This is achieved by either one of two ways: 
conversion or compulsion.  Here, though the ends may differ, for Cicero and Augustine the means 
are similar.  That is to say, both men believe that it is permissible for men in positions of political 
power to compel individuals to live virtuously.  For Cicero that means in the humanistic sense.  
For Augustine it means Christian beliefs.38 
 Because Augustine believes the purpose of a commonwealth is the spiritual health of its 
people he believes that a commonwealth can justly engage in war so as to ensure its own survival.  
Augustine extends the similar argument made by Cicero to serve a Christian purpose.  That is to 
say, Augustine sees threats to a commonwealth existing in two possible forms: an external threat, 
and an internal threat.  The external threat is obvious.  The internal threat is more interesting for 
my purpose.  As we have already seen, a commonwealth is incapable of survival if it is devoid of 
justice.  Therefore, any citizen who is allowed to live without God, or Christianity, which is 
necessary to live justly, is by definition living unjustly.  Such a citizen poses a threat to the 
commonwealth itself, for the unjust citizen may come to corrupt virtuous citizens.  That is to say, 
the unjust citizen may exert an unjust influence on just citizens.  This is how Augustine viewed 
non-Christians.39 
 Both Cicero and Augustine seem to be in agreement on this score.  Consequently, Cicero 
and Augustine seem to agree that a course of action is required when the commonwealth is dealing 
with internal threats.  Once exposed, the internal threat has the two options mentioned earlier: (i) 
                                               
38 This is an interesting point because the only way Augustine can claim this is permissible for Christianity but not for 
Islam, or Judaism, or any other religion is if Augustine, in fact, believes Christianity is the one true religion holding a 
monopoly on truth, which he does.  The problem is when scholars from the other faiths claim precisely the same 
monopoly for their faiths how does one determine who is right? 
39 This, in some respects, is how some followers of Islam view non-Muslims. 
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voluntarily live according to justice, or (ii) be forced to live according to justice.  For Augustine, 
this means compelling an individual to live pursuant to and consistent with Christianity. 
 Augustine’s argument for religious coercion is absolutely important to his JWT.  As I will 
explore below, Augustine took Cicero’s ideas of a commonwealth and a just war and reconfigured 
them so as to serve as justification for religious coercion against Donatists.  This is a crucial 
difference with Cicero despite seeming similar to Cicero’s allowance for a commonwealth to 
compel citizens to live justly.  Cicero, however, is arguing for justice in the context of social 
justice.  Augustine took what was an end for Cicero, namely social justice, and converted it into a 
means to a different end altogether, the commonwealth’s temporal welfare, which serves the end 
of spiritual well-being. 
 As mentioned above, Augustine believes that a Christian commonwealth should be willing 
to not only defend itself, but to punish sinners.  For a Christian to be in compliance with Romans 
13:4 Augustine believes an inward disposition is required.  Why someone engages in specific 
behavior is crucial.  In other words a given act done for the wrong reasons can be an unjust act.  
To that end, a Christian who remains passive when confronted with a grave wrong, a wrong that 
threatens the commonwealth, and its function, as described above, is committing a sin.  In The City 
of God Augustine writes: 
They who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in 
conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public 
justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death 
wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, 
“Thou shalt not kill.” (Book 1, 21). 
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Aquinas 
 In discussing Thomas Aquinas we see that while, in a sense, he largely continued the 
Augustinian tradition, he increased its precision, and, in so doing, according to Alexander 
Moseley, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP), Aquinas ultimately became the model 
upon which “later Scholastics and Jurists … expand[ed] … and gradually … universalize[d] 
beyond Christendom – notably, for instance, in relations with the peoples of America following 
European incursions into the continent” (http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/).  Moseley continues, 
“[t]he most important of these writers are: Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), Francisco Suarez 
(1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704), Christian Wolff (1679-
1754), and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767)” (http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/).  Aquinas seems to 
ask one central question with regard to JWT: Is waging war always sinful?  In the Summa 
Theologiae, specifically in questions 40 and 41, he sets out to answer the question (IIa IIae Q40-
41). 
 To begin with, in question 40 Aquinas sets forth the criteria that must be satisfied for a war 
to be considered just.  Aquinas writes, “There are three requisites for a war to be just.  The first 
thing is the authority of the prince by whose command the war is to be waged” (Question 40, 
Article 1).  This is to say that private individuals are not free to wage war, because they have 
recourse to a state’s judicial system when they have a grievance that needs addressing.  The second 
requisite is a just cause, so that they who are assailed should deserve to be assailed for some fault 
that they have committed (Question 40, Article 1).  Aquinas believes that there must be culpability 
on the part of those who are being targeted with aggression.  They must have injured the assailing 
party in some way, thereby making the actions of the assailing party just.  In other words, according 
to John Finnis (Finnis), in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), “[o]nly public authority 
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can punish or rightly engage in war …” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas-moral-political/ 
, 22).  Finnis continues, “[p]rivate persons can never rightly intend precisely to harm or kill, though 
they can knowingly bring about harm or death as a proportionate side-effect of intending to block 
an attack,” as in the case of defending oneself from an attack or potential homicide 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas-moral-political/ , 22).  This is an important distinction 
for Aquinas as he believes that proper intention is of paramount importance and only he, the prince, 
who is charged with protecting the public welfare can “rightly intend to kill (or injure) in the 
exercise of their duty to suppress the attacks of criminals, pirates, and other public or private 
enemies” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas-moral-political/ , 22).  This segues to the third 
requirement: a right intention of promoting good or avoiding evil (Question 40, Article 1).  Here 
the intention behind the decision to go to war must be a good intention in itself.  Moseley explains, 
“[w]hether the act be good or evil depends on the end.  The ‘human reason’ pronounces judgment 
concerning the character of the end.  It is, therefore, the law for action.  Human acts, however, are 
meritorious in so far as they promote the purpose of God and his honor” 
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/aquinas-iep/#SH2b , 4). 
 Aquinas seems to find that waging war is not only not sinful, it is permitted, if not 
sanctioned by Christianity.  In support of his conclusion Aquinas cites Augustine, who argues: 
If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary 
advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their 
arms, and to give up soldiering altogether.  On the contrary, they were told: 
‘Do violence to no man … and be content with your pay’ (LK. 3.14).  If he 
commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering” 
(Question 40, Article 1). 
 Interestingly, this is not Aquinas’ only reference to Augustine.  Given his constant 
references to Augustine it is quite clear from whom Aquinas drew his inspiration for his conception 
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of JWT.  But here Aquinas enhances Augustine’s original formulation.  Aquinas argues that if 
warfare satisfies three conditions it will not be sinful: (i) proper authority, (ii) just cause, and (iii) 
right intention.  If we look at each in turn we see that Aquinas is the first to formalize the three 
main principles of JWT and give them important philosophical explanation.  Moreover, these three 
elements have been addressed and developed over the years. 
Proper Authority 
 Proper authority, at its essence, speaks to the underlying issue of who may engage in armed 
conflict (Hensel 2008, 42).  Historically, during the time in which Cicero was alive and writing, 
Rome had rather comprehensive laws governing war.  A formal declaration was required by the 
College of Fetials.  This formal declaration set forth the specific grievances underlying the 
possibility of war; moreover, the declaration had to be responded to within a specific timeframe, 
30-33 days.  In the event that the opponent failed to respond to the declaration Rome was legally 
permitted to initiate war (Bellamy 2006, 19).  Importantly, anyone participating in war, under 
Roman law, required proper credentials (Reichberg, et al. 2006)40.  While early Christianity 
allowed for self-defense, Christians believed that only God’s handpicked few to whom power was 
entrusted were endowed with the authority to initiate war.  In other words, anything beyond self-
defense must be initiated by God’s chosen few, or their designees.  To this end Augustine argues 
that a king is inherently vested with the authority to decide to go to war.  More importantly, once 
the king makes the decision his subjects are obligated to obey the king’s decision.  This is because 
the king, not the people, is appointed by God.  The king not the people has the proper authority.  
                                               
40 In many respects the institutional mechanisms for going to war under Roman law can be seen in modern institutional 
checks and balances, modern constitutional structures, and modern international charters and treaties that serve to 
control abuses of authority with respect to war. 
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The only exception to this seemingly unchecked power is when the king’s actions are contrary to 
God’s law (Mattox 2006).  This one exception notwithstanding, the king’s decision bound the 
subjects to act.  Refusal to act pursuant to the king’s decision was not permissible (Bellamy 2006).  
Moreover, according to Augustine, individuals were only permitted to engage in violence when 
they were acting as actual soldiers on behalf of the king (Coppieters & Fotion 2008).  For 
Augustine it is as simple as God reigns supreme; God’s chosen few, the monarchs, are the 
manifestation of God’s will (Mattox 2006).  To be the proper manifestation of God’s will, that is 
to say, to be a godly ruler the king must merely act consistently with God’s will, God’s purpose.  
Assuming the king does this then war is rightly seen as simply the manifestation of God’s will 
(Mattox 2006).  Functionally, provided the proper authority makes the decision of going to war, 
Augustine connects two of the elements of JWT: proper authority and right intention (Reichberg, 
et al. 2006). 
 Aquinas argues that war must be undertaken by “the authority of a sovereign by whose 
command the war is to be waged…” (Question 40, Article 1).  This is crucial for Aquinas as he 
acknowledges that war provides a forum within which one may succumb to “private feelings of 
anger or hatred” (Question 41, Article 1).  This is problematic for Aquinas because ultimately war 
must serve the public good, not an individual one.  Therefore, only the proper political leadership 
whose job it is to serve the public good may endeavor to find the measured good and the measured 
action needed to serve the public good.  It is part of the function of the proper political authority 
to formally consider the common good and act accordingly.  Private individuals are not permitted 
to act on behalf of the state, but only on behalf of their own individual or partial goods.41 
                                               
41 This is an idea to which I will return later.  I do not believe this issue of Proper Authority speaks to a legalistic 
consideration, although the requirement surely serves a legal requirement.  Instead, I argue that this issue has more to 
do with the question of political legitimacy in so far as I argue that the political precedes the legal. 
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 Ultimately, for Aquinas the proper authority must meet the need of serving the state.  While 
this may take many forms it is predominantly the maintenance of security that is the proper purpose 
of the proper authority (Patterson 2009, 117).  This is an important premise as it delineates the 
narrow circumstances under which individuals may revolt against their king.  In other words, 
Aquinas acknowledges that threats may come from both without and within a given state.  When 
looking inward for internal threats Aquinas concerns himself with sedition.  Aquinas generally 
considers sedition to be obviously wrong.  The common good within a community is disrupted 
when individuals engage in sedition.  His reasoning is simple: individuals may justifiably fight for 
the common good; sedition threatens, if not outright destroys, the common good.  Consequently, 
sedition is unjust.  On the other hand, individuals are permitted to fight against a truly tyrannical 
ruler.  This is because a truly tyrannical ruler has himself abandoned the common good.  As the 
tyrant has placed his personal needs before that of the commonwealth the commonwealth itself is 
justified in fighting back against the tyrant (Dyson 2007). 
 This is a critical development in the evolution of JWT as here Aquinas breaks from 
Augustine.  For Augustine all kings whether tyrannical or not are divinely chosen by God.  As the 
ruler is chosen by God resisting the ruler is to engage in civil disobedience against God and is 
therefore wrong.  Aquinas, on the other hand, believes that a king must serve the common good.  
A king who fails to serve the common good has functionally abdicated his moral authority and his 
subjects are thereby absolved of having to obey (Dyson 2007).   
 Francisco de Vitoria (Vitoria) argues that anyone may use violence.  Anyone may use 
violence in defense of oneself, but contrary to Augustine, in defense of one’s personal property.  
Most importantly for Vitoria’s work, he argues that an individual need appeal to no authority other 
than his own when dealing with an immediate threat.  Where Vitoria draws his line, however, is 
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in the use of force.  In other words, while an individual may engage in violence to stop an 
immediate threat there are limits in just how much force may be used; moreover, once the 
immediate threat ceases the use of force must also cease (Reichberg, et al. 2006).  Also, the 
minimum force must always be used.  Gratuitous violence is simply impermissible (Pagden, et al. 
2010).  Vitoria argues that the commonwealth is in many respects similar to the individual.  That 
is to say, a commonwealth may exercise the same self-defense available to an individual.  The 
only difference between the commonwealth and the individual is that the king is the 
commonwealth’s proper authority.  It is the proper authority’s prerogative to decide whether to go 
to war.  Vitoria restricts the decision to go to war to the highest-level authority (Reichberg et al. 
2006). 
 In the final analysis the element of proper authority speaks to who, or what, has the political 
power to determine when someone may engage in armed conflict (Hensel 2010).  Grotius believes 
armed conflict is just when the proper authority, which is the person or entity who holds the 
supreme political power, sanctions armed engagement (Reichberg, et al. 2006).  Grotius believes 
that, at the international level, an entity that supersedes the state should be the final arbiter of 
engaging in armed conflict outside its own borders. 
 These ideas are important because it is quite clear that they have had a profound impact in 
shaping the modern ideal that for an armed conflict a proper authority must sanction it.  Often it is 
the founding document of a given state, whether a charter or a constitution of some sort, that sets 
forth the procedural mechanisms by which one may identify the proper authority and the proper 
process by which armed conflict is itself sanctioned (Raymond 2010, 12).  In this regard the UN 
serves as the modern institutional authority that – at least on paper if not in practice – supersedes 
the states and creates the mechanism by which the decision to undertake armed conflict is 
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undertaken and sanctioned.42  Also, the option to go to war is not the only option available to the 
community of nations.  The UN also exercises the power of economic sanctions and inspections.43  
These various mechanisms are tools used by the UN to visit discipline upon those members of the 
international community who violate or disregard international law or norms.  These laws and 
norms lead to the next element of JWT, just cause. 
Just Cause 
 In developing the concept of a just cause Aquinas does not make a distinction between a 
just offensive cause and a just defensive cause.  While I do not explore this in great detail I believe 
it has to do with the fact that for Aquinas warfare is undertaken when the party to be attacked is 
morally culpable.  Therefore, to some extent all warfare is defensive in that presumably a war is 
commenced for right or wrong reasons.  If the war was started for right reasons the entity fighting 
back is wrong.  If on the other hand the war was commenced for wrong reasons then the entity 
fighting back is in the right.  Either way, the war itself is just in the strict spirit of the word (i.e. 
one of the parties is fighting for the right reason).  In other words, provided that community A is 
living in a morally righteous44 manner it is defending justice when community B behaves in a way 
that is morally suspect.  We get a sense of this argument when Aquinas argues, “There is much 
more reason for guarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from being slain, and 
innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual” 
(Question 40, Article 4). 
                                               
42 The UN Charter restricts the decision of whether to undertake armed conflict to the Security Council pursuant to 
Article 51.   
43 The UN Charter allows for economic sanctions pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 41. 
44 The idea of moral righteousness is an issue to which I return as it necessitates answering inconvenient questions as, 
how does one know whether their morality is in fact righteous?  In some sense this is a question asked and addressed 
by Vitoria. 
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 A concern for what is a just cause is crucial in the context of the GWT as it either validates 
or absolves.  Interestingly, we see that what has been considered a just cause has changed.  
Understanding that the definition of a just cause has changed is important when we consider 
applying this element to non-state actors.  Cicero argues that the preservation of the state and the 
pursuit of justice justify the use of force (Mattox 2006).  We know that for Cicero these two reasons 
were not the only reasons justifying the use of force; nevertheless I focus on these two as they are 
the most relevant to my research question.  Augustine, referring to Cicero, argues that justice must, 
among other things, be coercive and based on power (Elshtain 1995).  Despite understanding the 
need for coercion, Augustine understood the limits of coercive power.  His understanding, I would 
argue, can be seen in the modern world in so far as there exists an understanding that violence 
often results in greater violence, not peace. 
 Augustine is also suspicious of man’s motive for fighting wars.  During his time he was 
very critical of the idea of a man having a right of self-defense that could be exercised with deadly 
force (Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will 9).  Killing to protect that which could not be taken 
into the next life was impermissible for Augustine.  He did, however, allow for killing in the 
defense of others, or when ordered by a legitimate political authority (Bellamy 2006).  It should 
be noted that Augustine’s notion of not being able to kill in self-defense has been rejected in its 
entirety by modern society.  In all 51 jurisdictions here in the U.S., for example, one may kill 
another if, and when, acting in self-defense.  Augustine also believes that one may kill if God 
commands it, or to enforce proper religiosity (Bellamy 2006).  In short, both Cicero and Augustine 
believe that force may be used when preserving the state, and the state may punish individuals who 
threaten its existence. 
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 Aquinas, on the other hand, argues that cooperation between and among men is the key, 
and that the common good ought to be the focus.  Therefore, leaders must have as their primary 
concern the pursuit of common good within a given community (Dyson 2007).  It is in 
contradistinction with this idea that Aquinas focuses on civil disobedience.  While Aquinas does 
not generally allow for internal strife as it threatens the state from within, he does allow for 
resisting a tyrannical ruler.  This distinction for Aquinas hinges on one presumption: the tyrant 
pursues self-interest at the expense of the community (Dyson 2007). 
 Vitoria developed just cause still further.  He argues that restoration of a state’s rights may 
be pursued with the use of force.  These types of campaigns are defined as defensive by Vitoria.  
Moreover, these defensive wars can be used for a multitude of reasons.  For example, an enemy 
can be attacked on their grounds if it is deemed doing so would ultimately prevent an attack at 
home (Hensel 2010).  A key difference for Vitoria, however, is that he allows for something that 
his predecessors did not: the warring parties could both believe they are acting justly.  He attempts 
to prevent this problem by delineating the circumstances in which he does not believe that a valid 
argument can be made as to the justness of a given motive.  Among these circumstances are 
religion, imperialist pursuits, personal whim of the ruler, or personal aggrandizement.  At the other 
end of the spectrum is defense of the state, which Vitoria thought was patently just (Pagden 2010).  
Grotius argues along the same line as Vitoria but allows for self-defense to include defense against 
the mere potential of an attack (Coppieters & Fotion 2008). 
 A truly modern account of a just cause is argued by Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars.  
Walzer believes that a just cause is both necessary and sufficient for the use of force.  That is to 
say that Walzer allows for debate around the idea of whether a just cause exists; however, once a 
consensus has been reached it is the only element on which the state need be focused (Walzer 
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1997).  In short, Walzer believes the state’s rights are derivative of individual rights.   A state may 
protect its sovereignty in much the same way an individual may protect his own.  Walzer does 
allow for the idea that when living within the structure of the state the individual, by necessity, 
sacrifices some of his individuality for the benefit of the collective.  That is to say, the individuals 
precede the state in existence and ultimately consent to the state’s existence in so far as they choose 
their form of government (Walzer 1977).  Walzer’s conception of a just cause is largely consistent 
with Aquinas in that one party will be acting justly while the other party is acting unjustly (Walzer 
1977).  Modern scholars of just war largely agree with Walzer.  These scholars include Thomas 
Nagel, Jeffrie Murphy, Robert K. Fullinwider, Philip Devine, Anthony Kenny, John Finnis, Joseph 
M. Boyle, Jr, Germain Grisez, and Ingrid Detter, who will be discussed in greater detail below.45  
I state at the outset that my research stands in stark contrast to theirs.  In other words, I reject the 
works and ideas of these scholars.  Importantly, I do so not out of hand but only have careful 
consideration of JWT itself.  In that way, my research is part of a developing school of thought 
that rejects not only JWT but to an increasing extent the very idea of natural law that underpins 
JWT.  I count among this number scholars such as Alexander Wendt, Aleksander Jokic, and 
Andrew Fiala.46 
 In the final analysis we see that just cause has morphed.  It no longer means what it did 
when Cicero and Augustine addressed it.  What was once narrowly construed as protecting the self 
and the group now encompasses protecting states in various contexts and for varying reasons.  For 
the most part, modern scholars look to defensive reasons as being just and offensive reasons being 
                                               
45 For representative works of their views see Thomas Nagel’s War and Massacre; Jeffrie Murphy’s The Killing of 
the Innocent; Robert K. Fullinwider’s War and Innocence; Philip Devine’s The Ethics of Homicide; Anthony Kenny’s 
The Logic of Deterrence; and John Finnis’ Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism; and Ingrid Detter’s Law of 
War. 
46 For representative works of their views see Alexander Wendt’s Quantum Mind; Aleksander Jokic’s What’s a Just 
War Theorist?; and Andrew Fiala’s Just War Myth. 
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invalid.  The one exception, along the lines argued by Grotius, is preemption.  The potential for 
attack may justify the use of force and therefore provides a just cause.  Closely related to just cause, 
however, is right intention, which I look at now. 
Proper Intention 
 Aquinas argues that “military prudence may be an art, insofar as it has certain rules for the 
right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but insofar as it is directed to the 
common good, it belongs rather to prudence” (Question 50, Article 1).  This speaks to proper 
intention, which is predicated on prudence.  Prudence is heavily dependent upon an actor’s internal 
disposition.  Therefore, we can conclude that warfare, for Aquinas, is largely about the characters 
of the actors and the participants.  To this end, Aquinas argues that right intention is dependent 
upon the pursuit and attainment of peace.  An emphasis upon proper intention is an attempt to 
prevent warfare from devolving into gratuitous cruelty and violence.  Aquinas specifically argues, 
“The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, and an unpacific and relentless 
spirit, lust of power” are “rightly condemned in war.” (Question 40, Article 1).  Finally, a closer 
reading of the three conditions demonstrates that proper intention must be present in the first two.  
Only a just peace, pursued by the proper authority for a just cause, renders a war just. 
 As was argued by Thucydides, wars are often claimed to be fought for idealistic reasons, 
but are actually fought for reasons vastly different from those professed (I.1.23).  In the context of 
JWT, the problem is how does one determine the true intention of a state?  Coppieters and Fotion 
speak of discerning the true intentions of a given state’s leaders (Coppieters & Fotion 2008).  I 
believe this is problematic in the modern context as most states are not governed by dictators.  
Rather, most developed states are governed by democratic forms of government.  Therefore, 
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instead of looking to a “leader’s” intentions one can deduce the intention of the state by looking to 
not only its rhetoric but its actions when going to war.  Nevertheless, the concept of right intention 
is still important in the modern world, or at least in the GWT, because the intention behind a given 
act of violence can change it from homicide to terrorism.  For this reason I must, and do, consider 
right intention a still important part of JWT. 
 Historically, the motives for war have been met with skepticism.  Consequently, scholars 
have attempted to articulate ways of identifying the true intentions of an individual when the choice 
to go to war is made.  Cicero believes that right intent is known if a ruler abides by the rules in 
place for such a decision, makes a clear demand for remedying the problem and also places the 
other party on notice of the possibility of war, and, finally, allows the other party sufficient time 
to respond. 
 Augustine argues in Contra Faustum “the real evils of war are love of violence, revengeful 
cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and lust for power and such like” (book 22, 
chapter 74).  For reasons similar to those cited above as problematic Augustine looks to the 
legitimate authority of a regime or a state to determine whether the intention behind going to war 
is proper.  This is convenient for Augustine considering that, as demonstrated above, he believes 
that as God’s chosen man his choices are a reflection of God’s will.47  This is crucial because for 
Augustine the fact that a leader is God’s choice demonstrates a presumptively valid intention.  
 Aquinas, more so than his predecessors, connects the three elements of proper authority, 
just cause, and right intention.  He nevertheless argues that war is acceptable if it is fought in the 
                                               
47 This is important because Augustine acknowledges that acting on God’s behalf provides not only a Just Cause, but 
is also evidence of acting with Proper Intention. 
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service of the good over the evil.48  Aquinas ultimately sees that proper intention must, and does, 
underpin the other two elements.  In other words, adhering to the elements of legitimate authority 
and a just cause, but doing so without proper intention, renders the entire endeavor unjust in the 
context of JWT (Dyson 2007). 
 Vitoria, like Aquinas before him, moves JWT in a new direction.  He argues that morality 
need not rely exclusively on religion.  Preceding Grotius’ argument regarding the secularization 
of morality and natural law, Vitoria believes that force may be used if the intention is to defend 
oneself, defend others, and punish evil.  This, he believes, is universally valid.  That is to say, 
Vitoria’s argument is essentially that morality transcends culture and religious differences.  To this 
end, Vitoria advocates a somewhat detached way of analyzing one’s intentions for going to war.  
First, war should be avoided for as long as absolutely possible.  Second, once undertaken, the only 
goal of war should be peace.  Third, once concluded, assistance should be provided to the 
vanquished (Pagden & Lawrence 2010).  Given the importance of Vitoria I explore him more 
closely. 
Francisco de Vitoria 
(School of Salamanca) 
 As mentioned above Vitoria’s version of JWT goes in a different direction from those who 
preceded him.  Vitoria is regarded as the leader of that which is commonly referred to as the School 
of Salamanca.49  Moreover, Vitoria’s conception of an international legal order, universally valid, 
stems from the idea that the family of peoples consists of both a community of states and a 
                                               
48 This is important in that we see President George W. Bush make the similar argument in 2001 when initiating the 
GWT.  For my purposes, however, it is ultimately a meaningless statement both when made by Pres. Bush, and 
Aquinas before him. 
49 The School of Salamanca is a label applied to scholars of natural law and of morality who attempted to reconcile 
the works of Thomas Aquinas with the political economy of Europe in the sixteenth century. 
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community of men.  Carolina Kenny of the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at 
Missouri State University argues that Vitoria was working at a time when “looting, pillage, 
exploitation and conquest were common in the territories discovered by Spain…” (Kenny 2015, 
2).  In that context Vitoria used the theology of ethics as a starting point from which to create a 
“universal system of laws ruling all mankind” 
(http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2015/07/relectiones-by-francisco-de-vitoria-1538-1539.html 
#3r ,1).  Nevertheless, despite his affinity for Aquinas and Augustine, Vitoria’s conclusions differ 
profoundly from those of Aquinas.  Vitoria argues that right, in itself, and justice, in itself, take 
precedence over any concern for either the proportional use of force or the consequences thereof.  
To this end we see that Vitoria, like the thinkers before him, begins with the ideas of his 
predecessors and changes them in a manner more consistent with his times.  Moseley argues that 
in applying the “just war tradition to the contemporary world, Vitoria offers a systematic account 
of just war.  In doing so he offers the world what is now a very modern view of rights and 
responsibilities in war” (http://www.alexander-moseley.me.uk/Articles/just%20war%20theory 
/philosophers/Vitoria.htm).  It must be noted, however, that Vitoria, in his lecture, De Indis, argues 
Christian norms and mores are both universal and endorsed by jus gentium.  Moreover, 
evangelizing, or spreading the law, is not a function of the divine law.  Instead, under Vitoria’s 
logic, it is authorized by the law of nations (De Indis).  In this way Vitoria is largely considered 
by many in the field of international law as the founder of modern international law. 
 As already stated, Vitoria was writing in part as a response to Spain’s activities and 
propensity for war in the “New World.”  He attempted, therefore, to offer a structural 
understanding of JWT universally applicable.  First, breaking markedly from Aquinas and 
Augustine, Vitoria rejects religious differences as legitimate for just cause (De Jure Belli).  Despite 
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this rejection of religious difference as a just cause, Vitoria is nevertheless a Christian and argues 
that a war ought ultimately to be fought consistently with Christian virtues (De Jure Belli).  
Understanding how Vitoria can argue against religion in one respect yet embrace it in another 
requires, at minimum, a superficial understanding of his political theory.  His political theory is 
largely predicated upon an understanding of natural rights that presupposes that social existence, 
and not individualistic self-interest, is the driving force behind human nature, morality, political 
community, and law.50  According to Vitoria, if one begins with this different assumption one finds 
that government’s purpose is the promotion of the common good.  It is important to note that 
within Vitoria’s understanding of the common good is the idea of a virtuous life.51  Namely citizens 
must live a virtuous life, as defined by Christianity, and one of the government’s main functions 
is to promote this endeavor.  Moseley writes, Vitoria believed the best form of government to 
accomplish this virtuous life is a monarchy because a monarchy is presumably beyond the reach 
of the common ailments of democracy: political dissension, special interests, and factions 
(http://www.alexander-
moseley.me.uk/Articles/just%20war%20theory/philosophers/Vitoria.htm). 
 With respect to JWT, Vitoria clearly begins with many of the assumptions made by 
Aquinas, the most important of which is the notion that warfare may be undertaken to combat a 
wrong committed, provided that peace is the ultimate purpose of engaging in war.  Similarly to 
Aquinas, Vitoria argues that only the proper political authority for a given political community 
may declare war.  This proper authority is found in the sovereign of a given state.  As for reasons, 
                                               
50 This is similar to an argument I will make later in Chapter 4 of this work.  Vitoria is essentially claiming that social-
contractarians, such as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, are wrong in the their foundational 
assumptions of human beings living as largely isolated individuals in the state of nature who come together out of 
individual self-interest temporarily aligned.  Instead, human beings are social animals. 
51 During the defense of my dissertation I will argue that Vitoria and his ilk get this entirely wrong. 
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or just causes, for going to war, as stated above, Vitoria rejects religious differences as a just cause.  
Instead, he seems to argue that aggression, and aggression only, constitutes just cause. 
 In this way we see that Vitoria’s understanding of just cause is a categorical one.  That is 
to say, whether a cause is just stems from the intent with which an action is taken, and not from its 
consequences.  An interesting facet of Vitoria’s JWT with regard to an intrinsic value of justice is 
the idea that both sides of a conflict can argue in earnest that it is the one and not the other who is 
fighting for justice.52  He understands that human beings can quite simply get it wrong.  That is to 
say, people can be mistaken when it comes to identifying just cause.  In which case both sides to 
a conflict may, in good faith, believe that they are justly combatting an aggressor and yet they can 
both be honestly mistaken in their belief as compared to the transcendent truth as understood by 
God.  This is a fundamental difference from the thinkers who came before him and in a sense a 
turning point in international law. 
 Lastly, Vitoria, in On the Law of War, addresses the issue of combatant status.  He argues, 
“it is lawful to kill indiscriminately all those who fight against us” (Vitoria, Law of War, 315).  
Presumably the fact that individuals are engaging in threatening behavior renders them subject to 
killing.  Interestingly, however, Vitoria also argues that all adult males, when innocents are 
indistinguishable from the guilty, may be killed indiscriminately.  This is so because the intent is 
a proper one.  That is to say the intent in such a situation is to kill the guilty.  The innocent are 
essentially collateral damage. 
                                               
52 This is not Vitoria engaging in an argument for cultural relativism and non-universality.  Vitoria certainly believes 
in a universal truth and consequently a universal justice that transcends time and space, but allows for the possibility 
that both sides to a conflict are wrong regarding their understanding of what that justice actually is. 
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 Before moving on to Grotius a concise summary is helpful to see where we are in the 
chronology.  Vitoria’s analysis of JWT is a foundational component of the laws of war.  A 
sovereign, a proper political authority, may go to war under certain circumstances.  While Cicero 
first described a theory of what would make a war just, not necessarily a just war theory, Augustine 
and Aquinas “picked up” Cicero’s idea and developed JWT further.  Augustine begins to lay the 
foundational ideas for a theory for the use of force that is consistent with morality and thus morally 
legitimate.  Nevertheless, Augustine did not articulate the condition precedents, or the antecedents, 
required to render a war just.  Because Augustine was writing at a time of increasing violence and 
disorder within the Roman Empire, the concept of defense53 was central in Augustine’s work. 
 Aquinas, writing in the thirteenth century, took Augustine’s arguments as authoritative.  In 
an attempt to clarify and thus render JWT more succinct, Aquinas, in effect, fine-tunes, or refines, 
Augustine’s arguments with respect to JWT.  Aquinas enumerates conditions, or criteria, that must 
first be satisfied before a war is deemed just.  First, “the authority of the sovereign by whose 
command the war is to be waged” (Question 40, Article 1) must be proper.  Second, the causes 
leading to the war must be just (Question 40, Article 1).  Third, a proper, or rightful intention, is 
required during hostilities as the only intent that is proper is the “advancement of good, or the 
avoidance of evil” (Question 40, Article 1). 
 Vitoria takes the work of Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas and applies it to the conditions 
of the sixteenth century.  Where JWT, as created and developed by Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas 
falls short in the sixteenth century, Vitoria undertakes to adapt JWT to the then existing conditions.  
Specifically, we see in De Indis, Vitoria pushes the boundaries of Aquinas’ understanding of JWT.  
                                               
53 Defense included both self-defense and defense of others. 
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Vitoria argues war itself must be subject to rules: it should be used only to prevent greater evil; 
legitimacy of war must be predicated upon proportionality and the fighting of the war must comply 
with certain moral limitations.  When viewed from this perspective, acknowledging that Vitoria is 
the founder of international law, and that his goals were to create a non-religious basis for a 
universally applicable international law, and that his thinking was clearly affected by the times in 
which he was writing, we see that the foundations of international law, as largely understood today, 
are grounded in a Dominican Friar’s moral critique of the Spanish empire as it existed in the 
sixteenth century.  Nevertheless, despite historians tracing the origins of international law to 
Vitoria, Hugo Grotius is generally considered the father of international law and I address him 
next. 
Grotius 
 For all intents and purposes, it is proper to begin a discussion of Grotius’ work in 1604 
when, according to the IEP, “Grotius was drawn into the sensational controversy over privateering 
in the Southeast Asian trade” (http://www.iep.utm.edu/grotius/ , 2).  This is important because in 
an attempt to justify the seizure of Spanish cargo, Grotius thought extensively about the “deep 
principles of law that connected those separated by nation and culture” 
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/grotius/ , 2).  Out of this endeavor comes the notion that there exists a 
basic law of nature whereby one may at once engage in self-preservation and participate in social 
life; these ideas are pivotal in his later life and later work.  After decades spent in various high-
level diplomatic posts either actively shaping, or participating in shaping, the major political events 
of his day, Grotius, while in prison, began to think about and write De iure belli ac pacis.  In 
writing this, his most famous work, he returned to his earlier ideas and simply both expounded and 
developed them. 
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 To that end, Grotius, unlike the scholars who came before him, depends heavily on the 
authority of other writers.  Why this is the case is a bit of a mystery.  According to the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), there are three plausible explanations for why Grotius places 
such emphasis on the works of others: (i) Grotius believes in a universal cause, or a universal truth 
that transcends time and place, (ii) Grotius is interested in refuting skepticism with respect to 
international law, and (iii) Grotius seeks to identify first principles “… which lie at the basis of all 
normativity, not just a portion thereof.” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/ , 4).  It is my 
opinion that these three different explanations are actually distinctions without differences.  That 
is to say, in so far as Grotius is looking to demonstrate that political, legal, and moral “… norms 
are all based on laws derived from or supplied by nature” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/ 
, 4), then there is fundamentally no difference to be found in the three reasons set forth above 
because each of the three is predicated on the assumption that there is a definitive transcendent 
right and wrong, a transcendent natural law, which governs politics, the law, and morality.  
Therefore, Grotius focuses more on natural law than any other topic, thereby earning the title, 
rightly or wrongly, the father of natural law (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/). 
 Grotius’ treatment of natural law depends upon his answering two questions: (i) what is 
the source of natural law, and (ii) how do we determine the content of natural law?  He answers 
the first question by proclaiming that the source of normative values “arises from the nature of the 
action itself, so that it is right per se to worship God and it is right per se not to lie” 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/ , 5).  This differs markedly from his previous view that 
God chooses the normative content of natural law and we are thereby bound by his decisions.  It 
should be noted that this is similar to Socrates in the Euthyphro in so far as Socrates enquires into 
whether something is pious because it is in fact right or because the gods say it is right.  If it is the 
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former, then why does one need the gods to understand right and wrong?  If it is the latter, by what 
standard does one determine who is right when the gods disagree?  Here, Grotius changed his mind 
from the latter to the former.  Arguably, his most famous or oft-quoted statement demonstrates 
Grotius’ final position and the fundamental basis for his natural law theory.  In The Rights of War 
and Peace Grotius argues, “… all we have now said would take place, though we should even 
grant, what without the greatest Wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he 
takes no Care of human Affairs” (Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, I.XI).  With this one 
statement Grotius effectively removed natural law from under the auspices of God and functionally 
secularized it so that right and wrong were right and wrong regardless of God.  Foreshadowing 
John Locke, perhaps following Cicero, Grotius now argues that right reason and nothing else is 
solely necessary to answer both questions.  In other words, right reason is the source of natural law 
and is both necessary and sufficient to identify the content of natural law.  Grotius argues, “the law 
of nature54 is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in 
conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, 
in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined” (Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 
I.1.10.1).  What this means is that only behavior that is consistent with both right reason and the 
need for social cohesion is permissible under natural law. Behavior that is inconsistent with these 
aspects of human nature is impermissible under natural law.  Here is the fallacy in their thinking.  
Right reason is not separate and distinct from social cohesion.  Right reason is entirely dependent 
on social cohesion.  The merit of the former is determined by its utility in achieving the latter. 
                                               
54 A phrase similarly invoked by John Locke who claimed the state of nature is governed by the law of nature, namely 
reason. 
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 As to the second question set forth at the outset, “how do we determine the content of the 
natural law?”, Grotius answers by stating that human nature itself reveals, and thus teaches, the 
content of natural law.  If one studies human nature, according to Grotius, one finds that humans 
are governed by two fundamental characteristics: (i) the desire for self-preservation55 and (ii) the 
need for society56 (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/ , 6).  Interestingly, the two not only act 
upon each other, but they are crucial for humans to survive.  For Grotius this follows from the 
simple premise that human nature clearly renders humans both emotional and rational creatures.  
We have a natural instinct for self-preservation, but not self-preservation at any cost.  Our desire 
for society seems to affect our instinct while simultaneously being affected by it.  In this way 
Grotius not only changed the natural law but also international law in so far as international law is 
grounded on the idea that there is an inherent right and wrong, irrespective of a deity.57 
 To that end, John Fabian Witt (Witt) argues, in Lincoln’s Code, “… war in America is … 
the story of an idea about war, an idea that Americans have sometimes nurtured and often scorned” 
(Witt 2012, 1).  Witt continues, “[t]he idea is that the conduct of war can be constrained by law” 
(Witt 2012, 1).  This is important because given America’s prominence at the international level 
and its unrivaled military dominance, America’s attitude toward any attempt to constrain its 
behavior in the context of war is critical because, as Witt asserts “… the idea of a law of war has 
contained inside itself two powerful but competing ideals for armed conflict.  One is 
humanitarianism.  The other is justice” (Witt 2012, 9).  Interestingly, the American statesman, 
Henry Kissinger, contrary to Witt’s contention famously said, foreign policy “should not be 
                                               
55 I return to this idea and discuss it in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
56 I return to this idea and discuss it in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
57 In Chapter 4 I briefly demonstrate that Grotius, and others, began with correct premises but ultimately arrived at 
incorrect conclusions; therefore, he was ultimately wrong. 
54 
 
confused with missionary work.”  This would seem to imply that to an extent neither 
humanitarianism nor justice plays a major role in U.S. foreign policy.  Nevertheless, Witt’s work 
will be explored in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
International Law 
 
Argument Against Extending Rights to Nonstate Actors 
 Answering my research question requires an answer to an equally basic question: Under 
the legal system, as it currently exists, are nonstate actors, or terrorists, legally protected in any 
way by international law?  Determining whether a terrorist is covered under the law of war is a 
relatively straightforward endeavor as what is required is little more than a legal and contextual 
analysis of the various relevant primary documents that speak to who is and who is not covered 
under the law of war.  Any analysis undertaken to determine the protected status of individuals 
begins with the four relevant international treaties commonly known and referred to as the 1949 
Geneva Conventions (Geneva Conventions).58 
 The first question to ask is, Are there any qualifying conditions upon which protection is 
predicated?  The answer to this question is found in understanding the purpose behind the Geneva 
Conventions.  The conventions were, and are, meant to protect the men and women fighting on 
behalf of duly, legally constituted states.59  In other words, the Geneva Conventions are meant to 
protect soldiers when fighting.60  Soldiers wounded on the field of battle are protected under 
Convention I.  Soldiers wounded in the sea, air, or shipwrecked are protected under Convention 
                                               
58 The four Geneva Conventions are: (i) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (hereinafter Convention I), (ii) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereinafter Convention II), (iii) 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter Convention III), and (iv) Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter Convention IV). 
59 The international law expresses the ideas expressed by Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, and others with respect to war 
being undertaken by a proper authority and carried out by the state’s lawful, and legitimate, representatives, namely 
soldiers, not private citizens. 
60 See note 37. 
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II.  Soldiers captured by their enemy under Convention III are protected and afforded prisoner of 
war (POW) status.  And, finally, civilians are protected under Convention IV.61 
 Taken in the aggregate the Geneva Conventions constitute the law of war, which is to say 
international law as it pertains to war.  As such these conventions delineate and articulate the 
individuals who are protected and the individuals who are not protected by, and under, the law of 
war.  To be protected under the law of war, an individual must first satisfy certain conditions.  
Under the law of war, the treatment to be received by a captured individual depends entirely upon 
their status pursuant to, and consistent with, the Conventions.  In other words, a soldier that 
satisfies the conditions of the Conventions, if captured, will be legally classified as a POW and 
will enjoy all of the benefits and legal protections such a classification affords him.  On the other 
hand, an individual engaging in armed conflict who does not satisfy the conditions of the 
Conventions finds himself outside the law, classified an unlawful combatant,62 and thus designated 
a detainee as opposed to a POW.  Detainees, pursuant to Convention III, do not enjoy POW status 
and are therefore not entitled to legal protection. 
Geneva Convention III: Protection of Law 
 Pursuant to Convention III an individual qualifies for protection under the law of war if he 
adheres to concepts that derive from one of the tenets of JWT, proper authority.63  Under 
international law one must be in possession of proper authority to wage a just war.  Therefore, a 
combatant must wear a uniform, carry arms openly, be subject to a proper command structure, and 
affirmatively adhere to the tenets long embraced by the international law and now set forth in the 
                                               
61 There are two additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, both adopted in 1977.  Protocol I speaks to the rights 
of liberation movements in international conflicts.  Protocol II addresses the specifics of internal wars. 
62 “Unlawful combatants” are also referred to as “nonstate” actors, “unlawful enemy combatants,” or “terrorists.” 
63 See note 37. 
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law of war.  These fundamental principles serve to identify and separate civilians from combatants.  
These principles make up the principle of distinction, the core of the law of war. 64  Therefore, any 
attempt to place terrorists on equal footing with soldiers, or to provide terrorists with greater legal 
rights than they are already afforded, or to which they are legally entitled under international law, 
is a violation of the law of war itself.  In other words, treating “terrorists” and soldiers equally is 
illegal under the law of war.  Therefore, in a sense, treating them equally serves to undermine 
international law.  It is important that we remember that Convention III stands for the proposition 
that the international legal system will protect soldiers and only soldiers who take great pains to 
respect civilian life and distinguish themselves accordingly.  As stated above, failure to distinguish 
themselves renders a combatant unlawful and thus, by definition, outside the law.  For some, it is 
perhaps intuitive to say these nonstate actors, if not soldiers who are protected under the law, must 
therefore be citizens and protected accordingly under Convention IV.  Unfortunately for those who 
make this argument, civilians are in fact protected by Convention IV, but if, and only if they do 
not take up arms or otherwise participate in hostilities.  Taking up arms, or participating in 
hostilities, results in one’s loss of the designation “civilian.”  As a concept this is important because 
anyone at any time can behave in such a way so as to effectively remove themselves from under 
the auspices of international law and render themselves a nonstate actor, an unlawful combatant, 
or a terrorist subject to detainment and punishment.  More specifically, the law of war speaks to 
three classes of people who are protected under international law.  The class distinction depends 
entirely on the legal status of those captured during a conflict.  These classes are (i) regular 
                                               
64 While these conditions are contained within Convention III, these conditions also existed and applied under the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 
58 
 
soldiers, (ii) uniformed freedom fighters, and (iii) citizens.  Taking each in turn, as stated, regular 
soldiers are entitled under the law to be treated as POWs. 
Regular Soldiers 
 The third Convention contains the principle that this entitlement and all of the privileges 
afforded POWs under international law are contingent on soldiers engaging in combat while 
wearing regular combat uniforms, bearing their weapons openly, only while under a proper and 
responsible command structure, and themselves following the laws of war.  Moreover, providing 
these criteria are satisfied, a captured soldier, a POW, will be held, but will not be put to trial and 
will be released immediately upon the cessation of hostilities.65  Nevertheless, the protection 
afforded POWs is limited in one legal respect.  Under Common Article 366 POW status does not 
protect the soldier who may have undertaken, or in fact committed, war crimes.  If such a soldier 
committed such acts and was captured, he would have presumptive protection under the POW 
classification, but if it were discovered that he committed war crimes, he, while still classified a 
POW, would be legally triable under the law of war.  He would likely be tried in a military court 
or tribunal, and, if adjudicated guilty, would be subject to punishment.67 
Uniformed Freedom Fighters 
 Uniformed freedom fighters, the second class of protected individuals, while neither 
representing a duly constituted state nor necessarily regular soldiers, behave similarly to, if not 
exactly like, regular soldiers.  They wear uniforms, answer to a proper chain of command, bear 
                                               
65 Convention III, article 118: “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities.” 
66 Common Article 3 refers to the identical Article 3 in each Geneva Convention.   
67 It should be noted that this is simply not true for Americans as it is the stated policy of the U.S. under several 
administrations that no American will be subject to the jurisdiction of international law. 
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arms openly, and adhere to the law of war.  Because they are not members of a state-sanctioned 
military, however, they are irregular belligerents and freedom fighters.  The law presumes that 
their motives are independence from, of, or in some instances affiliation with, a country.  
Conceptually, an example would be any group who rises up within their own state and fights for 
their own independence.68 
 Admittedly, if these freedom fighters fail in their attempt to gain their independence they 
are subject to the severest of punishments under their respective domestic law.  They will likely 
be treated as insurgents, rebels, or traitors, and at minimum will be presumptively triable for, and 
likely be guilty of, treason.  Although domestically a given country is free to impose its own 
domestic laws on such citizens under international law, the international community, through the 
United Nations and the International Court of Justice, and even the International Criminal Court, 
can treat these same individuals as traitors or criminals who betrayed their country and, depending 
on how they conducted themselves, triable at the international level.  They may be entitled to 
protection under Protocol I.69  This can happen for one of two reasons: (i) the state in which the 
revolution was attempted was a signatory to Protocol I, or (ii) the state in which the revolution was 
attempted actively applies, or adheres to, Protocol I despite not being under any formal obligation 
to do so.  Moreover, uniformed freedom fighters are protected under the language of Common 
Article 3.  In short, uniformed freedom fighters, as long as they are fighting for independence from, 
or within, a nation that is a party to the Conventions, are protected under the law of war.70  If these 
freedom fighters succeed in their revolution, they will be a step closer to acceptance of their new 
                                               
68 E.g., The American Revolution, the American Civil War, but not the civil war currently underway in Syria. 
69 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (hereinafter Protocol I). 
70 They are protected under the international law of war insofar as they are protected under Common Article 3. 
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state at the international level.  If, on the other hand, they are unsuccessful, they will likely be 
prosecuted by the state in which they fought despite having a recognizable legal status under the 
law of war.  Victory brings validation; defeat, condemnation. 
Civilians 
 Civilians, the third group who receive protected status under international law, are 
protected pursuant to the language in Convention IV as it was adopted specifically to protect them.  
Insofar as it was understood that civilians, where and when possible, were excluded from attack, 
general international law has long protected civilians.  Codifying this in explicit language in a 
treaty is relatively new.  To that end, civilians were, and are, afforded special protection and 
privileges if captured during an armed conflict.  However, as stated, under international law, in the 
event that a civilian takes up arms and fights, which is to say a civilian willingly inserts himself 
into an armed conflict, he loses the protection of Convention IV.71  In other words, there is an 
extent to which the Fourth Geneva Convention simply expanded, enhanced, and specified the 
rights afforded civilians during conflict even though many of those rights were, at least in principle, 
already understood under international law.  For the purposes of this analysis one of the more 
relevant rules, if not the most important, is that terrorists claiming to be civilians are not designated 
POW when captured.  Instead, as stated, terrorists are detainees, unlawful combatants, and thus 
not afforded any of the rights of POWs.  They are, however, still subject to release upon the 
                                               
71 See Convention IV, art. 5, which specifically states: “Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is 
satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of 
the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention 
as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.” 
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conclusion of hostilities72 – whatever that means in the context of the GWT, which could 
conceivably continue in perpetuity. 
 This segues into the next section, which states that those who are excluded from protection 
under the law of war: (i) unlawful combatants, (ii) mercenaries, and (iii) spies.  The exclusion of 
these groups of individuals is well established in international law.  On its face, any movement or 
argument to include terrorists within the group of protected individuals, without first changing 
existing international law, is to behave, by definition, illegally.  Taking each in turn I begin with 
unlawful combatants, or terrorists.  For my purposes here I look to the United States Supreme 
Court (USSC) and its definition as it is the intellectual backbone for the legal artifice created by 
the United States post-9/11. 
Unlawful Combatants 
 In Ex parte Quirin the Court stated, 
 By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction 
between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent 
nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.  
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war 
by opposing military forces.  Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to 
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency 
unlawful. (Ex Parte Quirin 1942, 31) 
Essentially, anyone fighting in a conflict must distinguish themselves from civilians.  If they fail 
to do so, they run the very real risk of altering their legal status, thereby losing their protection 
under the law.  It is important to note that the requirement for combatants to distinguish themselves 
from civilians is quite old.  This includes those combatants who affirmatively attempt to appear to 
                                               
72 See Convention IV, art. 45, which specifically states: “This provision shall in no way constitute an obstacle to the 
repatriation of protected persons, or to their return to their country of residence after the cessation of hostilities.” 
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be part of the civilian population by way of disguise.  Warfare has always had an implicit 
understanding that those who do not participate in combat are excluded from the war itself.73  That 
is to say, the civilians are protected by the law of war.74  There is a fundamental reason why such 
emphasis is placed on the requirement for distinction.  Without it, neither side would know whom 
they are fighting; neither side would know who the enemy is.  Therefore, the law of war simply 
takes as a given that those who fail to distinguish themselves accordingly are undeserving of legal 
protection.  Moreover, the law of war will assume those combatants to be unlawful terrorists.  
Therefore, taken as a whole, under the current structure of the law of war, terrorists qualify for 
neither soldier status nor civilian status. 
 Because of this distinction, a captured soldier will be treated differently under the law from 
a terrorist.  As has been stated, a terrorist is not protected under the law of war.  He will not be 
entitled to the legal protections POW designation would otherwise provide him.  In terms of 
proving the elements of these criminal acts, if he is caught during the commission of a crime, the 
intent component of international law will be assumed based on the nature of his behavior.  If 
caught during the commission of an act of terrorism, depending on whether or not others were 
involved, the terrorist would be charged with conspiracy or, depending on the circumstances, 
possibly espionage as a spy.  If in addition to his attempting to commit an act of terrorism he 
participates, illegally, in a given conflict, he is in further breach of the international law of war.  If 
this is the case, he is subject to a trial, and, if tried, he is to be tried by a military tribunal, not the 
civilian courts; if convicted, he is subject to punishment deemed adequate by the convicting entity 
                                               
73 I believe that this is due to cultures sufficiently similar recognizing something of themselves in the other and not 
wanting to destroy them indiscriminately.  On the other hand, the same does not hold when cultures engaging in 
conflict recognize nothing deemed worthy of preservation in each other. 
74 See Convention III, art. 4. 
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within the parameters of the law.  Moreover, terrorists, as detainees, are legally subject to 
potentially indefinite detention until such time as the hostilities are concluded. 
Mercenaries 
 The second group of unprotected individuals is mercenaries.  Despite at times wearing 
uniforms, thereby indicating they are perhaps members of an organized unit, mercenaries are 
actually excluded from protected groups under the international law of war.  An attempt has been 
made to codify this idea in the 1989 United Nations Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries.75  Article 3 of the Convention Against Mercenaries 
specifically attempted to prohibit the use of mercenaries in armed conflicts.  Admittedly, this 
Convention has not been adopted by many states.76  I would argue that the main problem with this 
classification of individuals is that it is conceptually difficult to differentiate between mercenaries 
and “security forces,”77 let alone concisely define mercenaries.  In other words, the legal or 
definitional parameters for mercenary status are narrow to the point of being all exclusive.78  The 
legal definition of mercenaries is so amorphous that terrorists could qualify for inclusion, because 
an argument can be made that terrorists fall under the heading of mercenaries.  Moreover, I can 
easily make an argument that the overwhelming majority of American service members are 
mercenaries as they are not joining the military for patriotic reasons but for purposes of advancing 
themselves financially and socioeconomically.79  By definition a mercenary is one who joins a 
                                               
75 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries Dec. 4, 1989 
(hereinafter Convention Against Mercenaries). 
76 To date forty-three states have ratified this Convention.  The U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China have not signed 
this treaty. 
77 As defined, and increasingly used by the U.S., security forces can also mean private contractors/military companies. 
78 Given the legal language used in many Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), security companies are often 
excluded from this convention. 
79 Under the definition of mercenary in the Convention Against Mercenaries I was a mercenary as I enlisted in the 
United States Coast Guard for no other reason than to draw a steady salary and derive certain educational benefits 
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fighting force for private gain.80  While determining the motivation of another is difficult, in the 
case of terrorists private gain may include the desire for religious reward and not simply 
financial.81 
Spies 
 The third group of individuals not covered under the law of war is spies.  Here the analysis 
is a rather straightforward affair insofar as spies make themselves as indistinguishable as possible 
from a given civilian population.  In carrying out their work their sole purpose is to blend in entirely 
with the surrounding civilian population.  A terrorist, it can be argued, falls into this category in 
that an individual is blending in among the civilian population in an attempt to garner information, 
ascertain a state’s or a population’s weakness, and then attack.  This, by definition, renders them 
as having violated the law of war and thus excludes them from the law’s protection. 
Terrorists 
 This brings me to my analysis of the legal status of terrorists.  Terrorists, by definition, use 
terrorist tactics.  It is their very modus operandi to use nonconventional methods at unexpected 
intervals to attack their targets – more often than not the civilian population of a given country.  In 
recent history we have witnessed terrorists using bombs, planes, automatic weapons, and even 
cyber-attacks as means to terrorize their targets.  Soldiers, similarly, can commit acts of terror.  
Even when they are focusing on targets of military importance, it is possible to commit acts of 
terror.  Therefore, the legal status of the soldiers involved in conflict requires that certain 
                                               
upon the successful completion of my four-year enlistment, specifically the Montgomery GI Bill – Active Duty 
(MGIB-AD). 
80 Convention Against Mercenaries, art. 1; see supra note 18. 
81 For example, salvation, eternal life, martyrdom, etc. 
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protections be afforded and a case-by-case evaluation be undertaken to determine whether an act 
of terror has occurred.  Terrorists, on the other hand, are entitled to no such courtesy under the law 
of war, as they are by definition unprotected and not deserving of such protections. 
 If we look at the goals of terrorism within a historical context, we can differentiate between 
political and social goals.82  In the American experience political goals, or terrorism, pre-9/11, can 
be loosely defined as pursuing “political objectives.”  Again, this definition of terrorism is more 
readily applicable to pre-9/11.  In the post-9/11 world of the GWT one can claim that the acts 
undertaken by the likes of al Qaeda and ISIS are qualitatively outside the scope of the concept of 
“political objectives” insofar as they are attempting to kill for social reasons, which is tantamount 
to genocide. 
 It should be noted, however, for quite some time, civilized society has seen individuals, 
who on some level would qualify as terrorists, pursuing traditional political goals, taking deliberate 
action to blend in with the civilian population, and using methods of terrorism that would be 
considered beyond the pale to coerce a non-conflicting third party.  Such acts can include, for 
example, mass rape, random killings, beheadings, and forced participation of children in armed 
conflict.  This type of terrorism is somewhat unfortunate from a political perspective as the 
immediately affected third party is usually in no position to capitulate to the demands of terrorists.  
Instead, the terrorists rely on the suffering of the civilian population to place pressure upon the 
political leaders to do something about their goals in order to stop the attacks.  These goals could, 
and do, vary widely.  They can include, for example, creating their own state, merging two existing 
states, or even seeking the release of men they deem political prisoners.  It must always be 
                                               
82 By social I mean killing for ethnic, national, racial, or religious reasons.  In other words, one social group, for 
purposes that do not go much further than simple hatred of the other, kills another social group. 
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remembered, however, that to the extent to which combatants, regardless of their motives, fail to 
wear uniforms, fail to carry arms openly, and fail to operate within a proper chain of command, 
under article 4 of Convention III they will be outside the protection of the law of war. 
 Terrorists pursuing social goals, on the other hand, can be said to be engaging in genocide 
insofar as they are specifically targeting a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group for its own 
sake.  According to Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (CPPCG), genocide is defined as 
… any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
 (e) Imposing transferring children of the group to another group. 
Article 3 defines the punishable crimes according to the CPPCG: 
   (a) Genocide 
   (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide 
   (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
   (d) Attempt to commit genocide 
   (e) Complicity in genocide 
 The goals of terrorism, it is being argued, transitioned from political to social in the 1990s 
when al Qaeda, and most recently ISIS, began targeting the U.S., Europe, and even Islamic 
countries seemingly due entirely to hatred of the West and its values – as both embodied and 
manifested in the U.S. (bin Laden 2002; DABIQ Issue 15, 30).  While these groups may have 
started out pursuing political goals, as they professed to have a political motive, they can now be 
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classified as social, or genocidal, in that what seems to drive terrorism is a hatred of the U.S. and 
a purported desire to kill Americans (bin Laden). 
 Here a prima facie argument can be made that under the law the elements of both genocide 
and attempted genocide are satisfied insofar as a specific group is being targeted for extermination.  
Moreover, because members of both al Qaeda and ISIS neither wear proper uniforms – 
traditionally understood – nor bear arms openly they are excluded from the law of war; 
furthermore, because of this legal status states are permitted under law to hold nonstate actors 
incommunicado for an indefinite period of time, kidnap nonstate actors and deliver them to various 
CIA black sites, where we know they will be tortured and subjected to degrading and inhumane 
treatment, and in the case of Anwar al-Awlaki and his sixteen-year-old son, summarily 
assassinated in violation of the due process rights afforded all American citizens if and when they 
are captured because they are neither afforded, nor entitled to, POW status.  They are merely 
detainees83 with no legal protection.  Consequently, given their actions, groups such as al Qaeda 
and ISIS are triable for, if not guilty of, genocide to the extent that they specifically target 
identifiable groups with little if any discrimination. 
 Terrorists who pursue genocidal goals are not afforded protection of the law of war for 
several reasons.  Most obviously members of al Qaeda and ISIS are illegal combatants to the extent 
that they deliberately choose to blend in with non-combatant civilians by choosing not to wear a 
uniform.  Moreover, an argument can be made that they should be considered, and classified, as 
mercenaries, as they are recruited in one country, or volunteer in one country, ultimately serving 
on the military force of another country for their own “private gain,” however one defines private 
                                               
83 See Convention III, art. 17. 
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gain – even if that private gain is religious in nature.  Lastly, terrorists who pursue social or 
genocidal goals may be excluded if they are spies.  Once captured they are detainees, considered 
terrorists, and have little to no rights.84  In other words, the national security of the state they attack, 
along with the international law, warrants that their normal rights be disregarded in so far as they 
are detained, however long they may be detained, whether or not they have the right to appeal their 
detention, whether or not they receive legal counsel, and even whether or not they have a right to 
a trial. 
 An illegal combatant is a legal distinction that is attached to any individual who engages 
in the behavior set forth above.  That means that even a citizen of a given state could qualify as an 
illegal combatant if, for example, he attacks his own country.  Interestingly, however, if captured 
he is not entitled to POW status because (i) he is not a lawful combatant, and (ii) he is a citizen, a 
national, of the country he attacked.  Under the law of war the only legal status to which he is 
entitled is that of detainee; they can, however, be dealt with under the country’s domestic law. 
 It should be noted that an individual who is both an illegal combatant and a citizen of the 
state in which he carries out a terrorist act may be held and treated as a detainee within his home 
country pursuant to normal legal structure.  The law of war allows for precisely such treatment.  
The intent necessary for such treatment under international law can be inferred from the act itself.85  
Essentially, a terrorist attack is a general intent crime in that the requisite criminal intent is inferred 
from the actus reus itself. 
                                               
84 Convention III 
85 Padilla v. Rumsfeld 2003. 
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 Assuming arguendo that members of al Qaeda and ISIS are in fact guilty of genocide, those 
who advocate both the rights of these terrorists and their protection under either the international 
law of war or international human rights law are undermining the legal system itself by affording 
these illegal combatants legal protection to which they are not entitled nor which they deserve.  
Indiscriminate attacks carried out in the manner in which they are conducted quite simply violate 
the law of war.  It must be remembered that the purported reason for the GWT is the U.S. defending 
itself from terrorist members of al Qaeda and ISIS who are determined to harm the U.S., its 
citizens, and its interests anywhere in the world they are located.86  When al Qaeda pronounced 
that it is the duty of all Muslims to seek out and kill both U.S. citizens and allies of the U.S.,87 it 
called for what amounts to genocide – the targeting of a specific group due to their nationality – a 
crime under both U.S. law88 and international law (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide 1948).89 
 Under U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 50A, sec. 1091, genocide is defined as 
  (a) Basic offense – whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war and  
   with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, 
   ethnic, racial, or religious group as such –  
   (1) kills members of that group; 
   (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group; 
   (3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of   
    members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques; 
   (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the 
    physical destruction of the group in whole or in part; 
   (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or 
   (6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; 
                                               
86 NSSM 2002. 
87 bin Laden 2002. 
88 18 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (2006). 
89 Art. III(c). 
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 Here al Qaeda and ISIS are both explicitly calling for the killing of U.S. citizens.  To the 
extent that they are actually targeting and killing U.S. citizens for no other reason than they are 
Americans, they are presumptively guilty of (a)(1), which renders them presumptively guilty of 
genocide. 
 Under international law the Genocide Convention of 194890 is applicable in peace time as 
well as in war, which renders the actors liable under the law.  In the context of the GWT the 
Genocide Convention is a treaty to which the U.S., Iraq, and Afghanistan are bound.  Despite the 
nonstate actor status of al Qaeda and ISIS members, a legal precedent has been established at the 
international level as a result of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, that individuals cannot escape 
responsibility for committing genocide or acts of genocide.  The Nuremberg Tribunal and the 
Tokyo war trials made clear that individuals can be, and are, both bound and liable under the 
Genocide Convention.  Moreover, the tribunals, insofar as they adjudicated their cases prior to the 
1949 Convention, demonstrated that relevant rules, functionally operating as part of the customary 
international law, are operative independent of the Convention. 
  Article II (a), (b), and (c) of the Genocide Convention provide: 
  In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed  
  with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious  
  group, as such: 
   (a) killing members of the group; 
   (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
   (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to  
    bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part …  
 Furthermore, article III provides: 
                                               
90 Art. III(c). 
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  The following acts shall be punishable: 
   (a) Genocide; 
   (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
   (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
   (d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
   (e) Complicity in genocide.91 
 Here, under international law, just as with the analysis within U.S. law, al Qaeda and ISIS, 
to the extent that they are calling for the murder of U.S. citizens, because they are U.S. citizens, 
are presumptively guilty of inciting genocide, or acts of genocide, against U.S. citizens. 92 
 Article IV makes clear that individuals can be personally liable under international law as 
it states, “[p]ersons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals” (CPPCG 1948, Art. IV).  Consequently, members of al Qaeda and ISIS, and any other 
terrorist group who advocate, incite, or otherwise adopt similar goals, “shall” be punished under 
international law.  The word “shall” renders the obligation to seek out and punish nonstate illegal 
combatants engaging in genocide compulsory.  Article V of the Genocide Convention sets forth 
the manner in which this is to be completed.  Specifically, the Convention requires the 
“Contracting States,” which include the U.S., to “undertake to enact, in accordance with their 
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any 
of the other acts enumerated in article III” (UCCPG 1948, Art. V).  Under the language of the 
Convention, the U.S. is legally obligated to tailor its internal domestic legal structure in such a 
                                               
91 Genocide Convention, art. III.  Notably, conspiracy is classified as a crime.  Id. art. III(b). 
92 See Genocide Convention, arts. II(a), III(c). 
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way that U.S. law allows for the punishment of any and all individuals guilty of genocide or acts 
of genocide.  Article VI of the Genocide Convention (1948) states, 
 Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 
III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which 
the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have 
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction. 
 In short, a cursory analysis of the relevant law renders terrorists engaging in genocidal 
terrorism excluded from POW status and the corresponding legal and political privileges (Geneva 
Convention 1949, Art. 17).  As stated above, however, POW status is not the only legal protection 
available to nonstate actors.  We must then ask whether genocidal terrorists are entitled to other 
forms of protection under the law of war.  To answer this we must establish that a war, in fact, 
exists.  In other words, can a war, under current international law, not in the philosophic sense, 
actually exist between duly constituted states and terrorists? 
A New War 
 Under a legal analysis, the GWT is a new war, a different type of war from the many wars 
fought by the U.S. in the past.  Legally speaking, the U.S. is not at war with Iraq.  The U.S. has a 
peace-keeping force in Iraq attempting to assist in establishing and maintaining order.  The U.S. 
is also playing a police function in that ground troops are also assisting with apprehending 
insurgents or individuals considered terrorists.  Similarly, in Afghanistan the U.S. is not at war 
with Afghanistan as it only has peace-keeping troops in that country.  The U.S. is looking to 
apprehend members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan.  Presently in Syria the U.S. is not officially 
involved, although some reports claim it is siding with the rebels by arming them in their fight 
against the Assad regime, which is itself backed by the Russian Federation and Russian President 
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Vladimir Putin.  Al Qaeda and ISIS are responding to these interventions by attacking the U.S. and 
its allies on a global scale.  We must, therefore, ask whether this situation results in a legal “war” 
between the U.S. and its allies on one side and al Qaeda, ISIS, and others on the other side. 
 Because of the continuous references to the GWT, many seem to believe that a traditional 
war is underway.  Certainly an armed conflict is underway between the U.S. and multiple entities, 
but armed conflicts are not necessarily legal war.  Consequently, it is possible that many 
individuals are under the impression that the international law of war is applicable.  To the extent 
that terrorists, or illegal combatants, are participating in the conflict, as has been stated above, the 
law of war is simply inapplicable to them as they do not qualify for protection under international 
law.  Nevertheless, the USSC, in opposition to the international law, has decided that detainees, 
illegal combatants, are in fact protected by the Geneva Conventions.  The U.S. Congress has 
responded by passing laws to undermine the USSC’s ruling.  That said, in undertaking a legal 
analysis of the decision within the context of international law, we can determine whether or not 
the USSC was correct in its decision.  Under one way of viewing international law, which is to say 
strictly adhering to the black-letter of the law, the court was incorrect. 
 The rationale is that the ongoing situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria is essentially a 
conflict with illegal combatants and insurgents, not a war.  It is to some extent a global armed 
conflict with its locus of tension in fact in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria; however, these individuals 
are willing to fight and actually are fighting their ideological battle anywhere they find Americans.  
And as stated, they are doing so contrary to the law of war.  Despite efforts by the U.S. and its 
allies to locate and destroy terrorist facilities and to either capture or kill any members of al Qaeda 
and ISIS they find, or perhaps because of efforts, the increased frequency and level of severity of 
terrorist attacks around the globe seem to indicate an armed conflict is in fact underway, albeit of 
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a different form from a traditional war.  In other words, what the terrorists have done, and have 
promised to do, if undertaken by a duly constituted state, would be enough to trigger the War 
Powers Act, the act of allowing the Executive (the President) to claim the U.S. has been visited by 
war and thus defend the U.S. accordingly.  While only the Congress can legally declare war, 93 the 
War Powers Act94 allows the President to act unilaterally.95  Here, however, the actors are not duly 
constituted states but unlawful nonstate actors. 
 Those who argue for favorable treatment of unlawful combatants, and for the exclusion of 
nonstate actors from international law, are arguing in favor of an untenable legal position given 
the existing legal structure.  These arguably fatuous positions have at minimum confused the 
conceptual clarity that war can exist between states and nonstate actors.  In other words, war, 
legally understood, requires two states.  What is different, and dispositive in its difference, is that 
this type of war, which is to say a war on terror, is not being fought by lawful combatants.  On one 
side of the conflict are duly constituted states, the U.S. and its allies.  On the other side of the 
conflict are al Qaeda and ISIS, who are by definition illegal combatants and thus not entitled to 
any of the protections of the law, or so goes the argument.  I simply disagree. 
 
 
 
                                               
93 Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the sole power “to declare war…” 
94 The War Powers Act was passed in 1973 and gives the President of the United States the ability to initiate hostilities 
for a period of 90 days without consulting Congress. 
95 It should be noted that many Presidents act unilaterally pursuant to the authority granted them by neither the 
Congress nor the 1973 War Powers Act but rather by relying on Article II, Section 2, which clearly states “The 
president shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.”  This, presidents have argued, 
grants them the authority to send soldiers into combat without a formal declaration of war by Congress. 
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Chapter Four: 
International Law 
Argument For Extending Rights to Non-state Actors: 
(The Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 
Philosophical Problem with JWT and the GWT 
 If we accept the assertions of these just war philosophers we have to accept fundamentally 
that self-defense is permissible.  We also have to accept that a war initiated without just cause vests 
in the attacked party the indisputable right of self-defense.  In this context the current U.S. foreign 
policy position as set forth in the 2002 National Security Strategy memorandum (NSSM 2002) is 
unbelievably problematic.  9/11 witnessed violence being visited upon the U.S.  This violence 
resulted in the GWT.  But while some believe that 9/11 fundamentally redefined both American 
foreign policy and America’s national security strategy, I am of the opinion that it did no such 
thing.  Instead, 9/11 simply emboldened America to state outright that which it has believed and 
pursued for a great many decades: America First!  This foreign policy position and national 
security strategy are served by what is commonly referred to as the Bush Doctrine.  Understanding 
the Bush Doctrine is important because its motivation is critical under both JWT and international 
law.  JWT and international law require that the motivation for using violence be examined.  When 
used legitimately and correctly by the state, violence is used justly.  When used illegitimately and 
incorrectly, violence is used unjustly.  This is why understanding the doctrine’s motivation is 
important.  There exists no blanket prohibition against the use of violence in either JWT or 
international law.  One of the requirements is that if used it must be used for the right reasons.  
Moreover, the motivation behind the initiation of violence will help us determine whether those 
nonstate actors who resist can be treated the way they are currently treated, which is at the heart 
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of my research question.  Consequently, the question before us now is whether or not the Bush 
Doctrine is itself just within the context of JWT. 
The Bush Doctrine 
 The Bush Doctrine, to state it plainly, is the idea that the U.S. will proactively attack any 
and all countries or entities the U.S. deems to be a threat to its national security and national interest 
anywhere in the world.  As will be demonstrated below, the GWT is actually less a war on terrorism 
and more a strategy for both hegemony and dominance at the global level.  The Bush Doctrine 
combines supposed principles of justice with a national security strategy that is grounded in a show 
of force and a use of power.  The GWT has two parts: (i) a purported war on terror, and (ii) a grand 
strategy of global leadership.96  Problematically, the Bush Doctrine, which is argued to be 
preemptive in nature, is actually preventive in nature.  This is not a distinction without a difference.  
A preemptive attack, as articulated by the Hon. Daniel Webster in a letter he wrote on August 6th, 
1842, addressed to Lord Ashburton, is one in which “…the necessity of that self-defence is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”  A preventive 
attack, on the other hand, allows for, in fact requires the proactive seeking, identifying, and 
destroying of any potential threat to the U.S.  It is now more apt to say the U.S. follows less the 
advice of Daniel Webster and more the advice of Niccolò Machiavelli who argues 
[one must] not only have to have regard for present troubles but also for 
future ones, and they have to avoid these with all their industry because, 
when one foresees from afar, one can easily find a remedy for them but 
when you wait until they come close to you, the medicine is not in time 
because the disease has become incurable.  And it happens with this as the 
physicians say of consumption, that in the beginning of the illness it is easy 
to cure and difficult to recognize, but in the progress of time, when it has 
                                               
96 This grand strategy includes the elimination, preclusion, and prevention of any and all rivals either regional or 
global. 
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not been recognized and treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to 
recognize and difficult to cure.  So it happens in affairs of state, because 
when one recognizes from afar the evils that arise in a state (which is not 
given but to one who is prudent), they are soon healed; but when they are 
left to grow because they were not recognized, to the point that everyone 
recognizes them, there is no longer any remedy for them (Machiavelli, The 
Prince 1998 [1532], 12). 
Again, this is not a distinction without a difference for the change from Webster to Machiavelli 
renders the Bush Doctrine morally unjustifiable under JWT. 
 The historical record shows that almost immediately after 9/11 President Bush framed the 
events of 9/11 as an act of war.  President Bush, in a meeting with his national security team, on 
September 12, 2001, said, “[t]he deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday 
against our country were more than acts of terror.  They were acts of war.”  The U.S. responded 
by initiating the GWT.  He also said, in the form of the NSSM (2002), “The United States of 
America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach.  The enemy is not a single political 
regime or person or religion or ideology.  The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”97  Despite this fiery rhetoric it is important to 
note that a war on terrorism is a conceptual non sequitur as the hallmark of terrorism is 
opportunistic asymmetrical violence, rendering it functionally nothing more than a tactic.  
Moreover, the label terrorism is attached based on what is little more than a feeling engendered 
within those attacked.  As for the ‘why?’ terrorists attack, they are not monolithic.  They are not 
necessarily all fighting for precisely the same reasons.  In fact, what the U.S. is at war with are 
organizations and individuals who seem to vehemently, and violently, disagree with aspects of the 
western way of life and America’s political economy goals as manifesting and pursued in U.S. 
foreign policy.  ISIL openly proclaims in their magazine Dabiq that they hate the West for its 
                                               
97 Remarks made by President George W. Bush at the National Cathedral in Washington DC on September 14, 2001. 
78 
 
refusal to accept Allah, and for the way we live our lives, and mock and persecute those who live 
under Islam.98  On the other hand, while bin Laden regularly invokes the language of Islam, if the 
expression that “we can know all we need to know about a person and their motives” is true then 
we can infer based on many of the books found on bin Laden’s book shelf99 that he was motivated 
by political economy considerations just as much as he was motivated by religious ones.  More 
specifically, the political economy as furthered and pursued by U.S. foreign policy is but one thing 
that these organizations and individuals are fighting against.  The GWT can therefore be placed in 
a larger context, a context of an ongoing geopolitical and economic strategic conflict rather than, 
as it is framed by the U.S., some rogue individuals who “hate [our] freedoms,”100 a contention that 
is as laughable as it is uninformed.  Therefore, when properly framed and understood, I argue (later 
in this chapter) the GWT was and continues to be a colossal mistake.  9/11 could have and should 
have been seen and treated as nothing more than a criminal act under both domestic and 
international law.  Those responsible for 9/11 should have been dealt with accordingly. 
 In practical and theoretical terms the GWT purports to attempt to curtail the proliferation 
and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to rid the world of evil, an ambitious goal if 
                                               
98 There is an interesting argument to be made here that ISIL is invoking the natural law of God as justification for 
killing anyone who does not believe in their God and who will not convert to their religion in order to worship their 
God.  This is interesting because it is precisely the same argument made by Christians who killed those who did not 
believe in their God and who did not convert to their religion in order to worship their God. 
99 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a full reading list of items found in OBL’s compound.  
Some of these works are John Perkins’ Confessions of an Economic Hitman, Anthony Sutton’s The Best Enemy Money 
Can Buy, Greg Palast’s The Best Decomcracy Money Can Buy, Noam Chomsky’s Hegemony or Survival: America’s 
Quest for Global Dominance, and Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies, Michael Scheuer’s 
Imperial Hubris, Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Eustace Mullins’ Secrets of the Federal 
Reserve, Colin Mason’s The 2030 Spike, Michael O’Hanlon’s Unfinished Business, U.S. Overseas Military Presence 
in the 21st Century, Robert Hopkins Miller’s The U.S. and Vietnam 1787-1941, and Anthony Aust’s Handbook of 
International Law. 
100 President Bush made this comment during a speech on September 20, 2001 to a joint session of Congress.  President 
Bush framed 9/11 by claiming “our fellow citizens, our way of life, our freedom came under attack in a series of 
deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks.”  President Bush went on to say, “America was targeted for attack because we 
are the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” 
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ever there was one.  Rhetorically, President Bush framed the GWT as a struggle between “good 
and evil.”  At the Military Academy at West Point in June, President Bush stated, 
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism 
and technology.  When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear 
weapons, along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even 
weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike 
great nations.  Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been 
caught seeking these terrible weapons.  They want the capability to 
blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends – and we will oppose 
them with all our power. 
Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong.  
Brutality against women is always and everywhere wrong.  There can be no 
neutrality between justice and cruelty between the innocent and the guilty.  
We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by 
its name.  By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a 
problem, we reveal a problem.  And we will lead the world in opposing it.101 
 This position led the Bush administration to see the need for what it termed preemptive 
action.102  Actually, as described above when analyzed we see that what it calls for is actually a 
preventive action.  To be fair, despite the name attached to the doctrine it is not the brainchild of 
President Bush.  The idea of prevention as applied to U.S. foreign policy was first articulated by 
Albert Wohlstetter, in a paper he wrote for the Rand Corporation, the Delicate Balance of Terror 
(DBT 1958).  The central tenets of the DBT are essentially as follows: the nature of the new threat 
confronting the U.S. is both hidden and unpredictable.  The only way to ensure true safety is to 
eliminate the threat before it manifests.  A purely defensive posture wherein the U.S. waits to be 
                                               
101 Remarks made by President George W. Bush at the commencement ceremony at the Military Academy at West 
Point on June 1, 2002.  It must also be pointed out that leading the world is not exactly what we are doing when one 
considers the fact that the U.S. is willing to go it alone.  The U.S. is not at all concerned with whether the world, the 
international community, follows the U.S. in its foreign policy endeavors. 
102 What the U.S. calls preemptive is actually preventive and the implementation of an idea that ostensibly began in 
1958 with Albert Wohlstetter.  Despite his contention to the contrary, his idea is tantamount to prevention and not 
preemption.  Placed in this historical context one can plausibly argue that the “Bush Doctrine” is less an ad hoc 
response to 9/11 and more the opportunistic seizing of a moment to implement a policy initiative long desired by neo-
conservatives.  The central idea is that the U.S. must take proactive steps to prevent any potential rival from emerging 
anywhere in the world. 
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attacked or waits for an attack to be imminent as required by both U.S. law and customary 
international law (Caroline Affair 1837) and international law before using force is now 
unsatisfactory.  Article 51 of the UN Charter envisions and speaks to self-defense only.  In the 
event of a preemptive military strike the Caroline Affair allows for a permissive legal posture.  
That is to say Article 51 of the UN Charter does not actually apply because no actual attack has 
yet occurred.  The proponents of the Bush Doctrine, and Wohlstetter before them, argue the U.S. 
must now act first so as to prevent any and all threats.  In so doing they will have created a situation 
in which they prevent any and all rivals from emerging and challenging the U.S. in the future.  This 
new foreign policy posture is explicitly for the purpose of ensuring that no nation on Earth will be 
in a position to challenge American access to key resources, human or otherwise, anywhere in the 
world. 
 Failure to prevent an attack is deemed to be the very definition of irresponsible in the eyes 
of the Bush Doctrine.  As Machiavelli argued centuries ago, today the U.S. argues 
History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to 
act.  In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security 
is the path of action (NSSM 2002, 2).103 
… defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at 
home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches 
our borders.  While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the 
support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively 
against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people 
and our country (NSSM 2002, 6) 
                                               
103 Once we realize that “path of action” means war we see this statement for precisely what it is, one-third of the 
slogan of the Ministry of Truth as observed by Winston in George Orwell’s 1984, “War is Peace; Freedom is Slavery; 
Ignorance is Strength.” 
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President Bush, in a speech to the nation on the evening of September 11, 2001, also articulated 
the position that the U.S. would make “… no distinction between the terrorists who committed 
these acts and those who harbor them.”  This is best summarized by the idea of giving aid and 
comfort to the enemy.  This is a radical policy because the U.S. is functionally claiming the right 
to unilaterally invade a sovereign country if the U.S. believes it is necessary before an attack has 
taken place.  In the context of broader American goals it will be deemed necessary if it is in 
America’s economic interests.  This violates the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, 
both of which are central to the conception and integrity of the nation-state system.  Moreover, the 
U.S. would be hard-pressed to claim such motivation constitutes a just cause, and would be loathed 
to accept if any other country claimed a similar right for themselves at the expense of U.S. 
sovereignty. 
 The Bush Doctrine marks a shift in the American government’s rhetoric away from 
“containment,” as articulated and practiced during the Cold War, toward prevention under the 
guise of preemptive self-defense during the new GWT.  To those of us who study international 
relations the Bush Doctrine is the ideological cornerstone of America’s new global strategy that 
pursues U.S. global hegemony.  It is difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to argue otherwise.  
President Bush, in the commencement speech at the West Point Military Academy stated, 
For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War 
doctrines of deterrence and containment.  In some cases, those strategies 
still apply.  But new threats also require new thinking.  Deterrence – the 
promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against 
shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.  
Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of 
mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide 
them to terrorist allies. 
The NSSM 2002 states: 
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It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this 
new threat.  Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States 
can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The 
inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and 
the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ 
choice of weapons, do not permit that option.  We cannot let our enemies 
strike first (NSSM 2002, 15). 
In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a 
generally status quo, risk-averse adversary.  Deterrence was an effective 
defense.  But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less 
likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, 
gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations 
(NSSM 2002, 15). 
Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy 
whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; 
whose so called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent 
protection is statelessness.  The overlap between states that sponsor terror 
and those that pursue WMD compels us to action (NSSM 2002, 15) 
It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength.  We 
must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge.  Our military’s 
highest priority is to defend the United States (NSSM 2002, 15). 
 This idea of “defending” the U.S., or more specifically, this particular way of defending 
the U.S., according to Andrew Bacevich, can be traced through several documents.104  The Defense 
Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, written by then-Secretary of Defense 
Cheney, sets out a new philosophy of international relations, a global strategy for American 
leadership.  Secretary Cheney argues that because the U.S. was victorious over the Soviet Union 
it is now the world’s only superpower; therefore, a new global strategy with respect to U.S. foreign 
policy is needed.  That new global strategy, Secretary Cheney argues, is the elimination and 
preclusion of rivals, whether regional or global, that would challenge, and thus threaten, U.S. 
                                               
104 We can trace the development of the Bush Doctrine through (i) The Delicate Balance of Terror (1958), the Defense 
Strategy for the 1990s (1993), From Containment to Global Leadership (1989), the Joint Vision 2010 (1996), 
Rebuilding America’s Defenses (2000), and, finally, the National Security Strategy Memorandum (2002). 
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dominance in economically and geopolitically strategically critical regions of the world.  Secretary 
Cheney writes, 
… [the] goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region 
critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against 
the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the United States and 
our allies.  These regions include Europe, the Middle East/Persian gulf, and 
Latin America.  Consolidated, nondemocratic control of the resources of 
such a critical region could generate a significant threat to our security 
(1993, 4).105 
A Rand Corporation study, From Containment to Global Leadership (FCGL) (1989) written at the 
behest of the U.S. Air Force, argues, 
… the United States needs a new “grand strategy” for pursuing national 
security, economic, and foreign policy interests (FCGL 1989, vii) 
… the United States has been operating without a grand strategy since the 
end of the Cold War (FCGL 1989, vii) 
… the central strategic objective for the United States could be to 
consolidate its global leadership and preclude the rise of a global rival 
(FCGL 1989, 13). 
The balance of power system failed in the past … it might not work any 
better in the future; and war among major powers in the nuclear age would 
surely be devastating (FCGL 1989, 21). 
… [the] global environment will be more open and more receptive to 
American values: democracy, free markets, and the rule of law.  Second, 
such a world has a better chance of dealing cooperatively with its major 
problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threat of regional hegemony by 
renegade states, and low-level conflicts.  Finally, U.S. leadership will help 
preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States 
                                               
105 While perhaps believable to the average American, this argument is somewhat laughable as the U.S. could not care 
less about the form of a given government.  Examples of this are the overthrow of the democratically elected Iranian 
government in 1953, the overthrow of the democratically elected Chilean government in 1973, and the military and 
economic support of authoritarian governments such as the Shah in Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pinochet in Chile, 
et.  That is to say, democratic control of needed resources could be just as problematic for America as an Authoritarian 
government.  The issue is not the form of government, but rather the extent to which a government is willing to conduct 
itself in a manner that is in our best interest.  In other words, the main issue is whether a given government is an 
unfriendly government not whether it is a democratic government. 
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and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all its dangers, 
including a global nuclear exchange (FCGL 1989, 21). 
Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what 
interest the United States should regard as vital.  It is a prism for identifying 
threats and setting priorities for U.S. policy toward various regions and 
states, for military capabilities and modernization, and for intelligence 
operations (FCGL 1989, 21). 
A global rival could emerge if a hostile power or coalition gained hegemony 
over a critical region.  Therefore, it is a vital U.S. interest to preclude such 
a development – i.e., to be willing to use force if necessary for the purpose.  
A region can be defined as critical if it contains sufficient economic, 
technical, and human resources so that a hostile power that gained control 
over it could pose a global challenge (FCGL 1989, 25). 
 Given its explicit goals of pursuing global hegemony, despite using the label “global 
leadership,” the legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine is refuted.  The U.S. does not have a just cause 
or a right intent behind its act.  The GWT was simply integrated into the new global strategy of 
global hegemony, which is itself prima facie neither a just cause nor a right intent.  Because 
prevention is part of global hegemony, in the context of global dominance, the U.S. identifies as 
“rogue” states any state that does little more than present a challenge – whether actual, potential, 
or simply imaginary – to the U.S.  This metric, and nothing more, will determine whether such a 
state must have its regime destabilized, undermined, or outright changed.106 
 I believe that JWT served the purposes of dealing with the conceptual implications of the 
anarchic reality of international relations defined as the interactions among separate sovereign 
nations.  Historically, relations between nations have been described as anarchic because of the 
absence of a global power capable of enforcing either a universal conception of morality or a 
universally applicable law.  The international context is rhetorically a Lockean state of nature 
                                               
106 “Changed” refers to regime change, which is the euphemism of choice of the American foreign policy establishment 
when they mean an invasion, an overthrow, a destabilization, or a U.S. backed coup d’etat of a government. 
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where reason wills out; functionally it is analogous to a Hobbesian state of nature.  At its core a 
Hobbesian state of nature is the pursuit of self-interest under no unified moral code, “a war of all 
against all” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 189).  In this Hobbesian context morality and law are nonexistent.  
The default position is fear and power.  “Dominate or be dominated” is the modus operandi. 
 The logical consequence of this position is that in a Hobbesian state of nature there is no 
terrorism, either as a moral concept or a legal prohibition.  For Hobbes, these standards do not 
emerge until the establishment of a strong central authority.  Terror is the constituent reality.  
Terror is the order of the day.  It is a fundamentally integral part of the system.  In a system such 
as this, one is free to pursue one’s self-interest by any means necessary.  This includes targeting, 
attacking, and even killing innocent civilians.  No central legal or moral authority exists to dictate 
otherwise; as there is no legitimate universal moral order or any universally applicable legal 
principles to prohibit such violence, “terror” is a valid means to an acceptable end.  In short, within 
a Hobbesian state of nature anything goes; that includes terrorism.  Any assertion to the contrary, 
that is to say, any assertion that terrorism is immoral or illegal, as Locke would argue, logically 
depends on a presupposition of the existence of a universal morality or illegality grounded in either 
natural law, natural justice, universal reason as argued by Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, 
Grotius and others, or some combination thereof.107  It is my contention that absent any such 
universal moral code terms such as “innocent” are in themselves meaningless outside the moral 
code of the groups engaged in the act of terror.  In this way, terror, it may be said, is in the eye of 
the beholder.  These groups will decide for themselves who is or is not innocent.  Subjective 
context matters. 
                                               
107 John Locke argues that the state of nature is not the free-for-all described by Hobbes because Locke believes that 
reason is the law of nature and thus checks human behavior. 
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 International law holds – at least on paper – that states are functionally equal.  States have 
the right to self-determination, and consequently are to refrain from intervening in one another’s 
affairs.  In this way, justice at the international level is largely procedural.  For states to behave in 
a just manner toward one another is to respect one another.  So long as state X is not invading, or 
otherwise threatening state Y, or vice versa, neither state X nor state Y is justified in attacking the 
other.  In the context of this limited understanding of justice, violating a nation’s sovereignty is a 
crime of aggression and the attacked state would be ethically and legally justified in fighting back.  
At the international level this philosophical idea, an idea that exists as customary international law, 
has recently been codified.  The use of violence without justification is now the international law; 
it is the crime of aggression.  Such a crime is deemed a crime against the state, a crime against the 
rights of the individual, as well as their individual sense of security.   For context, this is why the 
use of force requires both a legal and a moral justification.  In other words, legal justification is 
provided under the UN Charter.  Moral justification is provided under JWT. 
 As stated above JWT provides several elements grounded in a moral calculus for assessing 
the moral justifiability of the use of military force.  Just cause is but one.  Jus ad bellum also speaks 
to (i) right authority and (ii) right intention.  As demonstrated, these three elements, when used to 
assess both the Bush Doctrine and the GWT demonstrate that the GWT, is a crime of aggression 
and therefore unjustifiable in the context of JWT. 
 Taking these elements in turn, we highlight the problematic nature of the Bush Doctrine.  
In addition to the scholars already cited, the U.S. Catholic Bishops, in The Challenge of Peace: 
God’s Promise and Our Response (1983), described just cause as follows: “War is permissible 
only to confront ‘a real and certain danger,’ i.e., to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions 
necessary for decent human existence and to secure basic human rights” (TCP 1983, 18).  This can 
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include responding to the unwarranted aggression of another country, or responding to a country 
violating the principle of nonintervention.  Pursuant to the UN Charter aggression can be 
immediately met with military force until the international community decides on an official, 
sanctioned, course of action.108  In large part this is because at present there is no global police 
force, or global military force, standing ever-ready to uphold international law.  Individual nation-
states must pursue and punish transgressors.  Therefore, self-defense and the defense of others is 
a just cause. 
 The obvious next question is, does the Bush Doctrine itself qualify as a just cause?  In a 
word, no.  It does not.  America’s use of military force for the purpose of securing its dominance 
and protecting its own interests is not an adequate justification under JWT.  Therefore, it is immoral 
under JWT.  If America’s use of force is unjustified, it is a crime of aggression under international 
law and JWT.  The question then becomes, Are those who are acting in self-defense behaving in a 
way that is consistent with JWT?  While I would be among the first to argue it would appear that 
they are not an argument can be made that they very much are.  Jus in bello illustrates this concept 
insofar as it embraces a principle of discrimination.  This means that noncombatants enjoy, at least 
theoretically, a certain level of immunity from violence.  Noncombatants are not supposed to be 
targeted for intentional killing for either military or political gain.  While I concede this point as 
both a practical matter and a legal rule I do not concede this point as either a transcendent or an 
existential one.  It is precisely and merely tradition.  It is meaningless beyond the idea of tradition.  
If a group has now decided to draw upon their tradition, reinterpret the meaning and redefine the 
dictates of their tradition, it is free to do so.  What’s more, if it truly believes its God sanctions 
                                               
108 Article 51 of the UN Charter speaks to self-defense by a state. 
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their behavior, in fact mandates it, then in some sense, in a very real way, they are acting perfectly 
consistently with natural law as it is religiously understood by them. 
 The fact that this group has simply proclaimed divine authority for themselves with nothing 
more by way of actual evidence to support their seemingly absurd claim is not at all disqualifying 
philosophically speaking, for the conclusory statements of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas 
are on their face no more or less absurd than the conclusory statements of Seyyid Qutb and Osama 
bin Laden who now argue, without any evidence at all, that their God justifies their behavior.  In 
the foreign policy arena it is no different from the U.S. turning its back on tradition when it deems 
the tradition to no longer be in its best interest.  It would seem to me to be the very height of 
hypocrisy to claim that tradition must be followed by one but may be simply disregarded by the 
other.  The U.S. calls it “American Exceptionalism.”  The international community calls it 
“duplicitous” and “hypocritical” and reacts accordingly. 
 Legally speaking, to target innocent noncombatants is by definition to engage in what is 
defined under the law as terrorism.  This is why under the law nonstate actors and not state actors 
are capable of committing acts of terrorism.  Under domestic law terrorism is considered a crime 
(USC 18.1.113B sec. 2331).  Under international law terrorism is considered a crime and possibly 
a war crime.  Therefore, even under international law a military strategy that includes terror is 
always unjustifiable.  Other than collateral damage, provided no criminal negligence was 
exhibited, killing innocent noncombatants violates the notion of fundamental human rights.  That 
said, America is justified under both international law and JWT if it sticks to the well-established 
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legal norms of “preemption”109 or self-defense traditionally understood.  The NSSM 2002 speaks 
to this when it states, 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an 
attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against 
forces that present an imminent danger of attack.  Legal scholars and 
international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the 
existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of 
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack… (NSSM 2002, 9). 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated this is not what America is doing.  In one respect terrorism can be 
defined as the intentional and indiscriminate use of violence, aimed toward innocent civilians for 
political purposes – generating fear, disorder, and instability within a society.  If we borrow a 
concept from von Clausewitz, terrorists are essentially engaging in “politics by other means” 
(Clausewitz, On War, 23).  That said, the legal definition of terrorism is drafted in such a way as 
to ensure that nonstate actors are, or at least may be, accused of terrorism, while states are not.  
This is despite the reality that terrorism in the context of international relations is functionally a 
political strategy used by both states and nonstate actors alike.  Existentially, a people will decide 
for themselves when they are victims of a terror attack.  A right, I point out, the U.S. has reserved 
for itself. 
 It is my contention that terrorism is essentially an absolutely meaningless term in the 
context of philosophical examination, and it is of limited value in the context of legal analysis.  It 
serves to simply help in the treatment of a given act under the law based upon a frowned-upon 
motive.  For example, in the U.S. precisely the same act will be treated differently based on 
different motives (i.e. hate crimes).  In fact, a given act is devoid of any special meaning until the 
motive for the act is determined.  If a gunman kills 100 people with a high-powered rifle the 
                                               
109 The Caroline Affair is permissive when Article 51 of the UN Charter does not apply. 
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immediate question asked is why did he do it.  If the answer is God told him to do it or that he did 
it for political reasons media will call it terrorism, the public will be outraged, and the law will 
respond accordingly.  On the other hand, if the answer is the voices in the gunman’s head told him 
to do it – a distinction without a difference – the conversation will shift away from terrorism and 
toward a disturbed individual who simply undertook a ‘mass shooting’ and the 2nd Amendment 
will inevitably become the focus of the ensuing discussion. 
 To the extent that the world shares one transcendent moral code terrorism is essentially an 
attack on that moral.  However, as I have argued no such transcendent moral code exists.  Instead, 
what the global community is in the process of developing is a universally recognized legal code 
that ultimately speaks to due process.  In other words, trying to determine a philosophic basis for 
judging acts or tactics of violence is by its very nature a problematic endeavor.  Increasingly, terror 
is being seen as simply criminal.  Regardless of whether terror is being used within or without a 
national government, it is seen as something to be prosecuted under the law.  While I know that 
this does not yet translate to an established global moral code, I believe it does translate to a 
budding global legal order. 
 The Bush Doctrine was conceived as a “response” to the reality that terrorism, by its very 
nature, is a danger that is neither clear nor present.  Terrorism, as is the notion of violence 
specifically, is always a potentiality.  Consequently, we are left with what seems to be a binary 
choice.  JWT with its amorphous, vague, and ambiguous elements is either (i) outdated insofar as 
it does not account for the motivations of modern terrorism, or (ii) still relevant, and the 
motivations of the Bush Doctrine and the GWT are simply an unjust cause.  A nuanced analysis 
reveals it is not binary, it is both.  The Bush Doctrine, with respect to preventive attacks against 
those the U.S. perceives to be a potential threat, is simply unjust.  JWT, as an ethical system that 
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is largely a Judeo-Christian system, fails to see the motives of those acting as legitimate.  The only 
major problem with this idea is that in the final analysis both terrorism and the Bush Doctrine are 
explicitly linked to political ends, which renders both actors, state and nonstate alike, to the extent 
that they are both using violence in the service of political ends, guilty of engaging in terrorism.  
The only thing that separates the two is the legal definition written by states, and it should come 
as absolutely no surprise that the legal definition is written so as to ensure the exclusion of states 
and the inclusion of nonstate actors.  Therefore, the threat of terrorism ultimately cannot be 
resolved militarily.  Any good-faith attempt to resolve terrorism has to consider the legitimacy of 
motives and political conflict that drives the perceived need to engage in politically motivated 
violence. 
 In terms of international relations the Bush Doctrine goes a step further.  It links terrorists 
and states together.  The Bush Doctrine claims that terrorists and those who harbor them, or give 
aid and comfort to the enemy, are essentially one and the same.  They are equivalent.  Beginning 
from this position the Bush Doctrine is actually advocating the violation of the principle of 
nonintervention.  If so, it is presumptively legally, if not morally, circumspect.  This is problematic 
for the U.S. when one considers that if a people comes to view the U.S. military as a terrorist 
organization as many do, if they apply precisely the same standard to the U.S., those individuals 
would be justified in attacking civilian targets when we consider that modern military bases look 
like shopping malls and less like military establishments.  The civilians and private companies 
operating thereon are there to keep the morale of the soldiers high and to provide them with 
comfort.  By America’s own standards those American civilians are subject to attack. 
 A more nuanced approach sees us dealing with two issues: (i) what is the degree of 
separation between the terrorists and the State? and (ii) is the State actually providing material 
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support to the terrorists?  In other words, are the State and the terrorist so aligned politically that 
one is essentially indistinguishable from the other?  If so, conceptually, it is easy to see why there 
would be no need for differentiating between the two.  Under both JWT and international law 
invading a sovereign country under the claim that the sovereign country is engaging in terrorism 
(both engaging in it and harboring those who do) requires both a moral and a legal justification.  
Such justification would require substantial, clear, and conclusive, if not definitive evidence of a 
State’s support for terrorists.  In the absence of such evidence any invasion, despite the rhetoric, 
can be considered a crime of aggression, ultimately unjustifiable.  For example, the invasion of 
Iraq, predicated on toppling Saddam Hussein and eliminating its WMD, did not justify the U.S. 
invading Iraq.  Neither reason justified the U.S. invasion because (i) toppling a foreign government 
is permissible neither under international law nor under JWT, and (ii) Iraq never had WMDs.  The 
U.S. has done the former several times and knew the latter was not true when it knowingly lied 
claiming that Iraq had WMD.  We know the U.S. lied because we know that on October 7, 2002 
when President Bush, in his remarks at the Cincinnati Museum Center claimed that Iraq had a 
“massive stockpile” of WMD, specifically biological weapons there was no intelligence to support 
such a claim.  Condoleezza Rice said as much when speaking to Tim Russert on CNN.  In 2004 
George Tenet, CIA Director in 2004, noted that the CIA had “no specific information on the types 
or quantities of weapons agent or stockpiles at Baghdad’s disposal” and had made this clear to 
policymakers.  On December 31, 2002, when speaking from a coffee shop in Crawford, Texas, 
President Bush claimed, “We do not know whether or not [Iraq] has a nuclear weapon.”  Here 
again, George Tenet made clear that the CIA stated unequivocally, “… Saddam did not have a 
nuclear weapon and probably would have been unable to make one until 2007 to 2009.”  In other 
words, President Bush, while speaking from a coffee shop in Crawford lied.  In September of 2002, 
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while on CNN, Condoleeza Rice proclaimed that the aluminum tubes possessed by Iraq were “only 
really suited for nuclear weapons programs.”  Once again, this was directly contradicted.  On 
October 3, 2004, The New York Times ran an article The Nuclear Card: The Aluminum Tube Story 
– A Special report.; How White House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence.  The article 
made clear that the Energy Department informed the White House that it was not only possible 
that the tubes were for nonnuclear purposes, but that in their opinion the tubes were probably being 
used for nonnuclear purposes.  Finally, while on Meet The Press Condoleeza Rice admitted that 
then CIA Director George Tenet asked that all language pertaining to Iraq attempting to buy yellow 
cake uranium from Africa be removed from the Cincinnati speech because there existed no 
intelligence sufficient to support such a claim.  It should be noted that Ambassador Wilson made 
this absolutely clear to the White House over a year prior to the State of the Union.  The White 
House complied; however, three months later the offending and unsupported language was 
reinserted once again into the narrative and President Bush asserted this claim at the State of the 
Union.  Vice President Dick Cheney on more than one occasion claimed that Mohammed Atta – 
one of the conspirators of 9/11 – met with an Iraqi intelligence officer.  This claim was made so 
as to connect Iraq with 9/11.  According to both the FBI and the CIA, quite simply, this meeting 
never took place.  In August 2002 Vice President Dick Cheney, gave a talk at the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars (VFW) national convention in Nashville, Tennessee.  In that speech Dick Cheney 
said, “… there’s no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.”  Dick 
Cheney made this statement at a time when there was precisely zero confirmation of this from the 
intelligence community.  In fact, Gen. Anthony Zinni, who was in attendance at Dick Cheney’s 
speech, in a documentary called Hubris: Selling the Iraq War actually said about Dick Cheney’s 
comments, “It was a total shock.  I couldn’t believe the vice president was saying this, you know?  
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In doing work with the CIA on Iraq WMD, through all the briefings I heard at Langley, I never 
saw one piece of credible evidence that there was an ongoing program.”  My last example is the 
most obvious – perhaps a harbinger of what was to come in the form of Donald Trump.  President 
Bush, during a press conference at the White House, is asked “What did Iraq have to do with 
9/11?”  President Bush answered, “Nothing.”  President Bush literally said, “Nothing” 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_A77N5WKWM).  Iraq had “Nothing” to do with 9/11.  He 
said this after he and his administration spent months claiming that Iraq was somehow connected 
to 9/11 and that Iraq had WMD, which was known to not be the case. 
 It should be pointed out that this was not the first time a lie was used in order to justify an 
invasion of Iraq.  The first invasion of Iraq was predicated entirely predicated on a lie.  During a 
hearing held in October 1990, before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus a young woman 
name Nayira gave sworn testimony.  She testified that she was a volunteer at a hospital in Kuwait.  
While volunteering in al-Adan hospital, she testified that she personally witnessed Iraqi troops 
ripping babies out of incubators and leaving them for dead on “the cold floor.”  She wept, and 
sobbed, claiming how “horrifying” of a spectacle it was.  Nayira’s testimony was cited by no less 
than seven U.S. senators when they tried to get Americans to do what Americans were otherwise 
unwilling to do, support the invasion of Iraq.  President George H.W. Bush used Nayira’s 
testimony on as many as ten occasions to convince Americans they ought to support the invasion 
of Iraq.  There was only one problem with Nayira’s testimony: it was a lie from start to finish.  
Amnesty International along with independent journalists proved that the entire story was a work 
of fiction.  John MacArthur, in 1992, revealed that the young woman who testified on that die was 
the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S.  In fact, her testimony was organized by 
Citizens for a Free Kuwait, a front for the Kuwaiti regime.  Evidently, Citizens for a Free Kuwait 
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retained the services of New York public relations firm Hill & Knowlton in order to secure 
American support for the invasion of Iraq.  The ultimately successful campaign cost $10.7 million 
dollars and was the result of focus groups that helped the firm identify just what it would take 
Americans to support an invasion of Iraq.  Evidently, an atrocity laden campaign would do the 
trick, and it did.  As a result of a brilliant public relations campaign meant to manipulate the 
American people, stories about Iraqi baby-murderers were on pretty much every news outlet.  That 
the story was not true was, I suppose, an irrelevant detail.  Interestingly, Craig Fuller, President 
and COO of Hill & Knowlton was President George H.W. Bush’s COS when President Bush was 
Vice President under President Ronald Reagan.  The people living in Iraq are now justified under 
both international law and JWT to fight back against the U.S.  In fighting back they would not be 
terrorists as the U.S. would have the world believe.  They would be people fighting to free their 
homeland from an illegal occupying force, the U.S. 
 In the same press conference referenced above in addition to admitting that Iraq had 
“Nothing” to do with 9/11, President Bush goes on to say that the lesson of 9/11 is “take care of 
threats before they fully materialize.”  For all intents and purposes this idea is the Bush Doctrine, 
and it would make Machiavelli proud.  This claim notwithstanding, under JWT, the idea of regime 
change based on a “preventive” mindset is also problematic when one considers that a just cause, 
or a proper act, must be accompanied by a right intention.  That is to say the intention behind the 
decision to use force must itself be right.  The intention must itself be in accordance with a just 
cause.  In other words, when engaging in self-defense, one’s intention must be to engage in self-
defense and nothing else.  When engaging in protection, or defense of others, one’s intention must 
be to engage in protection, or defense of others, and nothing else.  When engaging in the 
establishment of a just peace, one’s intention must be to engage in the establishment of a just peace, 
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and nothing else.  These examples may not be mere pretexts for the annexation of territory, 
pecuniary gain, population or resource control, increasing one’s power, establishing hegemony, or 
any other ultimately self-interested motivation. 
 Obviously attempting to ascertain an actor’s actual intention, despite an actor’s pretense to 
intention, is difficult.  We may look to the historical record in this regard and from the historical 
record we may speculate as to an actor’s intentions.  In other words, we can look to an actor’s 
behavior over time and draw certain conclusions with respect to what an actor actually intended 
despite its political rhetoric.  Take, for example, the issue of peace.  If history demonstrates that 
an actor has not been committed to peace then we need not take the actor seriously when it states 
that it undertakes an action with the intention of exercising self-defense, defense of others, or 
establishing peace.  The actor’s claim is simply not credible, and can be viewed with suspicion.  
In other words, if an actor invokes JWT in an attempt to justify its actions, despite a long history 
of violating precisely those principles it now claims to uphold, the international community is free 
to not believe the actor’s rhetoric.  This is precisely the position in which the U.S. now finds itself.  
For example, without creating an exhaustive list the U.S. has undertaken both overt and covert 
actions around the world.  While the 19th century saw the U.S. engaging in regime change 
throughout Latin America, the 20th century saw the U.S. overthrowing or supporting the 
governments of Afghanistan, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, 
Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, etc.  If we expand our definition of interfering with foreign 
sovereignty to include tampering with another country’s elections we see that the U.S. has 
undertaken approximately 81 interventions between 1946 and 2000 – that we know about. 
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 This being said, both the historical record and the modern record give much needed context 
to the Bush Doctrine.  That the historical record is replete with examples110 of illegal U.S. 
intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign countries.  Moreover foreign countries can ignore 
the historical record and simply read the 2002 NSSM.  It is obvious that the Bush Doctrine is 
linked to the new global strategy of political hegemony and full spectrum dominance.  In other 
words, the U.S. has established, and is now availing itself of, a prohibitive and unchallengeable 
global military dominance so as to preserve the current status quo of U.S. economic dominance.  
Given that the new global strategy for the U.S. is domination both militarily and economically it 
finds neither support nor legitimacy under JWT as JWT neither allows, nor justifies, this course of 
action as this course of action is imperialistic.  JWT simply does not justify imperialism.  The 
wrong intention renders the justness of America’s foreign policy as invalid. 
Proper Authority 
 The next criterion under JWT is that of proper authority.  As explained in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation the decision to use force and the actual use of force must be within the purview of a 
legitimate political sovereign, or its agent.  Procedurally, right authority also requires that war be 
officially declared.  For a war to be declared officially a bill of particulars needs to set forth both 
the moral justification and the aims, or the desired end, of war.  Moreover, under the existing 
international legal order, pursuant to treaty agreements, under the auspices of the United Nations, 
consistent with the UN Charter, force must be legally authorized by the sovereign in question, 
                                               
110 Without creating an exhaustive list the U.S. has undertaken both overt and covert actions around the world.  The 
19th century saw the U.S. engaging in regime change throughout Latin America.  The 20th century saw the U.S. 
overthrowing or supporting the governments of Afghanistan, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, etc.  If we expand our definition of interfering with foreign 
sovereignty to include tampering with another country’s elections we see that the U.S. has undertaken approximately 
81 interventions between 1946 and 2000 – that we know about. 
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which is the United Nations in the form of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).111  
Requiring right authority is an attempt to confer legal and political legitimacy upon the use of 
force.  The Bush Doctrine, vis-a-vis the GWT, in the context of international law vis-à-vis UNSC 
is illegal.  The Bush Doctrine puts the international community on notice that the U.S. will act 
unilaterally in pursuing its own goals, its own interests (NSSM 2002, 31).  While one may argue 
that President Obama tried to bring the U.S. back in line with respect to a multi-lateral approach, 
Trump has made it abundantly clear that he has no such ambition and little if any concern for a 
multi-lateral international approach.  Given the extent of international interconnectedness the goal 
of the UN charter is to render the use of force justified in the legal sense when international law is 
followed.  This was not the case with respect to the invasion of Iraq and is not the case with respect 
to the GWT and other countries.  International law does not support the unilateral decision by the 
U.S. to invade Iraq and fight terror anywhere in the world. 
Security Dilemma 
 This is the problem with attaching a goal of global dominance to a foreign policy position 
that advocates actively preventing competition from emerging anywhere in the world with respect 
to resources of strategic and economic value.  In practice, this position will result in restarting the 
arms race as the security dilemma will be triggered.  Mutual cooperation is not necessarily the 
modus operandi of the U.S.  Again, the U.S. has put the world on notice that it will pursue its own 
interests even if to do so is to the detriment of others.  The international community knows all too 
well this is not an empty threat on the part of the U.S. for if history has taught the world anything 
it is that if they wish not to be invaded by the U.S. they ought to arm themselves, arm themselves 
                                               
111The UN Charter makes allowances for the use of force when used in self-defense, but the Security Council is the 
final authority. 
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heavily, and convince the U.S. that they are prepared to use their armaments.  To simply trust that 
the U.S. will sit idly by while a given country pursues its own interests to the detriment of the U.S. 
interests is to fail to have learned the lessons of history.  Therefore, the Bush Doctrine’s stated aim 
will likely result in an arms race as nations the world over increase their armaments in order to 
defend themselves from a perceived threat from the U.S..  Where countries are either unable or 
unwilling to spend their treasure on developing their military they are likely to pursue other means 
of defending themselves or attacking others, for example cyber capabilities.  Ironically, this 
plausibly purely defensive posture on the part of members of the international community will 
cause fear, or trepidation, on the part of the U.S., which will likely see the increase in armaments 
or capabilities as a threatening move.  As surely as night follows day the U.S. will call for increased 
military spending as it will likely claim that such moves on the part of its perceived adversaries 
are a potential destabilization of the status quo if not an outright provocation.  The increased 
armaments and the increased fear have the possibility if not the probability to lead to conflict.  The 
security dilemma, given the overwhelming military disparity between the U.S. and any other 
member of the international community, is likely to lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons, for 
nuclear weapons are the actual deterrent with respect to the U.S..  Where the attainment of nuclear 
weapons is difficult, if not impossible, the likely result of the security dilemma and the disparity 
of military power is an increase in asymmetrical initiatives given the near impossibility of 
conventional military confrontation and engagement.  In short, the Bush Doctrine and the GWT 
are useless as the former is a predatory doctrine in the guise of a global initiative to eradicate evil 
in the form of the GWT but in reality is nothing more than an attempt to establish global hegemony.  
The GWT will instead continue to destabilize regions around the world and will increase 
international terrorism as the predatory and subversive policy initiative that is the Bush Doctrine 
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will do more to reinforce the anarchic nature of international relations, and little if anything to 
create greater unity, safety, and security.  Unlike the Melians and the Athenians of old the modern 
day Melians are in a position to fight back and visit death and destruction upon the modern day 
Athenians.112 
Last Resort 
 With respect to last resort the Bush Administration used the Bush Doctrine as a means of 
justifying the invasion of Iraq as simultaneously a way of protecting against a potential terrorist 
threat and a way of removing a potential rival in control of a critical country in a critical region of 
the world in control of vital resources necessary to the U.S. political economy.  We know that the 
Bush Administration exhibited hostility toward any and all inspections of the Iraqi regime, opting 
instead for an invasion and ultimately a regime change.  Practically speaking the U.S. need not 
have acted when (or how) it did.  The U.S. could have waited.  Instead, the U.S. was more 
interested in putting into effect its strategy for global domination.  JWT’s requirement of last resort 
was unequivocally violated with respect to the invasion of Iraq.  Moreover, as the Administration 
knew that Iraq possessed no WMD and did not thus present an imminent threat, the threat itself 
was not a threat at all but rather a lie pure and simple.113 
 In short, the Bush Doctrine, vis-à-vis the GWT, is woefully problematic with respect to 
both international law and JWT.  A power-driven, hegemonic-focused foreign policy undermines 
                                               
112 President Bush acknowledged as much in his speech at West Point when he said, “…even weak states and small 
groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.” 
113 In the documentary Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War, in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, Scott 
Ritter, a UN Weapons Inspector, made clear that the administration’s claims regarding aluminum tubes were false; 
Ambassador Joseph Wilson stated Iraq did not purchase, let alone possess yellow cake uranium; David Albright, a 
UN Weapons Inspector, made clear that the administration was putting out one-sided and skewed information about 
Iraqi WMD. 
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the moral credibility of the Bush Doctrine.  By extension, the moral credibility of the U.S. is also 
undermined.  This renders the U.S. the aggressor and bestows upon those invaded the right of self-
defense. 
 As is often the case, there exist arguments on both side of the debate regarding the validity 
of the Bush Doctrine.  Robert J. Delahunty, John Yoo, Michael Doyle, and Nguyen Manh Hung 
are indicative of modern scholars who think the Bush Doctrine is a good idea.  For reasons that do 
not only fail to differ a great deal but actually overlap substantially these scholars tend to believe 
that modern-day threats render traditional countermeasures obsolete.  In The Bush Doctrine: Can 
Preventive War Be Justified, Delahunty and Woo argue preventive war is not a radical idea; it has 
been a longstanding cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy; the UN is not necessarily relevant in 
modern times; the Caroline Affair, which gave rise to the principle of preemption, is antiquated; 
and a new standard for the use of force “… should, and eventually will, supplant the U.N. Charter’s 
use-of-force rules in this area” (865).  In other words, the threat of terrorism looms large like a 
modern-day sword of Damocles.  As advised by Machiavelli, waiting for a threat to materialize, 
they argue, is folly and inadvisable.  What is needed in the twenty-first century, given the nature 
of the threats faced, is proactive and not reactive foreign policy measures.  On the other side of the 
debate are scholars such as Philip Bobbit, Jeffrey Record, Dan Reiter, and Robert Jervis, who for 
the most part all seem to agree with the conclusion drawn by Reiter in his work, Preventive War 
and Its Alternatives: The Lessons of History: “preventive attacks are generally ineffective, costly, 
unnecessary, and potentially even counterproductive tools for use in behalf of nonproliferation and 
counterterrorism” (2006, 2).  In his article, “Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained,” Robert 
Jervis writes, “Although evidence, let alone proof, is of course elusive, it is hard to avoid the 
inference that the war has created more terrorists than it has killed, has weakened the resolve of 
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others to combat them, and has increased the chance of major attacks on the west” (353).  Jervis 
writes 
Just as the means employed by the Bush Doctrine contradict its ends, so 
also the latter, by being so ambitious, invite failure.  Not only is it extremely  
unlikely that terror can ever be eradicated, let alone the world be rid of evil,  
but the fact that Saddam lost the war in Iraq does not mean that the United 
States won it.  Ousting his regime was less important in itself than as a 
means to other objectives: reducing terrorism, bringing democracy to Iraq, 
transforming the Middle East, and establishing the correctness and the 
legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine (355). 
As my conclusions are in greater agreement with the scholars in the latter group I reject the former. 
Jus in bello 
 It is at this point that we must confront the question of whether those who may otherwise 
have the right of self-defense are behaving in a manner that is consistent with jus in bello.  This is 
an interesting question, not because of the answer, but because of the implicit assumption 
involving JWT and its constituent elements in general.  It is presumed that JWT and its elements 
are a reflection of some transcendent truth that speaks to, or articulates, a universally valid moral 
code.  If this presumption is true then yes, insofar as these nonstate actors violate jus in bello, they 
are deserving of punishment under the dictates of JWT.  If, on the other hand, JWT is not a 
universally valid moral code then it simply does not matter that the precepts of JWT are violated 
as they are nothing more than a set of rules that are as seemingly arbitrary as a speeding limit.  This 
would mean that JWT is nothing more than the moral code of a specific group created at a specific 
time reflecting a specific, which is to say a subjective, view of the world and of absolutely no value 
or force to those who do not subscribe to it! 
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 To put it simply it is the equivalent of paganism in Egypt being challenged by Judaism and 
Christianity, and the Muslims challenging, if not overthrowing, the Christians.  Functionally, this 
question speaks to the age-old debate between natural law and legal positivism.  For me this is less 
a debate than a reflection of a myopic and incorrect way of seeing morality and the law on both 
sides of the issue.  In any conflict the victor, once victorious, gets to posit a new law, a new 
morality.  Once established they simply sidestep the obvious arbitrariness of supplanting the old 
and positing the new by claiming that their new way is not legal and moral positivism at all but 
rather the one true and valid natural law.  It helps to be willing to kill anyone who challenges these 
assertions.  After a few generations it becomes the norm, not because it was or is valid but because 
it is the given society’s new culture, its new tradition.  At this point in my analysis suffice it to say 
that given the parameters of JWT nonstate actors are not justified in their behavior.  To the extent 
that the law is then interpreted consistently with the ideals set forth by and in JWT, nonstate actors 
are not entitled to any legal protections.  The possibility that humans may be treated inhumanely, 
however, is increasingly and loudly deemed unacceptable to many countries, peoples, and 
institutions, the ICRC and the USSC among them.  I argue we are in the middle of a paradigm 
shift, one in which rights are now extended to individuals because they are human beings, not 
because they behave in a manner consistent with the dictates of a 9th century moral code largely 
based upon one of three Abrahamic faiths interpreting the stories of ancient peoples collected, 
edited, passed down verbally at first and through the written word eventually.  These traditions, 
once collected, eventually became the respective holy books, revered by some, understood by few, 
misused by many, and authenticated by precisely zero people, not a one. 
 It is my contention that the only way to prevent and combat terrorism is to look past the 
intent component of terrorism and instead treat any act of politically motivated violence as what it 
104 
 
is, a simple act of violence (e.g. attempted or actual murder).  It is my contention that we disregard 
JWT and embrace the dictates of the UDHR.  Nevertheless, I will both readily point out and 
concede that the assumptions and dictates of the UDHR are as unfounded, unsubstantiated, and 
ultimately unproven as the assumptions of JWT; while a consequentialist assessment is better than 
a categorical one on this issue, to borrow an idea from Socrates, the “noble lie” is perhaps 
preferable to a harsh, uncomforting truth.  To that end, the international legal order must be 
strengthened.  In many ways, the Bush Doctrine in the context of the GWT is undermining the 
international legal order.  By undermining the international legal order the U.S. is undermining the 
very infrastructure needed for sustainable security against runaway political violence. 
Legal Argument 
I now look beyond the philosophical and toward the legal.  More specifically, I look toward the 
existing legal structure and find justification in it for treating nonstate actors no differently from 
state actors.  The foregoing chapters demonstrated how any argument in favor of extending rights 
to nonstate actors supposedly undercuts the foundational principles of natural law in the form of 
JWT, which grounds international law.  In other words, those who believe the arguments in the 
previous chapter believe that if the law treats nonstate actors, or terrorists, similarly to soldiers it 
will subvert international law.  Those who argue in favor of not extending rights and protections 
to nonstate actors say that perhaps emotions are leading the charge.  This is insufficient, they argue.  
According to them nonstate actors are not entitled to those rights and protections.  Finally, 
according to them, ignoring this reality hurts those men and women who actually deserve the 
protection of natural law. 
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 There is a conceptual problem at play here.  The conflict between those who argue in favor 
of extending the rights and those who argue for limiting them hinges on fundamentally different 
conceptualizations of law.  For the former group, the problem stems from what international 
lawyers such as Ingrid Detter refer to as the positivist problem (Detter 2007, 1052).  Ms. Detter 
argues that misunderstandings of international law are due to a reticence, if not an outright 
resistance, by the legal community, both academics and practitioners alike, to engage in the 
messiness of debating natural law and its implications.  Instead, she believes, the focus is placed 
on legal positivism, especially at the level of international law.  Legal positivism, or jus positum, 
she argues, has been the predominant school of thought with respect to the practice of law for the 
last century and a half.  In part, she is correct on this point.  One need only look at the landscape 
of international law to see what is patently obvious: by and large treaties must be clearly, and 
expressly, agreed to by contracting states before they are considered legally binding.  Implicit in 
the positivist school according to Ms. Detter and those of like mind is the idea that natural law is 
of little to no importance to positivists.  She passionately espouses the all-too-often assumed, but 
ultimately mistaken, contention that the law must be grounded in a universal morality.  Quite 
simply, Ms. Detter, and those who argue this, are wrong.  A universally applicable law can never 
be based upon a universally applicable morality as the latter does not exist.  Consequently, 
international treaties, according to legal positivism, are binding on states only when assented to by 
consenting signatories to treaties or based on the behavior, or custom, of states.  Consent gives rise 
to the law’s binding power.  To claim the law is binding based on anything other than consent is 
to invoke natural law, which is just wrong. 
 I disagree with Ms. Detter because she fails to grasp the role public opinion plays in 
formulating the law.  Because people’s emotions have changed with respect to what is acceptable 
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behavior we are once again witnessing a change in the guiding paradigm.  A shift is underway 
once again with respect to what constitutes natural law itself.  Ms. Detter essentially looks to a 
snapshot of a space and a time and believes that is it.  That is the truth.  No change is either possible 
or desirable.  The mere fact that there is now an increasing call for human beings to be viewed 
differently provides evidence for the fact that today we are seeing a greater increase for humanity 
and by extension when human beings are entitled to protection, legal or otherwise.  In other words, 
today human beings are increasingly seen as entitled to protection by virtue of being members of 
the species homo sapiens, properly constituted, and not by virtue of being members of a state’s 
armed forces, properly attired.  To be fair, Detter’s argument extends beyond the presumption of 
categorical truths.  She also argues from a consequentialist perspective the same conclusion that 
nonstate actors should not receive full legal protections, a position shared by other scholars such 
as John Yoo and Robert Chesney.  In her book The Law of War, Detter argues that “The debate 
surrounding permissible interrogation techniques must carefully balance the rights of the detainee 
against the interest and duty of the State to safeguard its citizens” (2013, 373).  I, and the evolving 
international law, disagree with Detter.  I disagree with her and others like her who believe this is 
answered at the categorical level by appealing to natural law, and I disagree with her on the 
consequential level in that I do not believe her proposed course of action will lead to greater safety 
or security for either the state or the individual. 
 Human rights protections are now seen as applicable in all wars and conflicts.  For example, 
genocide, slavery, and torture are prohibited by the law of war due to an assumption of an inherent 
dignity of humanity.  The prohibition against genocide, slavery, and torture is a minimum standard, 
a foundational and organizing principle of the international community.  Today it is quite clear 
that individuals enjoy both rights and obligations under the law of war.  At both the international 
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level and the individual state level the governments of a given state must apply these minimum 
standards, as well as acknowledge and protect minimum standards with respect to court processes.  
Any claim that nonstate actors have essentially forfeited these rights is a non sequitur under 
international law.  The reasoning is simple.  These minimum standards guarantee that human 
beings will be treated humanely.  Despite the self-serving claims of the U.S., the international 
community stands at the ready, supposedly, to enforce these protections in the event a given nation-
state fails to protect individuals.  In practice we see that these protections fall into one of two 
categories: (i) procedural and (ii) substantive.  Procedurally, while a given nation-state may decide 
for itself what rights and remedies nonstate actors are entitled to, a nation-state may not grant less 
than the minimum rights required under international law. 
 Under international law any nonstate actor that is captured during the GWT is protected in 
that the U.S. may not engage in torture, or otherwise degrading and inhuman behavior.  This 
prohibition is considered to be part of the jus cogens of international law and has nothing to do 
with whether or not a nation-state is a party to the Torture Convention.  Evidently the international 
community now thinks that human dignity necessitates humane treatment.  To the extent that states 
grant protective privileges and legal due process rights they are doing so based on an evolving 
conception of what constitutes a minimum threshold of civilized behavior. 
 There is an increasing body of law that now demonstrates this reconceptualization of a 
minimum standard of civilized behavior.  When one looks to international human rights law we 
see, for example, that the Appeals Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court (2004) held that all 
parties to armed conflicts are bound by international humanitarian law.114  Under both international 
                                               
114 The court held: “it is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, are bound 
by international humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to international treaties.” 
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relations and international law it is now a matter of course to make the political and legal claim 
that nonstate actors are themselves bound to the dictates of international humanitarian law.  It is 
important to note that the law is evolving largely separately and distinctly from any underlying 
clear, philosophical, theoretical framework.  The driving force seems to be a shift toward the 
assumptions grounding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  The UDHR simply 
takes as a starting point that man is sacred in and of himself.  No political affiliation is required 
under the UDHR.  One’s status as a human being is sufficient.  Treaties reflect precisely this 
movement toward the UDHR.  Most importantly judicial decisions are now increasingly reflecting 
this viewpoint. 
The Law of Treaties 
 My legal argument begins where all analyses of international law begin, with the law of 
treaties.  We first look to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  Common Article 
3 addresses “each party to the conflict.”  Moreover, Common Article 3 is applicable to all conflicts 
“not of an international character.”  This indicates that nonstate actors are bound to the Geneva 
Conventions despite the fact that nonstate actors are not signatories to a given treaty.  In fact, 
although under international law treaties are technically only binding on the parties who signed on 
to the terms of the treaties, we see exceptions such as when states that have not signed on to treaties 
accept both the responsibility and the liability under the treaty.  In this situation the third party is 
deemed to be bound by acquiescence.  This exception is found in Article 96(3) of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention.  Article 96(3) allows for nonstate actors to accept 
the legal obligations and thus be bound by the treaty language covering their conflict. 
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 The international legal system itself is now acknowledging that the treaty language itself 
is creating not only rights to be enjoyed by individuals but also obligations to be observed and 
honored by individuals.  Take, for example, the UN Charter.  It is clear that the UN Charter is but 
a treaty signed on to by members of the international community and seemingly binding only on 
member states; nevertheless, the UN Charter has a shroud of morality covering its corpus of 
jurisprudence.  That is to say, while clearly the UN Charter is legally binding on its member states 
the international community writ large seems to agree that the purpose of the UN experiment, 
“saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” was, and is, of such importance that 
even non-signatories, non-member states, and even nonstate actors are bound by the decisions of 
the UN Security Council.  In a sense, therefore, the UN Charter is seen as binding on nonstate 
actors.  Another way of describing this is that the principles contained within both the four corners 
of the UN Charter and the spirit of the same is now part of customary international law.  Common 
Article 3 seems to have reached a similar status of customary international law and is thus binding 
on all.115  We can conclude that international law seems to now accept Common Article 3 as 
binding on nonstate actors. 
 When one attempts to distill a coherent meaning we find that with respect to the 
applicability of international law to nonstate actors, treaty language, like most, if not all, legal 
documents is open to interpretation and thus inherently, if only minimally, ambiguous.  Instead, 
increasingly the question of customary international law is proving dispositive and being found to 
apply to nonstate actors by judges throughout the world.  Therefore, if we accept the dispositive 
                                               
115 The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense believes that Common Article 3 “... purports to bind all parties, both 
states and insurgents, whether or not the latter have made any declaration of intent to apply the principles.”  The 
International Court of Justice seems to have argued the Contras in Nicaragua were bound by the terms of Common 
Article 3 when it held “the United States is … under an obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the 
conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.” 
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nature of customary international law we must question how customary international law is applied 
to nonstate actors. 
Contemporary Customary International Law 
 In large part the interpretation and status of customary international law are largely a 
euphemism for a finding and interpretation of natural law equivalent, or substitute.  It is the 
international community’s attempt to ground the evolving international law with something 
seemingly less arbitrary and therefore not subject to the power dynamics of international relations.  
In a sense just as philosophers of old understood the need to demonstrate a bedrock principle – not 
arbitrarily subject to change – so too do modern scholars, lawyers, and judges.  What constitutes 
customary international law therefore provides the foundational principles for legal prosecutions 
of individuals accused of committing a crime by breaking international law.  Without this validity 
the judicial process itself will be seen as little more than victor’s justice, the strong exacting 
punishment on the weak, and a victor exacting revenge on a vanquished.  Along the same line of 
inquiry, when undertaking a case, the International Criminal Court (ICC), to which the U.S. is not 
a member and which the U.S. actively attempts to undermine, looks to see whether the focus of its 
legal inquiry is covered by customary international law.  In short, customary international law is 
important for purposes of prosecution and determining the standards that are binding on nonstate 
actors.  For example, in the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
UN Secretary-General (RICID) (2004) the Darfur Commission found that rebel groups, armed 
nonstate actors, can be bound under customary international law if they “… have reached a certain 
threshold or organization, stability and effective control of territory…” (RICID 2004, paragraph 
172).  If armed nonstate actors satisfy this threshold they are both entitled to the rights and 
protections of, and bound by the obligations of, customary international law. 
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 I suspect that given sufficient time the international legal apparatus will concern itself less 
with international customary law and will simply take as a given the notion that seminal treaties, 
such as the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN Charter, and the Rome Statute, 
will themselves be sufficient for assessing the standards of international law.  I believe this to be 
the case because at present customary international law as a source of obligations and rights is 
limited, at least with respect to nonstate actors and their relationship to international humanitarian 
law.  This has to do with the reality of customary international law and the way in which it comes 
into being.  Essentially states by way of behavior agree to precepts being classified as customary 
international law, and thus binding on them – despite the absence of a treaty – because states come 
to believe it is in their best interest to do so.  By implication the customary international law creates 
norms that a number of states have come to be ready to be bound by.  Insofar as international 
humanitarian law is developing norms that can be seen to infringe upon or restrict a given state’s 
ability to behave as it sees fit, that state will likely resist.  Nevertheless the very nature of customary 
international law is that given time a critical mass is reached and those individual states that do not 
behave accordingly are seen as the outliers, the rogues who are operating on the outside of the 
international community.  What this does is create a situation like what we have now with regard 
to the GWT.  Try though it may, a state can hardly argue that a new norm exists under customary 
international law, applicable to states and nonstate actors alike, while simultaneously arguing that 
the state itself does not recognize the new norm and is therefore not bound by it.  This is precisely 
what is happening with the U.S. when it argues that nonstate actors are violating international law 
while simultaneously claiming the U.S. itself is not bound to international law. 
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Rebellion, Sedition, Insurrection, Civil War, and Belligerency 
 Despite being a legal argument the main issue is how one determines whether the cause for 
conflict is valid legally because the critical legal terms require philosophical assessments.  The 
need for these philosophical judgments, and the want of a standard by which to assess competing 
claims, take us back to the problems articulated earlier in this chapter.  In other words, how do we 
differentiate and determine whether the nonstate actors are in fact freedom fighters, belligerents, 
insurgents, terrorists, etc.?  This is crucial because legal analyses and thus legal consequences, 
under the law of war, are predicated upon an assessment and determination of the causes of those 
fighting.  So it is believed that when one is fighting on behalf of a sovereign state the presumption 
of justness exists; one need only look at the behavior of the U.S. to know this is not true.  
Nevertheless, one must still assess the why of the conflict.  Therein can be found the philosophical 
conundrum.  For example, in the nation-state itself, at the micro level, rebellion may be little more 
than a criminal act.  At the macro level, the international level, rebellion may be a cry for 
independence.  This is important because if viewed as criminal the rebels are subject to arrest and 
prosecution for endangering the life of the state and the non-rebellious citizens living therein.  On 
the other hand, if viewed as a struggle for independence the conflict will be considered a civil war 
in which case the laws of war, and all of the obligations and rights and privileges contained within 
the laws of war, would apply to the conflict, as both sides of the conflict will be bound to the 
applicable international law.116 
 Moreover, humanitarian law seems to reject the idea that international humanitarian law is 
only applicable when both sides are recognized legal entities, such as nation-states.  Lastly, 
                                               
116 Just as if two nation-states were warring. 
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because the international community increasingly acknowledges that nation-states have a vested 
interest in dealing with nonstate actors, an independent assessment is required with respect to 
classifying the nonstate actors.  In other words, nation-states will likely see nonstate actors as little 
more than criminals and will wish to treat them accordingly, while on an abstract level the 
international community can possibly view the nonstate actors as something more and thus entitled 
to protection under the law.  Therefore, the essentially historical approach of JWT is of little to no 
importance with respect to nonstate actors.117  Nevertheless, the terminology, which is to say the 
distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum, is still spoken of and considered by judicial 
bodies.  This seems to be a movement centuries in the making. 
 The Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel, in Le droit des gens (1758), addressed this question when 
he wrote, “It is a question very much debated, whether a sovereign is bound to observe the common 
laws of war towards rebellious subjects who have openly taken up arms against him?”  For my 
purposes here how he answered this question is not terribly important.  Rather I am demonstrating 
that the question itself is not new.  Today it seems as though while states will easily use terms such 
as good and evil, just and unjust, which implicitly speak to the issue of just cause, the international 
legal system is becoming increasingly reluctant to engage in such assessments as good and evil.  
Instead, what is developing is a strong push for the reinterpretation of those terms.  While still 
important on some level, classifying individuals as rebels, insurgents, belligerents, or terrorists, 
does not matter as much as recognizing that the nonstate actors have engaged in a way that is either 
lawful or unlawful.  Individuals are seen as entitled to certain minimal legal protections, namely 
                                               
117 When I say of little importance I mean with respect to the philosophical discussion regarding the classification of 
nonstate actors.  It is as if the international community recognizes the difficulty and subjectivity involved in making 
these determinations.  The international community is therefore supplanting one standard and replacing it with another, 
a Kantian categorical imperative of sorts. 
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due process.  It is to this point, my final point, that I now turn, the existing legal structure already 
in place with respect to affording captured nonstate actors with legal procedural safeguards. 
Modern International Law 
 When taken together the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions provide the regulatory 
framework for dealing with those captured during conflicts.  They also provide the legal 
framework analyzed and used by lawyers when arguing a legal matter before an international 
tribunal.  This is important because these laws are supposed to provide the standard by which 
actions are measured.  Moreover, I contend the law on an international level can serve this function 
in a way that natural law never could.  Nevertheless, as it stands now lawyers are using their 
considerable skill to exploit the imprecisions and latent ambiguities contained within the black-
letter law.  It is this skill that allows governments to overreach and underperform.  In other words, 
the ability to interpret so as to find meaning within the law that was not meant to be there results 
in individuals not being protected under the law, or not being protected well.  Governments have 
proven themselves willing to interpret the law in ways that they deem in the state’s best interests 
rather than in the best interests of the individuals.  The consequence of this behavior is that the law 
is ultimately divorced from its original spirit, which is to say its original purpose. 
 Despite the reality of politically motivated violence existing for millennia, 9/11 was seen 
by the U.S. as a game-changer.  As demonstrated above, the argument is that the supposedly unique 
nature of the participants renders this situation squarely outside the applicability of the laws of 
war; moreover, the treaties which speak to the treatment of individuals engaged in armed conflict 
are supposedly inapplicable as well.  That is to say the Geneva Conventions are deemed not to 
apply.  Also, as demonstrated above, lawyers in the field are able to make plausible, if not 
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convincing, arguments on either side of this issue.  We see well-respected lawyers and scholars 
disagreeing on al Qaeda, ISIS, the Taliban and others and whether they are entitled to certain legal 
protections based on the answers to questions such as “Are they wearing uniforms?” and “Do they 
have a command structure?”  Also, there exists fundamental disagreement over whether these men 
are entitled to legal protection as civilians under one treaty if not as combatants under another.  
This is because, as I have tried to demonstrate, the laws of war, and the corresponding treaties, can 
be looked at in one of two ways with respect to this conflict: (i) international or (ii) internal.  Yet 
what we have here is a situation in which nonstate actors are fighting states anywhere in the world 
they deem tactically advantageous.  Therefore, these nonstate actors are outside the law, not 
entitled to its protection, and they may be treated accordingly. 
 It is my contention that those who make this argument are disingenuous.  I also contend 
that those who make this argument have not taken the full breath of the philosophical and legal 
arguments underpinning the creation of the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions into account.  
Instead, they are doing what lawyers do.  They are starting with a position and looking for evidence 
to support their position.  While I certainly understand I absolutely disagree.  The Geneva 
Conventions, and the laws of war, have always recognized the reality of nontraditional combatants.  
More to the point, the laws of war have always had to deal with the reality of changing and adapting 
to meet the needs of the times.  The laws are flexible in that they contain within them the means 
to do precisely that, change and adapt with the needs of the times.  It matters not that a particular 
set of circumstances were not explicitly addressed by the laws of war.  Now, while I could say that 
lawyers ought to behave more humanely within the context of applying international law to non-
state actors, having attended law school and worked as a criminal defense lawyer I will make no 
such Pollyannaish claim.  Instead, I say that the system should be recognized as affording to those 
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suspected of crimes due process protections that are not themselves subject to the vagaries of 
interpretation.  James Madison was correct when he wrote, “[i]f men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.”118  Anyone suspected of having committed an act of violence should be 
afforded an attorney, an opportunity to confront his accuser, and a fair trial.  In doing this the needs 
of humanity will be served as humanity itself will have deemed it necessary and ultimately the law 
will have served humanity rather than the other way around. 
 In this chapter I demonstrate what I believe to be true that the modern international laws 
are predicated on precisely this idea: the law serves humanity; it does not supplant it.  History 
bears this out.  More specifically, history of the development of international law bears this out.  I 
look at some of the work of Francis Lieber, who dealt with this exact issue during the American 
Civil War.  I also examine how the Geneva Conventions have evolved to address (i) international 
and (ii) internal conflicts.  I also reiterate how the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. 
government misconstrued both the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions immediately after 
9/11 in order to pursue what the U.S. deemed to be in its best interest, and how the judicial branch 
is interpreting the law differently finding broader applicability of the law.  Nevertheless, I will 
demonstrate how at the core of the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions is an assumption 
under the guise of a recognition, a philosophic first principle that grounds the law in a categorical 
idea that human beings are entitled to legal protections.  Finally, I conclude by arguing that the 
current interpretation of international law is not only not appropriate, it is counterproductive from 
a consequentialist perspective, given America’s stated aims. 
                                               
118 See Federalist 51.  Also, James Madison wrote these famous words on February 6, 1788 in the Independent Journal.  
It was contained in a piece titled The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances 
Between the Different Departments. 
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 Beginning by way of conclusion, nontraditional combatants engaging in armed conflict are 
not a new phenomenon (Kossoy 1976).  The laws of war have always contended with this issue.  
Lieber, who wrote Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field 
(1863) in response to General Henry Halleck, gave thoughtful consideration to the issue, to the 
reality that there are times when individuals engage in combat despite not being part of regularly 
constituted armies.  Lieber wrote an essay in which he argued, 
It is universally understood in this country at the present time that a guerilla party 
means an irregular band of armed men, carrying on an irregular war, not being able, 
according to their character as a guerilla party, to carry on what the law terms a 
regular war. (Francis Lieber, Guerilla Parties Considered with Reference to the 
Law and Usages of War, 1861, 7) 
 I believe one is hard-pressed to argue that this assessment, written in 1861, is not precisely 
on point with respect to the Taliban, al Qaeda, ISIS, AQAP, etc.  It is obvious to even the most 
casual of observers that these groups can, and do, visit violence upon their perceived enemies in 
ways that mirror military strikes.  The death, destruction, and remnants of a U.S. led drone strike 
in Yemen is absolutely no different than the death, destruction, and remnants a car bombing or 
suicide bomber in a square or market.  The only distinction is the who not the what. 
 At the international level the law has come to reflect the issue of the nontraditional 
combatant.  For example, militia and volunteer corps came to be recognized under the law as 
combatants entitled to legal protections (Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, articles 1-2).   Organized resistance movements received combatant status after World War 
II (Geneva Convention III 1949, article 4A(2)).  America’s ill-advised GWT now requires that 
combatant status be extended to the Taliban, al Qaeda, ISIS and others. 
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 As mentioned above, the Geneva Conventions are concerned, for the most part, with 
international conflicts.  Under the Geneva Conventions civilians are explicitly protected.  Despite 
this predominant focus, the Geneva Conventions are also concerned with internal conflicts.  
Common Article 3 articulates minimum legal standards that must be applied in internal conflicts 
(Geneva Convention IV, article 3).  Specifically, common Article 3 makes clear that combatants 
“shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.”  To this end 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
 cruel treatment and torture [are prohibited]; 
(b) taking of hostages [is prohibited]; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
 treatment [are prohibited]; 
(d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous 
 judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the 
 judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
 peoples [are prohibited] (Geneva Convention IV, article 3). 
 If we behave according, to the dictates of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties, which 
is to say that we read common Article 3 consistently with its original intent, we see that common 
Article 3 was meant to deal with combatants engaging in internal armed conflict.  Because common 
Article 3 speaks to armed conflict between a state and a nonstate actor, it is understood that if a 
combatant does not present a threat, they must be treated humanely.  This idea was followed up in 
1977 when two protocols were added: (i) Protocol I (Protocol I 1977) and (ii) Protocol II (Protocol 
II 1977).  Protocol I speaks to international conflict by addressing the Hague Regulations.  Protocol 
I, Article 75, makes clear that those engaged in conflict are entitled, under law, to protections.  
Protocol I has been acknowledged under international law by 174 states.119 
                                               
119 As of the writing of this dissertation the U.S. is not among the state parties which have ratified, adopted, or ascended 
to Protocol I. 
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 Protocol II, on the other hand, speaks to internal conflicts.  It specifically speaks to conflicts 
“which take place between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol” (Protocol II, Article 1).  A total of 168 states have acknowledged Protocol II under 
international law.  Unfortunately, the U.S. has acknowledged neither. 
 It must be noted that the scope of Protocol I, Article 1(4), extends legal protections to 
individuals engaged in armed conflict when, and if, those individuals are “fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self 
determination …” (Protocol I 1977, Article 1(4)).  In this regard non-state actors are protected 
under the entirety of the Geneva Conventions, not simply the common Article 3 or Protocol I 
(Protocol I 1977, Article 44(3)). 
 The reciprocal is also true.  If they fail to behave in a manner consistent with the Geneva 
Conventions they are then subject to criminal prosecution for having violated international law 
(Protocol I 1977, Article 44(3) & Article 44(4)).  Interestingly, I should point out that when 
envisioning this manner of combatant the international law does not require that the nonstate actor 
control territory, or be based out of a specific territory.  This means that they may operate out of 
any location they wish, anywhere in the world.  In precisely the same fashion that the U.S. does 
not acknowledge international law when international law is seen to run counter to America’s 
interests, the U.S. does not acknowledge this aspect of international law. 
 It is obvious that the mores of war are evolving.  For example, it was once permissible to 
summarily execute those with whom one was at war.  Today, however, that is no longer the case.  
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Indefinite detention is now increasingly seen as legally and morally objectionable as well.  That 
this is the case even with respect to the most reprehensible among us is obvious.  While I personally 
believe the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS are reprehensible, even when considering the many 
horrifically abominable acts undertaken by them they are entitled to a full and fair public trial.  The 
Nuremberg Trials demonstrate this as they are seen to be of paramount importance in the annals 
of international law precisely because it is a moment in history where rather than seek revenge the 
victors put the vanquished to the law and afforded them the opportunity to argue their case.  It 
should be noted that in more than a few instances some Nazi defendants were not executed but 
imprisoned while others were either acquitted and set free, or sentenced to prison terms ranging 
from ten to twenty years.120  Similarly in Japan the Tokyo trials afforded those who were captured 
the opportunity to plead their case before the law.  Consequently, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
have ushered in the next phase of international law, the holding to account, under the law, those 
who violate the law. 
 In very recent memory international criminal tribunals have been initiated so as to deal 
with various crimes under international law.  The atrocities committed in Cambodia, Darfur, East 
Timor, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia, etc. are but a few instances in which individuals were brought 
before a court of law to answer for their actions.  For my purposes here in this dissertation I want 
to be as clear as I can possibly be.  I am thoroughly uninterested in whether particular trials are 
successful in winning convictions.  As far as I am concerned the trial itself is the success.  Not 
torturing, not holding suspects indefinitely is the success.  I am not so naïve to believe that due 
process protections will put an end to international violence, nor do I believe the U.S. will have 
                                               
120 Three defendants were acquitted: Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche.  Four defendants received 
prison sentences: Karl Dönitz, Baldur von Schirach, Albert Speer, and Konstantin von Neurath. 
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any success in ridding the world of evil.  That would be an absurd belief.  After all, as Napoleon 
Bonaparte said at the peace of Amiens, “[i]n the present state of affairs every peace treaty means 
no more than a brief armistice.”  Said another way, as quoted in Plato’s Laws, attributed to Clinias 
of Scambonidae, “‘peace,’ as the term is commonly employed, is nothing more than a name, the 
truth being that every State is, by a law of nature, engaged perpetually in an informal war with 
every other State.”  Instead, I believe that the trial itself is a way of dealing with the ongoing clash 
of civilizations and reframing the discussion surrounding the fall out of the ongoing culture clash.  
In dealing with it consistently with, and pursuant to, a legal code the world will be brought a little 
closer together. 
 We must acknowledge also that human rights law, as stated at the outset of this dissertation, 
has developed in such a way that human beings, whatever their behavior, are deemed valuable in 
their own right and are thus protected under the law.  This brings me full circle to the UDHR 
(General Assembly Resolution 217 1948).  The UDHR proclaims that there exist crucially 
important human rights that are enjoyed by individuals to the limitation of government power.  For 
example, Article 1 speaks to the idea that individuals are born free.  Article 3 speaks to the notion 
that every human being on the planet is entitled, under the law, to a protection of life, liberty, and 
security.  Article 5 holds that no one may be tortured, and Articles 6, 7, and 9 speak to both equal 
protection under the law and a prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention.  Finally, in 
relevant part, Articles 10, 11, and 8 hold that everyone is entitled to a fair trial, and that if any of 
these rights are violated an individual may sue for redress under the law.  It is not lost upon me 
that these ideals, radical though they may have been when proclaimed at the international level, 
are commonplace to the point of being self-evident within the U.S.  These very ideas are spoken 
to by the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, a document supposedly 
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revered by the American people.  Therefore, to watch the U.S. now disavow these ideals at the 
international level is perplexing if one assumes that America actually believes in them.  On the 
other hand, America’s behavior is understandable once one acknowledges the lessons of history, 
which is to say America believes in these ideals some of the time and for some of the people but 
never has America believed in these ideals all of the time for all of the people. 
 Regarding those who claim 9/11 created a unique scenario, while the UDHR is not binding 
law, interestingly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets forth 
certain protections that are deemed of such fundamental importance that not even a national 
emergency allows for their abdication and these protections mirror those contained in the UDHR.  
Unlike Protocols I and II the ICCPR has been acknowledged under international law by the U.S. 
and 167 other nations.  On the other hand, the ICCPR is deemed by the U.S. not to apply to the 
U.S. behavior conducted outside the continental U.S.  It is only a matter of time before this will 
change.  It appears to me that common Article 3 embodies the ideals of a minimum level of 
humanity that must be afforded to anyone engaged in conflict once they are caught.  It will be 
increasingly difficult for the U.S. to ignore this reality. 
 It requires neither a stretch of the imagination nor an incongruous intellectual leap to see 
that the existing corpus of international law is already moving toward my contention.  Implicit 
within the Hague conferences and the Geneva Conventions is the idea that the times change faster 
than the law.  Consequently, there exists language in the Hague Convention that speaks to the 
inevitability of a situation arising that the black letter of international law fails to address.  That 
language states, 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting 
parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
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adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection 
and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of 
the public conscience. (Hague Convention 1907, Preamble) 
It must be noted that because this language is contained within a binding treaty, the idea itself is 
binding on any and all nations that have executed this treaty.  When taken together we see that this 
language, the evolution of HRL, the principles emanating from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, 
the creation of permanently standing international courts of law lend evidence to my contention 
that even in a post-9/11 world human beings are entitled to certain due process protections.  I do 
not mean to give the impression that I am appealing to what President Abraham Lincoln in his 
First Inaugural Address described as the “better angels of our nature.”  I am making a more rational 
and concrete argument by appealing instead to the law.  Article 75, as described above, also makes 
clear that anyone captured in a conflict has the right to challenge evidence brought against them.  
The combatant not only has the right to present his own case, but he enjoys a presumption of 
innocence while he does so.  He may not be compelled to give testimony in his own trial, and he 
may challenge by way of rigorous cross-examination any witness who testifies against him.  And, 
in the event that he wins, he may not be held to account twice for the same crime (Protocol I, article 
75(4)).  Article 75 is important as it provides a backstop that prevents someone from arguing there 
exists a category of individuals who are not entitled to protection under the law.  While I 
acknowledge that Protocol I, Article 75, is not binding law on the U.S., as the U.S. has failed to 
acknowledge it, I would argue that the proverbial ship has sailed for Article 75 has slipped into the 
annals of customary international law.  Given the level of recognition received by Protocol I, and 
because the U.S. has not claimed that Protocol I is either unlawful, or abhorrent to international 
law, Protocol I and Article 75 are now part of the customary international law (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck eds.  2005).  In fact, while the U.S. initially embraced Protocols I and II in spirit if 
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not in practice, the judicial branch is changing that.  The USSC, the highest court in the land, has 
acknowledged as much in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld when the court found that common Article 3 and 
Article 75 are “indisputably part of … customary international law” (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006, 
2749), and, therefore, binding on federal courts within the U.S. 
Indefinite Detention 
 Lastly, we have to discuss a real consequence of the GWT, intended or otherwise.  That is 
to say the indefinite detention of combatants without recourse to trials.  The indefinite detention 
of individuals is an anathema and stands in stark opposition to everything the U.S. supposedly 
stands for, at least rhetorically.  The U.S. argues, as I made clear at the very beginning of this 
dissertation, that combatants may be held so long as hostilities are taking place.  The absurdity of 
this contention is that a boy of 7 (an age the U.S. believes is the age of a fighting male) could be 
captured after having been identified as an enemy combatant and held without trial for the duration 
of his life.  If this young boy of 7 lives to the ripe old age of 100 he will have spent 93 years in 
prison without trial.  While this statement may seem hyperbolic, I assure you it is not.  The GWT, 
as I have tried to make clear, is functionally a war on a tactic, not a person, a group, or a state.  The 
infliction of terror upon a population is undertaken in the service of an idea.  Despite the silliness 
of many of the statements made by President Bush, the articulate musings of President Obama, 
and the absurdly nonsensical idiocies uttered by Donald Trump, while the U.S. can kill a man with 
bombs it cannot and will never kill an idea.  Therefore, one attack per year deemed to be a terrorist 
attack will perpetuate the GWT.  Because anyone at any time can undertake an attack for political 
reasons there is quite literally no end to be had to the GWT.  This is an absurdity on its face.  
Nevertheless, the USSC has held it “is a clearly established principle of the law of war that 
125 
 
detention may last no longer than active hostilities” (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004, 12).  This too must 
be rectified. 
 In conclusion the Geneva Conventions are well-equipped to deal with the kind of armed 
conflicts currently being undertaken by the likes of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS.  The HRL and 
the international criminal law, along with the laws of war and international law, have all been 
moving in the direction toward more legal protections for all peoples, not fewer protections for 
fewer people.  As I have tried to demonstrate, this is an idea whose time has come and it is now 
increasingly enshrined in both customary and conventional international law.  The U.S. should 
acknowledge the general trend of international law and bring its behavior into compliance 
therewith.  At a minimum the U.S. should alter its official position and either begin to prosecute 
those it currently detains or release them from detention.  I have argued that, under the law, 
detainees should be given the opportunity to confront their accusers, challenge the evidence against 
them, and enjoy the presumption of innocence while doing so.  Also, detainees may be held only 
as long as they are deemed to be a threat but never indefinitely.  They may not be held for the 
duration of hostilities, especially in an open-ended perpetual war being undertaken for 
predominantly, if not exclusively, financial reasons.  For the U.S. to continue behaving as it has 
behaved for the last 17 years is not only counterproductive, it is unconscionable.  I believe my 
recommendation will be a large step in the right direction. 
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Chapter Five: 
Conclusion 
Just War Theory should be replaced by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights with respect 
to the treatment of nonstate actors. 
 
 By way of a brief review, the legal and moral parameters of the ongoing debate are 
established by the arguments that “Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the 
enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts 
are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war” (Ex parte 
Quirin, 37) and that an “Enemy combatant” is a general category that subsumes two sub-
categories: lawful and unlawful combatants.  Under international law lawful combatants receive 
POW status and the protections of the Third Geneva Convention.  Unlawful combatants, on the 
other hand, do not receive POW status and do not receive the full protections of the Third Geneva 
Convention (Haynes 2002, 2). 
 Haynes argued that within the context and legal framework of the GWT nonstate actors 
may be treated differently from state actors when captured and interrogated (Haynes 2002, 2).  The 
legal framework finds its basis in international law, which in turn finds its moral basis in part on 
conditions of JWT.  JWT requires combatants to possess legitimacy; to possess legitimacy a 
combatant must be a state actor; therefore, nonstate actors “do not receive Prisoner Of War status 
and do not receive the full protections of the Third Geneva Convention” (Haynes 2002, 2). 
 I now begin this chapter by restating my research question: should JWT be modified or 
abandoned in order to accommodate greater fairness121 toward armed nonstate actors, those 
                                               
121 I use the word “fairness” as defined by us.  I do not mean fairness in some categorical sense. 
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individuals to whom we commonly refer, and legally define as terrorists?  The answer to this 
question is yes.  The answer is yes for two reasons: (i) man has an inherent value that is not 
recognized under JWT, and (ii) the utility of criminal prosecutions for those engaged in political 
violence is higher relative to the desirability of the goal of greater peace, security, and stability. 
 To arrive at my conclusion I traced the evolution of the school of thought that makes up 
JWT and I analyzed its applicability to modern international relations – specifically international 
relations in the context of nonstate actors.  More to the point, my analysis found that JWT is both 
still relevant in the twenty-first century and applicable to nonstate actors who challenge the modern 
state and international institutions with the use of force and JWT is not relevant in the twenty-first 
century and is thus inapplicable to nonstate actors who challenge both the modern state and 
international institutions with respect to the use of force.  Nevertheless, given the supposed goals 
of international law,122 the international community, and specifically the U.S. ought to treat 
nonstate actors as criminals and prosecute them accordingly.123  To engage in an ideological war 
like the GWT is to functionally litigate anew the competing ideas of justice.  Finally, in critically 
thinking through the substance of the logical syllogisms that make up both JWT and the UDHR I 
find JWT is simply not universally valid as it is neither a metaphysical truth nor a transcendental 
one; therefore, JWT is important only insofar as it is understood to be but one way of seeing the 
world, not the universally correct way.  I would be remiss if I do not point out that precisely the 
same thing can be said about the UDHR.  The UDHR is neither metaphysically true nor 
transcendentally true; however, it is socially true given its utility with respect to the desired goal 
of less violence.  The UDHR better allows or affords individuals the opportunity to believe that 
                                               
122 The goals are articulated in the Preamble of the UN Charter, the ICRC, the ICC, the U.S. Proclamations of greater 
peace, etc. 
123 Individuals may be prosecuted domestically or at the ICC. 
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they have a unique value and an inherent dignity in or vis-à-vis creation.  As I stated in Chapter 1 
my conclusions should in no way be seen as either an attempt on my part to equivocate or a 
reticence on my part to reach a definitive conclusion.  Instead, my answers are a response to the 
fundamental problems with the presuppositions and assumptions underlying the conceptual and 
philosophical foundations of both JWT and the UDHR.  To that end, I now explain each answer 
in turn. 
No. 
JWT is relevant in the twenty-first century and nonstate actors can be treated as they are 
currently treated. 
 Of the two answers, the “no” answer is actually the easiest to reach.  It requires absolutely 
nothing of us other than to adhere somewhat unreflexively to the claims of Cicero, St. Augustine, 
St. Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, Grotius, Walzer, Finnis, Witt, and others.  That is to say, if we 
simply accept their pronouncements, their dictates, which are little more than conclusory 
statements, with little to no evidence, or at least unconvincing evidence, then we are locked into 
their conclusion: nonstate actors do not have proper authority and therefore are simply not entitled 
to certain legal protections in so far as those legal protections are predicated on satisfying certain 
preconditions.124  Why?  The philosophers have created a logical syllogism equivalent, a simple 
way of arguing that either locks one into a given conclusion or fails to do so based solely on the 
validity of the logical structure of the argument.  Consequently, once one accepts the premises of 
a given valid argument one is logically tied into a structurally inescapable conclusion. 
 That is what we have here.  All of the philosophers discussed in this dissertation have 
claimed that proper authority is required due in varying degrees to either natural law based either 
                                               
124 I use the word logic in the sense of reasoning in a specific way pursuant to a specific valid structure. 
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on proper reasoning or based on God’s will as only God could properly justify going to war or 
provide the proper reasons, the proper individuals who can decide whether justifications exist for 
going to war.  Therefore, accept this premise and the conclusion is inescapable.  Because the 
conclusion is inescapable, to the extent that international law is predicated on JWT, nonstate actors 
may be treated the way they are treated.  They are simply not entitled to certain protections as they 
have not satisfied the precondition of proper political authority. 
Yes. 
Nonstate actors may not be treated the way they are currently being treated. 
 The “yes” answer is actually also quite easy to reach.  It calls for little more than a rejection 
of the premises argued by the philosophers discussed throughout this dissertation, or at least a 
rejection of both their presuppositions and their assumptions regarding proper authority.  Once 
rejected, we need only substitute in its place, and then embrace, the dictates of the UDHR, namely 
that man enjoys an inherent dignity.125  It must be pointed out, however, that the UDHR, exactly 
as does JWT, simply proclaims as a given certain premises126 for which it does not provide any 
evidence; just like the proponents of JWT, any evidence that is provided is woefully 
unconvincing.127  That said, we need only look at the premises of this modern version of the logical 
argument.  Here too, if we simply accept the premises as true, follow the argument through to its 
logical conclusion the result is inescapable: nonstate actors because of their inherent dignity may 
                                               
125 The preamble to the UDHR specifically states, “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience 
of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom 
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people…” 
126 An example is contained in Article 1, which states “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” 
127 We should note that nothing is said nor provided by way of proof to support the contention that man has an inherent 
dignity. 
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not be treated the way they are being treated today.  Why?  Because treating someone fairly and 
giving them certain legal protections is required because of their humanity.  Let us remember, the 
UDHR unequivocally states that man possesses an inherent dignity that has absolutely nothing to 
do with a God and it is that inherent dignity that entitles man to a certain level of protection under 
the law.128  I do not at all mean to be flippant.  I am simply attempting to illustrate that at present 
we are in the middle of what Thomas Kuhn calls a paradigm shift.  One longstanding way of seeing 
the social and natural worlds is being supplanted by a new way of seeing the social and natural 
worlds. 
 In the field of law, philosophically speaking, we are witnessing the jettisoning in some 
situations and the shedding in other situations of no longer widely held ideas.  The intellectual 
artifacts of a bygone era are being replaced by an emerging and still developing way of viewing 
the world and man’s place in it.  As described above, some institutions have embraced this shift 
and are now moving in this direction.  On the other hand, some institutions are a little slower to 
engage and are remaining steadfast.  The point is that the underlying issue, the underlying reality 
of an almost blind non-critical adherence to JWT and its moral presuppositions – at least with 
respect to proper authority – is increasingly being called into question. 
We should abandon JWT and embrace UDHR 
 This brings me back to my initial two answers.  I ultimately argue in favor of a practical, 
less subjective development of an international law toward a more procedurally sound perspective 
and against any future adherence to the JWT with respect to fighting terrorism.  In attempting to 
                                               
128 Article 11 of the UDHR specifically states, “Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he 
has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.” 
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both limit aggression and protect innocent men and women JWT should be discarded and the 
UDHR should be embraced.  The GWT has demonstrated one thing definitively: military force 
cannot be applied surgically or discriminately.  The idea that we can engage in warfare over ideas 
in order to bring about peace, or that we can use just enough military force to obtain peace and 
security, and minimize the amount of damage done to property and loss of life while we pursue in 
pursuing those goals is now evidently and demonstrably silly.  As we make mistakes and miss our 
marks we will create greater hatred and greater antipathy toward the U.S.  That should be obvious 
to all. 
 From a practical perspective, because of the growing interconnectedness of international 
relations, to the extent that this century will witness greater conflict, and I believe that it will, it 
will likely witness it between groups of people whose understandings differ with respect to what 
constitutes a just cause for going to war, and who may in fact engage in armed conflict, among 
other issues of cultural and societal importance.129  These reasons are often unique to them.  As 
stated above, this is precisely the situation in the GWT.  For example, Osama bin Laden, as the 
founder, and now executed leader of al Qaeda, cited his holy book, the Qur’ān, when he claimed 
to have divine permission from Allah to initiate war because the Qur’ān says “[p]ermission to fight 
(against disbelievers) is given to those (believers) who are fought against, because they have been 
wronged and surely, Allah is able to give them (believers) victory” (Qur’ān 22:39 – parentheses 
added).  This one statement frames their struggle as one of both self-defense and defense of others.  
Also, the very concept of victory is altered in that victory need not be military victory.  It may be 
a spiritual and religious victory, which is to say a victory to be enjoyed in the hereafter.  Bin Laden 
                                               
129 This is a similar argument to that of Samuel Huntington; however, Huntington prescribes greater control whereas 
I argue for greater deference be given to the law and the legal system. 
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continued, arguing the Qur’ān says “[t]hose who believe, fight in the Cause of Allah, and those 
who disbelieve, fight in the cause of Taghut (anything worshipped other than Allah, e.g. Satan).  
So fight you against the friends of Satan; ever feeble is indeed the plot of Satan” (Qur’ān 4:76 – 
parenthesis added).  This one statement renders al Qaeda’s “resistance” squarely in the context of 
a religious war, and ultimately a battle between God and Satan, or good and evil.  This and nothing 
more justifies al Qaeda, and now ISIS, to kill any person that they believe serves Taghut.  Lest we 
think that this is behavior unique to Islam, the captains of the active conquest of Latin America 
were required by law and by faith to read to the natives living in Latin America a Requerimiento, 
an exhortation that they adopt Catholicism.  This Requerimiento was 
If you do not, or if you maliciously delay in so doing, I certify that with 
God’s help I will advance powerfully against you and make war on you 
wherever and however I am able, and will subject you to the yoke and 
obedience of the Church and of their majesties and take your women and 
children to be slaves, and as such I will sell and dispose of them as their 
majesties may order, and I will take your possessions and do you all the 
harm and damage that I can (Galeano 1997, 13).130 
How is this claim to natural law or God’s will in any meaningful way different from the prerogative 
claimed by ISIS to kill nonbelievers?131  It is not!  I am not engaging in what is commonly referred 
to today as what-aboutism, which is to say the attempt to draw moral equivalencies.  I am, however, 
attempting to demonstrate that perhaps there is at least a fundamental if not an uncomfortable truth 
in the observation of Alf Ross, the Scandinavian realist, who argued in his On Law and Justice 
“like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone” (1958, 261) 
                                               
130 Requerimiento cited in Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a 
Continent, trans. Cedric Belfrage (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997) 13. 
131 On January 27th, 2019 ISIS took credit for bombing a Catholic church during a Sunday mass in the Jolo Province 
of the Philippines.  Seventeen individuals were killed in the bombing and dozens more were wounded.  ISIS took 
credit for a second bombing that targeted soldiers nearby.  There is functionally no difference between what ISIS 
claims to be permitted to do to nonbelievers and what Catholics claimed to be permitted to do to nonbelievers. 
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 Interestingly, while we already know that Augustine cited his religious text, the Bible, 
when justifying his arguments we see that the disparity between texts, or rather the disparity 
between the interpretations of religious texts, can, and will, lead to problems.  More recently, but 
along a similar line of thought, ISIS wishes to return to the Caliph and return to the time of the 
Rashidun, a time when it believes Islam existed in its purest form.  In following the writings of 
Sayyid Qutb, specifically Qutb’s Milestones, ISIS believes a return to the Caliph is necessary for 
there to be correct adherence to Allah and his word, the Qur’ān.  Qutb, and those who subscribe to 
either his work or a similar way of thinking, believes that one must live this way in order to live 
righteously and in accordance with God.  We cannot be entirely dismissive of these ideas.  Afterall, 
the GWT has been declared by President Bush to be a battle between “good and evil.”  At a 
minimum he too has invoked the ideas of a transcendent morality of right and wrong.  At most he 
framed this as a battle of the respective followers of God and Taghut (Christianity calls him Satan), 
similarly to the way in which bin Laden and Qutb have framed this battle.  This rhetoric continues 
until this very day.  The current Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has openly said that we will 
fight until the rapture, the biblical rapture.132  Presenting his views on U.S. National Security, 
Mike Pompeo, addressing a church group in Wichita, Kansas, in 2014, said of terrorists and 
terrorism “they abhor Christians and will continue to press against us until we make sure that we 
pray and stand and fight and make sure that we know that Jesus Christ our savior is truly the only 
solution for our world.”  In this same speech he characterized the ongoing wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the GWT, as being “between the Christian West and the Islamic East.”  Former 
Attorney General, Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, III, has said, “I would cite you to the Apostle 
Paul and his clear and wise command in Romans 13, to obey the laws of the government because 
                                               
132 Mike Pompeo said this in 2015 during a speech in which he was essentially arguing against various policies 
originating from the progressive left. 
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God has ordained the government for his purposes.”  These are grown men, presumably rational 
men, modern-day politicians wielding unimaginable power and they are literally referencing 
ancient biblical language and citing to biblical passages as justification for their behavior and their 
policies in the twenty-first century.  As it turns out al Qaeda and ISIS’s presumptively irrational 
behavior, and supposed inability or unwillingness to reason clearly is not at all unique to Muslims 
in positions of leadership within al Qaeda and ISIS.  Americans, Christians, in positions of 
leadership within the U.S. government are pretty bad at it too. 
 At the broader international level, differing casus belli are argued by China and Russia, 
each of which has its own societal, political, cultural, and military traditions, any of which can 
provide the impetus for going to war.  If this is the case, then my research question is not simply 
one of academic concern.  It is of practical importance.  A greater understanding of the 
inadequacies and the limitations of JWT should lead to the conclusion that current development of 
international law is preferable to continuing down our current path. 
 For example, while the GWT can be looked at as a response to 9/11, 9/11 can itself be 
legitimately viewed as a response to U.S. foreign policy (bin Laden 2002; DABIQ Issue 15, 30).  
As I have attempted to make clear, determining whether nonstate actors are entitled to legal 
protections under the framework of JWT requires a preliminary assessment of the reasons for both 
parties engaging in their respective behavior.  In other words, a basic concern is whether a party is 
engaging in an act of aggression while the other party is engaging in self-defense.  More to the 
point, these largely philosophic questions require that a determination be made with respect to who 
is right, which is at once a legal and a moral concern. 
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 Speaking historically, at this point in time, any such undertaking which is to say any 
attempt to find a moral basis or a legal one will ultimately prove problematic for the West in 
general, and the U.S. specifically.  While the West, particularly Americans – especially 
considering that Americans have a poor understanding of history relative to the rest of the 
developed world – may no longer remember how it is that approximately five-percent of the global 
population came to control and consume approximately fifty-percent of global resources it is a 
pretty safe bet that the rest of the world remembers all too well.  At present, the U.S. is involved 
in what can accurately be called a forever war, which we now know was launched based entirely 
on lies.  The GWT is a war against an idea, against a tactic.  There is no traditional “front.”133  Nor 
are there traditional combatants.  To this point, in response to the question “How long can people 
be held?”, Donald Rumsfeld said “as long as the global war on terror lasts.”  The follow up question 
was “How will we know when the war is over?”  Rumsfeld said, “When there are no longer 
terrorist organizations of global reach left in the world.”  The U.S. repeatedly proclaims the factual 
absurdity that this is a war that can be won, and that combatants may be held until the cessation of 
hostilities if not outright victory.  With respect to the treatment of individuals detained in the GWT 
this is the entire point of my dissertation.  Eighteen years into this war, there is simply no end in 
sight.  To be fair, and to be clear, none of this began with Trump. 
 We need only go back to our founding as a republic.  The U.S. in a very real way owes its 
entire existence to colonization of indigenous people, the theft of land from those who already 
lived here, genocide of those indigenous people to allow for our expansion inward, and the 
enslavement of yet another people whose labor was then exploited without mercy to develop what 
                                               
133 In military parlance the “front” is where armed force – based on an unintentional boundary – is engaged in conflict 
with another armed force. 
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would be the U.S..  If I am to be completely honest, much of this is not taught in American schools, 
at least not in the form of a historical narrative predicated upon critical thought or inquiry.  Rather, 
facts are taught, largely isolated and seemingly unimportant, definitely without any moral 
judgments attached to said facts.  This is problematic for Americans because it does not allow 
them to understand why we find ourselves where we are.  The lack of this basic information makes 
it impossible for Americans to answer with any great sophistication the question put to us by our 
own government, “why do they hate us?”134  As early as 1958 we see ulterior motives at play in 
the Middle East.  Essentially setting the stage of what is to come that document indicates that 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the United Nations Secretary General, Dag 
Hammarskjold, discussed over lunch the question of economic development in the Middle East.  
Mr. Dulles, the very next day, called Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, John J. McCloy, to 
inform him of his discussion with Mr. Hammarskjöld the day before.  In the conversation between 
the Secretary of State Dulles, a representative of the U.S., and Mr. McCloy, a representative of 
private banking, Secretary of State Dulles said “Arab unity may make it more difficult for the oil 
companies to maintain a decent position there…” (1958, 1).  This dearth of information in 
American schools results in the silliness of Americans answering with an uninformed response of 
“they hate us for our freedoms.”  This silliness of thought, or lack of thought, means Americans 
can neither appreciate nor understand how the events of the past shapes the world of today.  This 
                                               
134 This question was asked somewhat rhetorically by President Bush in the aftermath of 9/11; however, it was asked 
in earnest by President Eisenhower.  President Eisenhower had his administration put together a study that would 
answer this question by giving an account of U.S. involvement overseas.  The result was document titled “Near East 
Region: January – July 1958: The United States and Radical Arab Nationalism; long-range U.S. Policy; the Crises of 
July 1958.” 
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is what Chalmers Johnson calls “blowback.”135  Consequently, as I have attempted to demonstrate, 
it is simply wrong to say things such as “well that is the past,” or “they think that way but not us.” 
 If we look internationally we are often told – as was argued many a time by many a 
professor in this very program – the U.S. is not an empire.  It should be noted that this is not limited 
to academics.  Donald Rumsfeld, in 2003, immediately after the U.S. launched the Iraq war, was 
asked if the war in Iraq was an action of imperialism.  Rumsfeld answered by rejecting the very 
premise of the question.  The U.S. “has never been an empire.  I don’t even know why you would 
ask the question” was his answer.  For the then Secretary of Defense to answer in such a way is 
tantamount to the sanctioning of American ignorance. 
 At the close of the nineteenth century, its conquest of this country complete, the U.S. 
moved into both the Caribbean and the pacific.  The U.S. took control of Puerto Rico and attempted 
to take control of Cuba.  In the Philippines the U.S. fought a colonial counterinsurgency.  If we 
jump ahead to WWII we see that what follows is a veritable master class in international relations 
duplicity if not outright hypocrisy.  WWII, Americans are taught, was fought in the name of 
democracy.  WWII, Americans are taught, was to usher into existence new norms of behavior.  It 
is out of this period of time that some of the documents to which I refer in this dissertation were 
                                               
135 "Blowback" is a term that was invented by the CIA.  It does not mean revenge.  “Blowback” refers to the unintended 
results of American actions abroad.  Chalmers Johnson goes further in explaining and contextualizing the reality of 
“Blowback” on the American public, which is to say Americans cannot put into context why a foreign power will be 
at all desirous of attacking the U.S..  One example of this is 9/11.  A second example of this is the ongoing conflict 
with Iran.  A not insignificant number of Americans have absolutely no idea the role the CIA played in the overthrow 
of the democratically elected Iranian government and the propping up of the brutal Iranian dictator, the Shah. 
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created.  As a result of WWII the world gets the Atlantic Charter,136 the UDHR, and even a “good 
neighbor” policy137 with respect to our interactions with Latin America. 
 Well, as is often the case, words written on paper wound up not being worth the paper on 
which they were written for some peoples.  Winston Churchill, that great savior of the West, wrote 
in the margins of the Atlantic Charter – the document that supposedly guarantees self-
determination – viewed this “as a guide not a rule.”138  More to the point, the Atlantic Charter, in 
addition to self-determination, guarantees that all nations will have access to all of the world’s 
resources (1941, Art. 4).  In many ways, this lays the predicate groundwork for powerful countries 
to get what they need from wherever the resources are located.  In other words, at precisely the 
moment in history when an end to colonialism is being promised we see the U.S. seizing new 
territories, and the enforcing of U.S. law and interests over foreign peoples. 
 Taken a step further, George Kennan, the arguable progenitor of the policy of containment 
in the cold war, writes a memo in 1948 that makes clear the rationale for U.S. foreign policy going 
forward.  He writes 
… we have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. 
This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of 
Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and 
resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of 
relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity 
without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have 
to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will 
have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. 
We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of 
altruism and world-benefaction (1948, 10). 
                                               
136 The Atlantic Charter was a policy statement issued during WWII on August 14, 1941.  It defined the allied goals 
for the post-war world. 
137 The Good Neighbor policy was created by Franklin Roosevelt’s administration toward Latin America.  The policy 
stood for the principle of both non-intervention and non-interference in Latin America. 
138 See House of Commons Debate, Vol. 408 c.794, 21  February 1945. 
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 This is a clear precursor to the identical idea contained in the 2002 NSS.139  To the point 
being made here, this colonial behavior leads to anti-colonial insurgencies.  Arguably one such 
anti-colonial insurgency is the Vietnam War.  Ho Chi Minh, President of the Vietnam Democratic 
Republic, essentially invoking the Atlantic Charter, sent a telegram to the Truman administration 
wherein he wrote, “I respectfully request you to interfere for an immediate solution of the 
Vietnamese issue.  The people of Vietnam earnestly hopes that the great American Republic would 
help us to conquer full independence and support us in our reconstruction work” (1946, 3).  
Historically speaking, we know that was not the case.  In fact, unbeknownst to Ho Chi Minh the 
U.S. was already assisting French combat troops in Vietnam.  Understandably, in the absence of 
assistance from the West the Vietnamese fought for self-determination for the next twenty years. 
 Unfortunately, the Vietnam War was not the first time the U.S. endeavored to intervene, or 
undermine, a foreign government – democratic or otherwise – for its own interests.  A non-
exhaustive list evidences the following interventions 
1948:  Elections in France & Italy 
1951 – 54: Regime change in Iran & Guatemala  
1957:  Attempted regime change/bribes Syria & Indonesia 
1958 – 63: Destabilization / Assassination plot in Iraq 
1960 – 61: Regime change / Assassination plots in Congo & DR 
1959 – 63: Failed regime change in Cuba 
1962:  Elections in Brazil 
1962:  Regime change in British Guiana & Haiti 
1954 – 63: Installed, propped up, removed President of South Vietnam 
1955 – 70s:  Propped up Government in Japan 
1970 – 73: Assassination of Salvador Allende & regime change in Chile 
1967 – 74: Support provided to “the Colonels” junta in Greece 
1980 – 85: Attempted regime change in Nicaragua 
1991 – 03: Attempted / Failed “covert” regime change in Iraq 
2002 – Prsnt: Afghanistan & Iraq / Venezuela / Iran, etc. 
 
                                               
139 The 2002 NSSM specifically states, “This is also a time of opportunity for America.  We will work to translate this 
moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty.  The U.S. national security strategy will be based 
on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests” (2002, 1). 
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 The Harvard academic and political scientist referenced above, Samuel Huntington, 
beyond writing a profoundly poignant and prophetic academic paper, authored a report, The Crisis 
of Democracy, for the Trilateral Commission140 in the 1970s.  In this report Huntington argued 
that the world was undergoing an “excess of democracy” (1975, 13).  Huntington believed that 
“people no longer felt the same compulsion to obey those they previously considered - superior to 
themselves in age, rank, status, expertise, character, or talents” (1975, 75).  This same attitude it 
seems extends to foreign countries.  Peoples cannot be left to decide for themselves their own 
future, their own destinies.  When it comes to self-determination, the Moirai are alive and well in 
the form of the U.S. 
 I bring up these many historical examples to provide evidence for the fact that American 
unilateralism in the context of U.S. foreign policy did not begin with Trump.  Nor did it begin with 
President George W. Bush.  This conceptualization of U.S. foreign policy spans many decades and 
witnesses American Presidents from both sides of the ideological spectrum continuing its 
implementation.  On June 27, 1970, when speaking to the Forty Committee, the secret operations 
group that he led, Henry Kissinger was correct it seems when he stated rhetorically of the Chilean 
elections that ushered Salvador Allende into power 
I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due 
to the irresponsibility of its people.  The issues are much too important for 
the Chilean voter to be left to decide for themselves (1970). 
 
This idea seems to really come together under President Reagan’s administration.  Under President 
Reagan we see a renaissance of covert military operations and interventions in our hemisphere.  
                                               
140 According to the Trilateral Commission website, it is “… a non-governmental, policy-oriented forum that brings 
together leaders in their individual capacity from the worlds of business, government, academia, press and media, as 
well as civil society” that supposedly shares “… a firm belief in the values of rule of law, democratic government, 
human rights, freedom of speech and free enterprise that underpin human progress.” 
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The Atlantic Charter, it seems, is dead.  The good neighbor policy, it seems, is dead.  What is now 
standard operating procedure are the wars taking place in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Cuba, 
Venezuela,141 etc. 
 In this historical context the questions I ask are important precisely because they are not 
entirely simply theoretical questions at the very heart of jurisprudence and legal theory.  The 
qualifications set by JWT, qualifications such as “is an act just?” are problematic.  For example, if 
an otherwise nonstate actor lives in a country that sees its democratic leader overthrown and a 
dictator installed – as in the case of Salvador Allende in Chile, Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran, 
Arbenz in Guatemala – are the individuals living therein terrorists when they decide to bring the 
fight to the U.S.?  On the other hand, I am perfectly comfortable saying unequivocally that they 
are not terrorists when they decide to fight back against (i) their illegitimate government at home, 
and (ii) the country that in his speech Beyond Vietnam the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King once 
called “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today” (1967).  To the extent that they are 
nonstate actors they can argue – rather convincingly – that their state no longer exists.  On the 
other hand, it can be a very simple, rather straightforward analysis.  If only states can go to war, 
then these individual nonstate actors are simply violating the criminal law of the state in which 
they attack.  If they conspired with someone outside of the U.S. they can seek out these individuals 
                                               
141 As of January 30, 2019, the U.S. is openly discussing overthrowing President Maduro in Venezuela.  Despite 
receiving precisely zero votes in any election whatsoever, ever, Donald Trump has decided to recognize Juan Gerardo 
Guaidó Márquez, President of the National Assembly of Venezuela, as the “legitimate” President of Venezuela.  John 
Bolton is regularly on Fox News spouting off foreign policy non-sequiturs.  For example, most recently, Bolton 
referred to President Maduro as a “dictator.”  President Maduro won an election and received a substantial number of 
votes in doing so.  Bolton, on Fox News, has also said “I think we’re trying to get to the same end result here.  
Venezuela is one of the three countries I call the troika of tyranny.  It’ll make a big difference to the United States 
economically if we could have American oil companies invested in and produce the oil capabilities in Venezuela.”  
The U.S., it seems, no longer feels the need to even bother with pretense.  It is openly discussed on the news that the 
CIA is speaking to members of the Venezuelan military to organize and orchestrate a coup d’ etat.  Venezuela has the 
largest proven oil reserve in the world.  The U.S. wants it.  The U.S. will take it.  U.S. foreign policy really is that 
simple.  Now, if a Venezuelan individual suffers as a result of the U.S. backed overthrow of his government, and he 
decides to visit pain and suffering to America or Americans, he is not a terrorist. 
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and try them in either an international or a domestic court of law.  To do otherwise is to engage in 
a philosophical dispute regarding the relative justness or unjustness of a given side’s cause.  To 
engage in this type of behavior is to engage in folly, a fool’s errand.  Instead let us turn them over 
to jurists who sit in judgment based on the rule of law.  The procedural protections afforded 
individuals accused of violating international criminal law, on the other hand, has been established 
and largely agreed to by almost every state in the world.142  We must note that to the extent that 
resentment against the U.S. builds because the U.S. is views itself above the law it will not be 
alleviated by the U.S. proclaiming itself above the law. 
 Insofar as answers to these questions govern our foreign policy decisions they have real-
world consequences.  Therefore, an almost blind adherence to the traditional answers to these 
questions result in both conceptual incoherence and a misguided pursuit of justice.  With respect 
to rights, protections, and their corresponding duties and legal vulnerabilities, in the limited context 
of the law, humanity is better served by the international law shifting its focus from the state as its 
main unit of analysis toward the individual as the main focal point as advocated by the UDHR.  If 
we acknowledge that the international community, in the form of both courts and tribunals, and 
international non-profit non-governmental organizations, now accept, almost without question, 
that individuals have internationally legally recognizable individual rights by virtue of their 
humanity, not by virtue of their being citizens of a state, then we see that the predicate groundwork 
already exists.  We need only go a step farther. 
 While the nation-state is the main actor at the level of international relations, I take it as a 
given that individual nonstate actors nevertheless have both rights and responsibilities under 
                                               
142 The United States actively undermines the ICC wherever and whenever it can despite proclaiming to any who will 
listen that it is both the one indispensable nation, a nation of laws, and the greatest county in the world. 
143 
 
international law.  Because the international community no longer balks at the idea that individuals 
are entitled to international rights under customary international law individuals are increasingly 
seen to have obligations to the international community that cannot be violated with legal 
impunity.  This is so even when the law recognizes an individual as having broken away from a 
state.  This is supposedly so even in the case of a head-of-state.  I readily admit that not everyone 
agrees with the notion of universal legal jurisdiction.  In The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 
published in Foreign Affairs, Henry Kissinger argued very much against the notion of universal 
jurisdiction (2001).  This is quite clear under international law.  For example, under Article 25 of 
the Rome Statute, international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes 
will result in legal liability and legal accountability directly upon any individual.   And legal 
liability is not at all contingent upon whether individuals act through states or act as nonstate actors 
(2002, 1-3).  Under the Rome Statute legal liability attaches because of the nature of the act, not 
the legal or political status of the actor (2002, 1-3).  In this way individuals are already bound by 
both customary and codified international law. 
 As stated above, this development of the applicability of international law to nonstate 
actors has been rapid and sophisticated (Fassbender and Peters 2012).  By way of review, a 
complex catalogue of crimes, as well as rules concerning individual responsibility and joint 
criminal enterprise, has developed under the international criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2002), and Cambodia (2006).  As an example 
of the expanding nature of international law, individual criminal responsibility now clearly applies 
beyond the context of armed conflicts.  Article 25 of the Rome Statute makes it clear that individual 
criminal responsibility now extends to crimes against humanity or genocide.  Moreover, in some 
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cases, international criminal law has been used to prosecute various individuals for various crimes 
under international law.143 
 Finally, for reasons I have argued, I believe that international law grounded by JWT, 
especially in the context of the GWT, is simply untenable insofar as it always requires an 
assessment of the philosophical merits of casus belli.  JWT requires one to engage in an assessment 
of the deductive soundness of what are little more than appeals to natural law and religious 
argumentation seeking validation in and of God and thus justification for killing one’s enemies.  
Lastly, I suggest that JWT applied to the American GWT is a confused endeavor, philosophically 
problematic because it essentially relies on the Bush Doctrine and therefore is destined to fail, 
certainly destined to neither halt nor prevent either further acts of terror or political violence.  
Instead of the preventive posture of current U.S. foreign policy, driven by a desire for hegemony 
or global domination, enforced by the military, the U.S. would be better served by simply 
acknowledging that the current fight against terrorism is best conceptualized as a criminal matter 
and not as a war.  Therefore, the time has come for JWT to be abandoned and replaced by the 
aspirational components of the UDHR, which is already delineated in various international legal 
institutions, where proper political authority is of no consequence and one’s humanity, not his 
political status, is recognized and protected. 
 A more prudent course of action would be to lead by example, ascend the Rome Statute, 
which creates the ICC, and play by the same rules as everyone else.  Acts of violence will never 
stop.  Rumsfeld’s definition of when the GWT will end is the very height of idiocy.  The U.S. 
could nevertheless recapture the proverbial moral high-ground and come to be seen as acting justly 
                                               
143 The website for the ICC indicates that it has 28 current cases that it is prosecuting. 
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once again.  On the other hand if the U.S. chooses to continue down its current course of action it 
can, and rightfully should expect more of the same with respect to violent responses.  Someone 
once famously said that “insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a 
different outcome.”144  By this definition the behavior of the U.S. qualifies as insane for a multitude 
of reasons.  Continuing to engage in a persistent, demonstrably counterproductive way that is at 
least as old as Thucydides undermines America’s supposed goals.  America’s behavior runs 
counter to the shifting international public opinion and emerging interpretative understanding of 
the customary and codified international law.  To do this and yet expect the geopolitical landscape 
to get better is at least wishful thinking, at most outright insanity.  Add to this the fact that one 
group is sitting in judgment of another group’s proclaimed divine authority with nothing by way 
of actual evidence beyond a verbal utterance to support their admittedly absurd claim is not at all 
disqualifying philosophically speaking, for the dictates of Islam are on their face no more or less 
patently absurd than the dictates of Christianity when argued as justifications for killing people 
and destroying countries.  In the words of John Adams 
Power always sincerely, conscientiously, de tres bon Foi, believes itself 
Right.  Power always thinks it has a great Soul, and vast Views, beyond the 
Comprehension of the Weak; and that it is doing God's Service, when it is 
violating all his Laws.145 
 
 
 
                                               
144 This quote is often credited to Albert Einstein; however, no proof exists to establish this. 
145 Adams to Jefferson, February 2,1816, in Lester Cappon, ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters, vol. 2 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 463 
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“Contemporary Issues with the Fourth Amendment:  Real World Application of the Fourth 
Amendment vs. Legal Philosophy and Constitutional Law Theory” – Lecture given at Spring 
Valley High School, Las Vegas, NV. 
 
“International Relations Theory and International Law in Practice” – Lecture given at Leadership 
and Law Preparatory Academy, Canyon Springs, Las Vegas, NV. 
 
“International Law: A Survey” – Lecture at Leadership and Law Preparatory Academy, Canyon 
Springs, Las Vegas, NV. 
 
“U.S. Foreign Policy: A Philosophic Perspective” – Lecture given at University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas, in Prof. Eugene O’Neal’s Political Science 101 (American Government course). 
 
“U.S. Foreign Policy (1943 – 2012) – Lecture given at University of Nevada, Las Vegas, in Prof. 
Eugene O’Neal’s Political Science 101 (American Government course). 
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“Civic Responsibility, Education, and Pride in the Las Vegas Latino Community” – Lecture at the 
College of Southern Nevada, Cheyenne Campus. 
 
“Plea Bargaining and the American Criminal Justice System” – Lecture at University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas, in Prof. Rebecca D. Gill’s Political Science 332 (Judicial Process course). 
 
 
Works in Progress:   
 
Non-state Actors and International Law: Just War Theory or the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights? 
 
The Trolley Car Fallacy: An introduction to Evo-Socio Theory and a reexamination of the 
underlying assumptions of philosophy of law, political philosophy, and moral theory. 
 
International Law: A Legal and Philosophical Primer. 
 
Political Theory vs. Political Reality: The Unintended Consequences and Real World Implications 
of U.S. Foreign Policy and Political and Legal Theory. 
 
Reviewer:  
 
Liang, Bin and Hong Lu (eds). In Press. Chapter 9: The Abolitionist and Retentionist Debate. In 
China’s Death Penalty in Transition: Policy, Practice, Challenge and Reform. Columbia University 
Press.  
 
 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Human Rights & Social Justice Center, Inc. (2016 – current): 
Chairman of the Board, President, & CEO 
 
A not-for-profit corporation providing education and training opportunities to both law students 
and lawyers in order to advance greater social justice.  The HRSJC also coordinates access to free 
legal services to the most vulnerable members of our society. 
 
 
RESEARCH INTERESTS/AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION 
 
Criminal Law 
Political Violence and Terrorism Studies 
Legal Theory; Philosophy of Law; Political Theory; Moral and Social Philosophy. 
International Relations and International Relations Theory 
International Law: 
(i) International Human Rights Law, 
(ii) International Law of Armed Conflict, 
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(iii) International Criminal Law. 
Trial Advocacy and courts  
 
 
HONORS 
 
Awarded a UNLV Outstanding Teacher Award. 
 
Nominated by the Political Science Department for consideration for the Graduate Student Teacher 
Award for outstanding teaching. 
 
Nominated by Dr. David Fott for the College of Liberal Arts Dean’s Graduate Student Award. 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
 
Pi Sigma Alpha – National Political Science Honor Society 
Phi Kappa Phi – National All-Disciplines Honor Society 
American Political Science Association 
International Studies Association 
British International Studies Association 
 
 
MILITARY TRAINING 
 
United States Coast Guard (Honorably Discharged: 1994) - Seaman, Onboard Primary Rescue 
Swimmer, Secondary Fire Fighter, and Rescue Team Secondary Leader – U.S. Coast Guard Cutter 
Assateague.  Advanced Training: Rescue Swimmer; Drug Enforcement Officer; and Special 
Weapons Operations.  Stationed at U.S. Coast Guard base Honolulu, Hawaii.   
 
 
SKILLS & CERTIFICATIONS 
 
Fluent in Spanish 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
David Fott, Ph.D. 
Professor, Political Science; Dissertation Chair: 702.895.4187   dfott@unlv.nevada.edu 
 
Joel Lieberman, Ph.D. 
Department Chair and Professor, Criminal Justice: 702.895.0249   jdl@unlv.nevada.edu 
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Hong Lu, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor, Criminal Justice: 702.895.0242   hong.lu@unlv.edu 
 
John Tuman, Ph.D. 
Department Chair and Professor, Political Science: 702.895.5258   john.tuman@unlv.edu 
 
Michael Bowers, Ph.D. Professor, Political Science: 702.895.3141   michael.bowers@unlv.edu 
 
Mehran Tamadonfar, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor, Political Science:  702.895.3318   mehran.tamadonfar@unlv.edu 
 
Tiffiany Howard, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor, Political Science: 702.895.3354   tiffiany.howard@unlv.edu 
 
David Damore, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor, Political Science: 702.895.3217   david.damore@unlv.edu 
 
Mark J. Lutz, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor, Political Science: 702.895.2899   mark.lutz@unlv.edu 
 
Johnathan R. Strand, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor and Graduate Coordinator: 702.895.3356   jonathan.strand@unlv.edu 
 
Mario Conte, Esq. 
Co-Founder, LL.M. in Trial Advocacy: 619.515.1510   mconte@cwsl.edu 
 
Justin Brooks, Esq. 
Co-Founder and Director, LL.M. in Trial Advocacy: 619.525.7079   jbrooks@cwsl.edu 
 
 
